These are detected changes in cable 09BAGHDAD3195 based on small subset of available CableGate WikiLeak torrents.
WikiLeaks was willing to hide this from you. But cats has found following changes in 09BAGHDAD3195:
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 09:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 10:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 11:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 12:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 13:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 14:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 15:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 16:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 17:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 18:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 19:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 19:54, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 20:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 21:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 22:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 02, 2010 23:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 00:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 01:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 02:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 03:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 04:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 05:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 06:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 07:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 08:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 09:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 09:03, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 09:54, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 10:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 11:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 12:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 12:51, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 13:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 14:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 is missing on December 03, 2010 15:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD3195 was restored on December 04, 2010 12:47
Changed on December 04, 2010 12:47 compared to December 02, 2010 08:01
`VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGB #3195/01 3480957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140957Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5706
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Monday, 14 December 2009, 09:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PECON, PREL, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf’'s social,
economic, political and military circles discussed with
Post’'s Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of
Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia
clerical establishment (Marja’'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah
Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province’'s
farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized
produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a
premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an
influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi
political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary
of Sistani’'s social and political clout among Shias, notably
in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah’'s rejection of the Iranian
regime’'s adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END
SUMMARY
¶2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf, [Slocal interlocutors,
including the province's head of military intelligence; the
chairman of the Provincial Council; a well-connected] Shia
businessman; the president of the farmer's union; the chief
judge of the province; and a representative of the local
Chamber of Commerce shared their views on the state of
political and economic development in the province and Iran’'s
role.
Provincial Council Chairman
---------------------------
¶3. (C) [NSheikh Fayedh al-Shimerri, the Chaireman of Najaf's
Provincial Council, a religious cleric turned] politician and
member of Maliki's State of Law coalition asserted that
Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly
frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq’'s
neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the
biggest culprits, but noted that a “"mental revolution”" was
underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to
undermine the country’'s stability, pointing to such trends in
Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and
Mosul against the Turks.
¶4. (C) [NaAl-Shime removed]ri echoed other interlocutors’' concerns
about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a
political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed
the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition
comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and
the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI’'s
image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.
¶5. (C) [NaAl-Shime removed]ri expressed concerns about rumors
circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist
conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless
rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship.
(NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also
mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held
in Washington in February. END NOTE).
Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
----------------------------
¶6. (C) [NMamejor Uday, a premovincial military intelligence
officer and] Maliki supporter, described Iran as a threat to
Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government’'s
(IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order
to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for
its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq’'s
potential influence in the region, and will continue to
support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine
Iraq. “"Iran does not offer its support for free,”" [NUdamey removed]
noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in
exchange for Iranian support.
¶7. (C) [NUdamy is supportive of Maliki's decision to foremgove (at
Q7. (C) Ud]ay is supportive of Maliki’'s decision to forego (at
least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is
dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining
the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security
institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill
key security positions with their own supporters, many of
whom are unprofessional and sectarian, [NUdame removed]y cautioned. The
Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to
maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to [N
Udame removed]y. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran’'s hit
list (NOTE: According to [NUdame removed]y, Iran had already assassinated
180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).
¶8. (C) [Name removeUd]ay also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements
often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of
supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism
unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He
asserted that Najaf's police chief, Abd Al-Karim (aka Abu
Ahmad Al-Miyahi), is a "former" member of Badr with dubious
loyalties. [Namjaf's chief justice, Kareem Faroovn, a
well-respected] judge also alleged that the Iraqi police were
responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in
November. “"He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is
still part of the militia (Badr),”" [NamJudge Faremooved]n asserted.
Sistani: “"What Do the Americans Want?”"
----QDI>RpQd%’'MkQQto pulse the cleric on
his views about matters of political consequence. [NKelamnte removed]
explained that Sistani’'s son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the
main conduit of information between his father whenever a
religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia
imams in the country.
¶12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll
in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG
infiltration, [NKelamnte removed] asserted. [NKelamnte removed] himself is
suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams
of the holy Abbas and Husayn shrines in Karbala, Shaykhs
Karbal'aie and Safi, were “"in the pocket of the Iranians”",
despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.
The Sadrists
------------
¶13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, [NKelamnte removed] recalled fondly his
time as a student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada
Al-Sadr’'s father), commenting that, unlike his radical son,
the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his
father’'s legacy. [NaAl-Shimme removed]i also praised the efforts of
Sadr’'s father and sought to distinguish between “"good”" and “
"bad”" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr’'s father. [N
Mame remjover Ud]ay believes the Sadrists are politically weak and
continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own
groups. (NOTE: [NMame remjover Ud]ay believes [NaAl-Shimme aremoved]i is a closet
Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki’'s coalition. [Na
Al-Shimme aremoved]i commented that the Iranians had told the wayward
Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).
Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
--------------------------------------------- --
¶14. (C) [Jabar Al-Garawi, the head of Najaf's Farme rems' Unioved]n
commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his
increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in
improving security. However, he complained that Iran and
Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by
flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce
that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.
¶15. (C) Iraq’'s neighbors were pursuing such measures in
order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling
the continued success of Iraq’'s new democracy, [NAl-Game removed]awi
alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water
shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels,
outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted. [N
Al-Game removed]awi confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had
recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into
Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60
percent of Najaf’'s labor force works in agriculture. The
sector is the province’'s most important revenue generating
industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).
¶16. (C) [Samira Al-Halawi, an outspoken female member of the
Najaf Chamber of Commerce, having recently returned from a
USG-sponsovred] visitors program in the U.S., railed against
Iran’'s pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that
many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in
the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians. [Name remov
Shed] also criticized Iraqi politicians “"for being ignorant
and overly-reliant on clerics”" for their political welfare.
COMMENT
-------
¶17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries
significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to
expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The
city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to
profit spiritually and financially from the city’'s religious
and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and
acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran’'s influence,
albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into
mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran
will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order
to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of
its ability to influence the ways of the Marja’'iyyah are more
limited, particularly during Sistani’'s tenure, given the
clerical establishment’'s unrivaled theocratic and geographic
prominence when compared to its “"sister city”" Qom.
HILL
`
Changed on December 05, 2010 19:45 compared to December 05, 2010 10:16
`VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGB #3195/01 3480957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140957Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5706
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PECON, PREL, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf'’s social,
economic, political and military circles discussed with
Post'’s Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of
Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia
clerical establishment (Marja'’iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah
Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province'’s
farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized
produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a
premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an
influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi
political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary
of Sistani'’s social and political clout among Shias, notably
in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah'’s rejection of the Iranian
regime'’s adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END
SUMMARY
¶2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf, local interlocutors,
including the province's head of military intelligence; the
chairman of the Provincial Council; a well-connected Shia
businessman; the president of the farmer's union; the chief
judge of the province; and a representative of the local
Chamber of CommerceXXXXXXXXXXXX shared their views on the state of
political and economic development in the province and Iran'’s
role.
Provincial Council Chairman
---------------------------
¶3. (C) SheikhXXXXXXXXXXXX Fayedh al-Shimerri, the Chairman of Najaf's
Provincial Council, a religious cleric turned politician and
member of Maliki's State of Law coalition asserted that
Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly
frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq'’s
neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the
biggest culprits, but noted that a "“mental revolution"” was
underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to
undermine the country'’s stability, pointing to such trends in
Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and
Mosul against the Turks.
¶4. (C) Al-ShimerriXXXXXXXXXXXX echoed other interlocutors'’ concerns
about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a
political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed
the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition
comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and
the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI'’s
image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.
¶5. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX Al-Shimerri expressed concerns about rumors
circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist
conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless
rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship.
(NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also
mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held
in Washington in February. END NOTE).
Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
----------------------------
¶6. (C) MajorXXXXXXXXXXXX Uday, a provincial military intelligence
officer and Maliki supporter, described Iran as a threat to
Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government'’s
(IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order
to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for
its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq'’s
potential influence in the region, and will continue to
support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine
Iraq. "“Iran does not offer its support for free,"” UdayXXXXXXXXXXXX
noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in
exchange for Iranian support.
¶7. (C) UdayXXXXXXXXXXXX is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
Q7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki'’s decision to forego (at
least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is
dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining
the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security
institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill
key security positions with their own supporters, many of
whom are unprofessional and sectarian, UdayXXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned. The
Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to
maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to
UdayXXXXXXXXXXXX . Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran'’s hit
list (NOTE: According to UdayXXXXXXXXXXXX , Iran had already assassinated
180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).
¶8. (C) UdayXXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements
often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of
supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism
unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He
asserted that Najaf's police chief, Abd Al-Karim (aka Abu
Ahmad Al-Miyahi), is a "former" member of Badr with dubious
loyalties. Najaf's chief justice, Kareem Faroon, a
well-respectedXXXXXXXXXXXX judge also alleged that the Iraqi police were
responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in
November. "“He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is
still part of the militia (Badr),"” JudgeXXXXXXXXXXXX Faroon asserted.
Sistani: "“What Do the Americans Want?"”
----QDI>RpQd%'’MkQQto pulse the cleric on
his views about matters of political consequence. KelanterXXXXXXXXXXXX
explained that Sistani'’s son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the
main conduit of information between his father whenever a
religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia
imams in the country.
¶12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll
in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG
infiltration, KelanterXXXXXXXXXXXX asserted. KelanterXXXXXXXXXXXX himself is
suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams
of the holy Abbas and Husayn shrines in Karbala, Shaykhs
Karbal'aie and Safi, were "“in the pocket of the Iranians"”,
despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.
The Sadrists
------------
¶13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, KelanterXXXXXXXXXXXX recalled fondly his
time as a studentXXXXXXXXXXXX of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada
Al-Sadr'’s father), commenting that, unlike his radical son,
the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his
father'’s legacy. Al-ShimmeriXXXXXXXXXXXX also praised the efforts of
Sadr'’s father and sought to distinguish between "“good"” and
"“bad"” Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr'’s father.
M[Najorme Uremoveday] believes the Sadrists are politically weak and
continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own
groups. (NOTE: MajorXXXXXXXXXXXX Uday believes Al-ShimmariXXXXXXXXXXXX is a closet
Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki'’s coalition.
Al-ShimmariXXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the Iranians had told the wayward
Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).
Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
--------------------------------------------- --
¶14. (C) Jabar Al-Garawi, the head of Najaf's Farmers'XXXXXXXXXXXX Union
commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his
increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in
improving security. However, he complained that Iran and
Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by
flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce
that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.
¶15. (C) Iraq'’s neighbors were pursuing such measures in
order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling
the continued success of Iraq'’s new democracy, Al-GarawiXXXXXXXXXXXX
alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water
shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels,
outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted.
Al-GarawiXXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had
recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into
Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60
percent of Najaf'’s labor force works in agriculture. The
sector is the province'’s most important revenue generating
industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).
¶16. (C) Samira Al-Halawi, an outspoken female member of the
Najaf Chamber of Commerce, having recently returned from a
USG-sponsored visitors program in theXXXXXXXXXXXX U.S., railed against
Iran'’s pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that
many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in
the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians.
She[ also criticized Iraqi politicians "“for being ignorant
and overly-reliant on clerics"” for their political welfare.
COMMENT
-------
¶17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries
significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to
expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The
city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to
profit spiritually and financially from the city'’s religious
and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and
acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran'’s influence,
albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into
mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran
will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order
to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of
its ability to influence the ways of the Marja'’iyyah are more
limited, particularly during Sistani'’s tenure, given the
clerical establishment'’s unrivaled theocratic and geographic
prominence when compared to its "“sister city"” Qom.
HILL
`
Changed on December 06, 2010 11:59 compared to December 06, 2010 01:38
`VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGB #3195/01 3480957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140957Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5706
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PECON, PREL, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf’'s social,
economic, political and military circles discussed with
Post’'s Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of
Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia
clerical establishment (Marja’'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah
Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province’'s
farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized
produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a
premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an
influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi
political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary
of Sistani’'s social and political clout among Shias, notably
in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah’'s rejection of the Iranian
regime’'s adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END
SUMMARY
¶2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf, XXXXXXXXXXXXlocal interlocutors,
including the province's head of military intelligence; the
chairman of the Provincial Council; a well-connected Shia
businessman; the president of the farmer's union; the chief
judge of the province; and a representative of the local
Chamber of Commerce shared their views on the state of
political and economic development in the province and Iran’'s
role.
Provincial Council Chairman
---------------------------
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXSheikh Fayedh al-Shimerri, the Chairman of Najaf's
Provincial Council, a religious cleric turned politician and
member of Maliki's State of Law coalition asserted that
Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly
frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq’'s
neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the
biggest culprits, but noted that a “"mental revolution”" was
underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to
undermine the country’'s stability, pointing to such trends in
Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and
Mosul against the Turks.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX Al-Shimerri echoed other interlocutors’' concerns
about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a
political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed
the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition
comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and
the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI’'s
image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.
¶5. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX Al-Shimerri expressed concerns about rumors
circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist
conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless
rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship.
(NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also
mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held
in Washington in February. END NOTE).
Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
----------------------------
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXMajor Uday, a provincial military intelligence
officer and Maliki supporter, described Iran as a threat to
Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government’'s
(IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order
to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for
its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq’'s
potential influence in the region, and will continue to
support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine
Iraq. “"Iran does not offer its support for free,”" XXXXXXXXXXXXUday
noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in
exchange for Iranian support.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXUday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
Q7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki’'s decision to forego (at
least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is
dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining
the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security
institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill
key security positions with their own supporters, many of
whom are unprofessional and sectarian, XXXXXXXXXXXX Uday cautioned. The
Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to
maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX
Uday. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran’'s hit
list (NOTE: According to XXXXXXXXXXXX Uday, Iran had already assassinated
180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX Uday also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements
often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of
supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism
unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He
asserted that Najaf's XXXXXXXXXXXXpolice chief, Abd Al-Karim (aka Abu
Ahmad Al-Miyahi), is a "former" member of Badr with dubious
loyalties. Najaf's chief justice, Kareem Faroon, a
well-respected judge also alleged that the Iraqi police were
responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in
November. “"He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is
still part of the militia (Badr),”" XXXXXXXXXXXXJudge Faroon asserted.
Sistani: “"What Do the Americans Want?”"
----QDI>RpQd%’'MkQQto pulse the cleric on
his views about matters of political consequence.XXXXXXXXXXXX Kelanter
explained that Sistani’'s son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the
main conduit of information between his father whenever a
religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia
imams in the country.
¶12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll
in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG
infiltration, XXXXXXXXXXXX Kelanter asserted. XXXXXXXXXXXX Kelanter himself is
suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams
of the holy Abbas and Husayn shrines in Karbala, Shaykhs
Karbal'aie and Safi, were “"in the pocket of the Iranians”",
despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.
The Sadrists
------------
¶13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, XXXXXXXXXXXX Kelanter recalled XXXXXXXXXXXXfondly his
time as a student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada
Al-Sadr’'s father), commenting that, unlike his radical son,
the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his
father’'s legacy. XXXXXXXXXXXXAl-Shimmeri also praised the efforts of
Sadr’'s father and sought to distinguish between “"good”" and “
"bad”" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr’'s father. [N
Mame remjover Ud]ay believes the Sadrists are politically weak and
continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own
groups. (NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXXMajor Uday believes XXXXXXXXXXXX Al-Shimmari is a closet
Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki’'s coalition. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Al-Shimmari commented that the Iranians had told the wayward
Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).
Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
--------------------------------------------- --
¶14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXJabar Al-Garawi, the head of Najaf's Farmers' Union
commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his
increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in
improving security. However, he complained that Iran and
Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by
flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce
that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.
¶15. (C) Iraq’'s neighbors were pursuing such measures in
order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling
the continued success of Iraq’'s new democracy, XXXXXXXXXXXX Al-Garawi
alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water
shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels,
outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Al-Garawi confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had
recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into
Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60
percent of Najaf’'s labor force works in agriculture. The
sector is the province’'s most important revenue generating
industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).
¶16. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXSamira Al-Halawi, an outspoken female member of the
Najaf Chamber of Commerce, having recently returned from a
USG-sponsored visitors program in the U.S., railed against
Iran’'s pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that
many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in
the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians. [
She also criticized Iraqi politicians “"for being ignorant
and overly-reliant on clerics”" for their political welfare.
COMMENT
-------
¶17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries
significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to
expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The
city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to
profit spiritually and financially from the city’'s religious
and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and
acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran’'s influence,
albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into
mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran
will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order
to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of
its ability to influence the ways of the Marja’'iyyah are more
limited, particularly during Sistani’'s tenure, given the
clerical establishment’'s unrivaled theocratic and geographic
prominence when compared to its “"sister city”" Qom.
HILL
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