These are detected changes in cable 09PARIS1097 based on small subset of available CableGate WikiLeak torrents.
WikiLeaks was willing to hide this from you. But cats has found following changes in 09PARIS1097:
Changed on December 01, 2010 18:01 compared to December 01, 2010 17:01
`VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #1097/01 2241402
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121402Z AUG 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6952
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T PARIS 001097
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TAG)
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC FR
SUBJECT: IRAN: FRENCH COMMENTS ON DEALING WITH HOSTAGES
REF: PARIS 1046
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: President Sarkozy's Strategic Affairs
Advisor Franois Richier and MFA Middle East Director (A/S
equivalent) Patrice Paoli told Political Minister Counselor
in separate meetings August 11 that the French approached
their hostage situations in Iran by first seeking an
immediate, behind-the-scenes resolution before the Iranians
brought charges against their captives, and then, once that
approach failed, by adopting a two-pronged strategy: (1)
relentlessly publicizing the cases with repeated employment
of key words chosen carefully to put the Iranians on the
defensive, and (2) constant exertion of diplomatic and
political pressure, with the help of allies, in the form of
regular demarches in Tehran and convocations of Iranian
Ambassadors in European and Middle Eastern capitals. Paoli
and Richier predicted that the Iranians will advise us, via
the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet while waiting for Iranian
legal procedures to move forward. Ignore this warning, they
insisted, because silence will not expedite the process.
They argued that USG statements and actions can sway and even
mobilize public opinion within Iran. Whether or not we
choose to speak out, they warned, the Iranians will
energetically disseminate fabricated accusations. As the USG
seeks to engage the Iranians, Richier predicted it will be
difficult to determine which Iranian institution currently
has control of American hostages and, more importantly, which
one has the authority to decide their fate. The French still
have not identified a key broker within the Iranian
government with the power to resolve their own hostage cases.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Paoli and Richier also warned of
possible Iranian efforts to blackmail the USG. They may try,
for instance, to drag out the cases of the American and
French hostages through the US/EU late September deadline for
a response from the regime on the nuclear issue. Richier
said the French believe this familiar Iranian tactic --
hostage-taking as political blackmail -- will only increase
in the near future. The Iranians may also seek specific
exchanges, such as the release from French custody of Majid
Kakavand, an Iranian national whom the French arrested March
20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on the behalf of the U.S.
Department of Justice on proliferation issues. Overall, as
the USG prepares to handle its hostage cases, the French
recommended we prepare for uncertainty. In the face of
unpredictable Iranian behavior, Paoli and Richier said that
constant pressure from foreign leaders and the media appears
to be the only means to accelerate decision-making in Tehran.
They also reported that the EU has no plans at the moment to
recall its Ambassadors from Iran. END SUMMARY.
STEP 1: SEEK BEHIND-THE-SCENES RESOLUTION
-----------------------------------------
¶3. (S) Franois Richier and Patrice Paoli told the Political
Minister Counselor that each time they learned of the arrest
of their citizens in Iran, the GOF sought their immediate
release through discrete but direct contact with Iranian
officials. (NOTE: Richier was accompanied by Mr. Lioutaud
from the Office of French National Intelligence Coordinator,
Bernard Bajolet (equivalent to our Director of National
Intelligence). END NOTE.) They hoped to act quickly enough
to prevent the regime from pressing formal charges. Once the
Iranians refused to release the prisoners, Paoli said, the
prosecutors publicized the charges and began preparations for
a public trial. A trial seems to be a pre-condition for the
release of foreign detainees in Iran, whom the French
described as "hostages" held in order to achieve political
goals.
STEP 2: USE THE MEDIA TO PUT IRANIANS ON DEFENSIVE
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (S) Once the quiet approach failed, the French launched a
relentless public relations strategy. They did not merely
wait for questions from the press; instead, they made
frequent pronouncements of their own about the hostages.
They publicized the cases with repeated use of key words
chosen carefully to put the regime on the defensive by
influencing Iranian public opinion. Paoli and Richier
emphasized the susceptibility of the Iranian population to
messages sent through the media. USG public statements can
sway and even mobilize public opinion within Iran, they
claimed, especially in the post-election environment.
¶5. (S) In their statements, the French repeatedly employed
key words to focus attention on the rights of detainees, and
on Iranian legal commitments to respect those rights, such as
"basic human rights," "good treatment," "Vienna Convention."
They also used words to refute the regime's false
accusations, like "innocent," "baseless," and "immediate
release." Paoli said the French have deliberately avoided
using the word "negotiation" when describing their contact
with Iranian leaders: "We demand only their immediate
liberation; we do not negotiate for the release of innocent
civilians." (NOTE: Paoli said he strongly regretted the
mistaken use of the word "negotiate" recently by a GOF
spokesman. END NOTE.)
¶6. (S) Moreover, the French predicted that the Iranians will
advise us, via the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet. They
will imply that the cases will be resolved more quickly if we
just wait for the Iranian legal procedures to move forward.
Ignore this warning, Richier and Paoli insisted. "Be vocal,"
Richier advised, "even more so if the Iranians ask you not to
be," because silence will not expedite the process. "They
are the masters of stalling tactics," Paoli said. Whether or
not we choose to remain silent about the cases, the Iranians
will launch a media blitz. They will energetically
disseminate fabricated accusations about their captives,
Richier predicted. Paoli and Richier both acknowledged that
an aggressive USG public posture involves risks as well, as
it will "increase the value" of the hostages to Iranian
leaders. Nonetheless, they said they still believe that
public pressure, on balance, will prove more effective than
behind-the-scenes engagement. Ideally, both public
statements and private discussions can take place
simultaneously.
STEP 3: CALL ON ALLIES (AND OTHERS) TO PRESSURE IRAN
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶7. (S) Paoli and Richier advocated the constant exertion of
diplomatic and political pressure on the Iranian regime.
Recognizing the central role of the wiss protecting power,
they suggested the USG enlist the help of other allies as
well, in the form of regular demarches in Tehran and
convocations of Iranian leaders in capitals around the world.
Paoli explicitly stated that France would be willing to
weigh in, if asked. Richier explained that the French
approached Syria almost immediately after they learned French
citizien Clotilde Reiss had been arrested on July 1. He then
previewed the presidential communiqu about the release of
the French Embassy employee, Nazak Afshar, in which the
French explicitly thanked the Syrians for their help. "Of
course we don't know if the Syrians did anything," Richier
admitted, "but we wanted to thank them anyway. It should at
least confuse the Iranians." He said the French did not/not
reach out to Russia and China for assistance, but he and
Paoli both argued that the support of EU and other countries
had a major impact on Iranian leaders. The French have
coordinated closely with the British, Richier said, though
primarily on the ground in Tehran. He suggested the USG
consider approaching other countries, including relatively
disinterested allies such as Brazil, and ask them to lean on
the Iranians. He also mentioned the potential impact of
blogs written by Iranian ex-patriates in the U.S.
GOOD LUCK FIGURING OUT WHO IS IN CHARGE IN TEHRAN
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (S) Richier predicted it will be difficult to determine
which Iranian institution currently has control of the U.S.
hostages and, more importantly, which one has the authority
to decide their fate. The French still have not identified a
key broker within the Iranian government with the power to
resolve their own hostage cases. They learned that the
deliberative procedures of Iranian institutions remain
unusually opaque.
BE PREPARED FOR POLITICAL BLACKMAIL
-----------------------------------
¶9. (S) Richier said the Iranians have in the past tried to
"blackmail" them, trading release of a French national for an
Iranian national. He warned of possible Iranian efforts to
blackmail the USG. The Iranians may try, for instance, to
drag out the cases of the American and French hostages
through the US/EU late September deadline for a response from
the regime on the nuclear issue. Richier said the French
believe this familiar Iranian tactic -- hostage-taking as
political blackmail -- will only increase in the near future.
¶10. (S) The Iranians may also seek specific exchanges, such
as the release from French custody of Majid Kakavand.
Without going into details, Richier said Kakavand had been
apprehended by the French and was under a U.S. extradition
request. He noted that GOF officials had briefed President
Sarkozy on this case and that the French are prepared to
continue holding him. (Background from Embassy Justice
Attache: Kakavand is an Iranian national whom the French
arrested March 20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on behalf of
the Department of Justice for extradition to the U.S. on
export control (proliferation) charges.) Then again, Richier
noted, it is possible that the Iranian agency or agencies
holding American citizens may not be aware of Kakavand, or
may have no interest in his release; it is simply impossible
to predict how their bureaucracies will behave.
¶11. (S) Paoli said the French knew the Iranians intended to
use the arrest of Clotilde Reiss and Nazak Afshar as a means
to punish the French for their criticism of Iran's recent
election results. More importantly, the Iranians hoped to
muzzle future French criticism: "They want to paralyze us,"
Paoli said, explaining that the Iranians had failed in this
attempt. Of course, he added, the regime also wanted to use
French and British hostages to validate their allegation that
foreign agents organized the mass post-election protests.
Paoli and Richier both reported that the Iranians continue to
harass and intimidate the local employees of their Embassy in
Tehran. They described the burden on resources required to
respond to each arrest: "The time we have had to devote to
this is absolutely ridiculous," Richier said.
ADAPT YOUR APPROACH FOR EACH HOSTAGE
------------------------------------
¶12. (S) Before offering accounts of the French experience
with hostages in Iran, Richier and Paoli were both at pains
to avoid offering any absolute advice. They noted
significant differences in the cases of Stephane Lherbier,
Reiss, Afshar, the Americans captured near the border with
Kurdistan, and other U.S.-Iranian dual nationals currently in
custody. Paoli said the French made a concerted, and
successful, effort to keep the case of Stephane Lherbier
"apolitical." (NOTE: Lherbier, a French fisherman arrested
by the Iranians in 2006, spent almost a year in prison prior
to his release in 2007. END NOTE.) Since the Iranians have
already accused the French and British hostages of espionage,
Paoli and Richier suggested the USG make strenuous efforts to
distance those cases from the situation of the U.S. hikers
currently in captivity. Moreover, in 2007, Iranian leaders
did not perceive the French as negatively as they do now,
which they said has further complicated the recent hostage
cases. Richier and Paoli both warned that the USG must make
every effort to dissuade the Iranians from politicizing the
case of the American hikers; thus far, they noted, Iranian
officials have not formally linked them to the case against
opposition members and the British and French hostages.
Richier reported that the French found the Iranian "system"
to be "perverse and complex but stable" in 2006, when seeking
the release of Lherbier. "Now it is still perverse and
complex," Richier said, "but unstable, and this makes
everything more difficult."
BRACE FOR UNCERTAINTY
---------------------
¶13. (S) Paoli stressed in particular the uncertain and
unpredictable nature of French dealings with Iran in hostage
situations. There are no procedural certainties, and the
timing of various steps appears arbitrary. Progress toward a
trial could take months, depending on variables such as the
political environment and the whims of key actors inside
Iranian institutions. "Anything is possible and we know next
to nothing," Paoli said, citing the recent arrest and quick
release of a French citizen who told Iranian provincial
police he was a researcher following the paths of the
dinosaurs. In the face of this uncertainty, Paoli and
Richier said that constant pressure from foreign leaders and
the media appears to be the only means to accelerate
decision-making in Iran.
¶14. (S) Paoli and Richier described their continuing
uncertainty about the case of Clotilde Reiss. They both
stopped short of confirming that she would soon be
transferred from Evin prison to the French Embassy in Tehran,
although they expressed strong optimism. Richier added that
this step will require the GOF to pay the Iranians a large
sum, to ensure that Reiss stays in the country pending
further legal action against her (reftel). Richier would not
say whether the French will permit the Iranians to take Reiss
back to court, or to prison: "We're focused on our short-term
objective right now -- getting her out of jail." He said
that the French worry the Iranians could decide to arrest in
the near future another one of the approximately 1,800 French
citizens living in Iran.
EU HAS NO PLANS TO RECALL AMBASSADORS
-------------------------------------
¶15. (S) Paoli noted that the EU relations with Iran are
extremely tense at the moment. He said the Iranians
currently refuse to receive the Swedish Ambassador, even in
his capacity as representative of the EU Presidency.
Nonetheless, barring extreme actions by the Iranians, such as
expulsion of one of the EU Ambassadors, Paoli predicted that
the EU will not/not decide to withdraw its Ambassadors from
Tehran. (NOTE: Deputy MFA Middle East Director (PDAS
equivalent) Jean-Franois Paucelle provided background on
this issue in an earlier meeting. He served as French Charge
d'Affaires in Tehran in 1997, after the EU withdrew its
Ambassadors to protest the assassination in Berlin, by
Iranian government agents, of four members of the Iranian
opposition-in-exile. European Embassies, after their
Ambassadors had departed, soon learned that Iranian officials
refused to receive European Charges d'Affaires, and so all
communication between EU members and Iran slowed down or
halted altogether. The Europeans also realized that the
politics of returning Ambassadors to Iran can become complex.
Following the withdrawal of their Ambassadors at present,
Paucelle said, the Europeans would need to determine ahead of
time when and under what conditions they would return.
Possible criteria range widely, from returning the
Ambassadors after the regime changes, as a long-term
deadline, to after the release of Clotilde Reiss, as the
shortest possible window. In addition, after the EU decided
to return its Ambassadors in 1997, the Iranians refused to
allow some of them to return, in an attempt to sow division
among EU members. This chastening experience, Paucelle said,
continues to inform EU discussions about whether or not to
recall their Ambassadors from Iran. END NOTE.)
¶16. (SBU) Post will continue to liaise with the GOF on
hostage issues and update Washington offices as events unfold.
PEKALA
`
Changed on December 02, 2010 17:01 compared to December 02, 2010 16:01
`VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #1097/01 2241402
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121402Z AUG 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6952
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T PARIS 001097
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TAG)
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC FR
SUBJECT: IRAN: FRENCH COMMENTS ON DEALING WITH HOSTAGES
REF: PARIS 1046
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: President Sarkozy's Strategic Affairs
Advisor Franois Richier and MFA Middle East Director (A/S
equivalent) Patrice Paoli told Political Minister Counselor
in separate meetings August 11 that the French approached
their hostage situations in Iran by first seeking an
immediate, behind-the-scenes resolution before the Iranians
brought charges against their captives, and then, once that
approach failed, by adopting a two-pronged strategy: (1)
relentlessly publicizing the cases with repeated employment
of key words chosen carefully to put the Iranians on the
defensive, and (2) constant exertion of diplomatic and
political pressure, with the help of allies, in the form of
regular demarches in Tehran and convocations of Iranian
Ambassadors in European and Middle Eastern capitals. Paoli
and Richier predicted that the Iranians will advise us, via
the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet while waiting for Iranian
legal procedures to move forward. Ignore this warning, they
insisted, because silence will not expedite the process.
They argued that USG statements and actions can sway and even
mobilize public opinion within Iran. Whether or not we
choose to speak out, they warned, the Iranians will
energetically disseminate fabricated accusations. As the USG
seeks to engage the Iranians, Richier predicted it will be
difficult to determine which Iranian institution currently
has control of American hostages and, more importantly, which
one has the authority to decide their fate. The French still
have not identified a key broker within the Iranian
government with the power to resolve their own hostage cases.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Paoli and Richier also warned of
possible Iranian efforts to blackmail the USG. They may try,
for instance, to drag out the cases of the American and
French hostages through the US/EU late September deadline for
a response from the regime on the nuclear issue. Richier
said the French believe this familiar Iranian tactic --
hostage-taking as political blackmail -- will only increase
in the near future. The Iranians may also seek specific
exchanges, such as the release from French custody of Majid
Kakavand, an Iranian national whom the French arrested March
20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on the behalf of the U.S.
Department of Justice on proliferation issues. Overall, as
the USG prepares to handle its hostage cases, the French
recommended we prepare for uncertainty. In the face of
unpredictable Iranian behavior, Paoli and Richier said that
constant pressure from foreign leaders and the media appears
to be the only means to accelerate decision-making in Tehran.
They also reported that the EU has no plans at the moment to
recall its Ambassadors from Iran. END SUMMARY.
STEP 1: SEEK BEHIND-THE-SCENES RESOLUTION
-----------------------------------------
¶3. (S) Franois Richier and Patrice Paoli told the Political
Minister Counselor that each time they learned of the arrest
of their citizens in Iran, the GOF sought their immediate
release through discrete but direct contact with Iranian
officials. (NOTE: Richier was accompanied by Mr. Lioutaud
from the Office of French National Intelligence Coordinator,
Bernard Bajolet (equivalent to our Director of National
Intelligence). END NOTE.) They hoped to act quickly enough
to prevent the regime from pressing formal charges. Once the
Iranians refused to release the prisoners, Paoli said, the
prosecutors publicized the charges and began preparations for
a public trial. A trial seems to be a pre-condition for the
release of foreign detainees in Iran, whom the French
described as "hostages" held in order to achieve political
goals.
STEP 2: USE THE MEDIA TO PUT IRANIANS ON DEFENSIVE
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (S) Once the quiet approach failed, the French launched a
relentless public relations strategy. They did not merely
wait for questions from the press; instead, they made
frequent pronouncements of their own about the hostages.
They publicized the cases with repeated use of key words
chosen carefully to put the regime on the defensive by
influencing Iranian public opinion. Paoli and Richier
emphasized the susceptibility of the Iranian population to
messages sent through the media. USG public statements can
sway and even mobilize public opinion within Iran, they
claimed, especially in the post-election environment.
¶5. (S) In their statements, the French repeatedly employed
key words to focus attention on the rights of detainees, and
on Iranian legal commitments to respect those rights, such as
"basic human rights," "good treatment," "Vienna Convention."
They also used words to refute the regime's false
accusations, like "innocent," "baseless," and "immediate
release." Paoli said the French have deliberately avoided
using the word "negotiation" when describing their contact
with Iranian leaders: "We demand only their immediate
liberation; we do not negotiate for the release of innocent
civilians." (NOTE: Paoli said he strongly regretted the
mistaken use of the word "negotiate" recently by a GOF
spokesman. END NOTE.)
¶6. (S) Moreover, the French predicted that the Iranians will
advise us, via the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet. They
will imply that the cases will be resolved more quickly if we
just wait for the Iranian legal procedures to move forward.
Ignore this warning, Richier and Paoli insisted. "Be vocal,"
Richier advised, "even more so if the Iranians ask you not to
be," because silence will not expedite the process. "They
are the masters of stalling tactics," Paoli said. Whether or
not we choose to remain silent about the cases, the Iranians
will launch a media blitz. They will energetically
disseminate fabricated accusations about their captives,
Richier predicted. Paoli and Richier both acknowledged that
an aggressive USG public posture involves risks as well, as
it will "increase the value" of the hostages to Iranian
leaders. Nonetheless, they said they still believe that
public pressure, on balance, will prove more effective than
behind-the-scenes engagement. Ideally, both public
statements and private discussions can take place
simultaneously.
STEP 3: CALL ON ALLIES (AND OTHERS) TO PRESSURE IRAN
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶7. (S) Paoli and Richier advocated the constant exertion of
diplomatic and political pressure on the Iranian regime.
Recognizing the central role of the wiss protecting power,
they suggested the USG enlist the help of other allies as
well, in the form of regular demarches in Tehran and
convocations of Iranian leaders in capitals around the world.
Paoli explicitly stated that France would be willing to
weigh in, if asked. Richier explained that the French
approached Syria almost immediately after they learned French
citizien Clotilde Reiss had been arrested on July 1. He then
previewed the presidential communiqu about the release of
the French Embassy employee, Nazak Afshar, in which the
French explicitly thanked the Syrians for their help. "Of
course we don't know if the Syrians did anything," Richier
admitted, "but we wanted to thank them anyway. It should at
least confuse the Iranians." He said the French did not/not
reach out to Russia and China for assistance, but he and
Paoli both argued that the support of EU and other countries
had a major impact on Iranian leaders. The French have
coordinated closely with the British, Richier said, though
primarily on the ground in Tehran. He suggested the USG
consider approaching other countries, including relatively
disinterested allies such as Brazil, and ask them to lean on
the Iranians. He also mentioned the potential impact of
blogs written by Iranian ex-patriates in the U.S.
GOOD LUCK FIGURING OUT WHO IS IN CHARGE IN TEHRAN
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (S) Richier predicted it will be difficult to determine
which Iranian institution currently has control of the U.S.
hostages and, more importantly, which one has the authority
to decide their fate. The French still have not identified a
key broker within the Iranian government with the power to
resolve their own hostage cases. They learned that the
deliberative procedures of Iranian institutions remain
unusually opaque.
BE PREPARED FOR POLITICAL BLACKMAIL
-----------------------------------
¶9. (S) Richier said the Iranians have in the past tried to
"blackmail" them, trading release of a French national for an
Iranian national. He warned of possible Iranian efforts to
blackmail the USG. The Iranians may try, for instance, to
drag out the cases of the American and French hostages
through the US/EU late September deadline for a response from
the regime on the nuclear issue. Richier said the French
believe this familiar Iranian tactic -- hostage-taking as
political blackmail -- will only increase in the near future.
¶10. (S) The Iranians may also seek specific exchanges, such
as the release from French custody of Majid Kakavand.
Without going into details, Richier said Kakavand had been
apprehended by the French and was under a U.S. extradition
request. He noted that GOF officials had briefed President
Sarkozy on this case and that the French are prepared to
continue holding him. (Background from Embassy Justice
Attache: Kakavand is an Iranian national whom the French
arrested March 20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on behalf of
the Department of Justice for extradition to the U.S. on
export control (proliferation) charges.) Then again, Richier
noted, it is possible that the Iranian agency or agencies
holding American citizens may not be aware of Kakavand, or
may have no interest in his release; it is simply impossible
to predict how their bureaucracies will behave.
¶11. (S) Paoli said the French knew the Iranians intended to
use the arrest of Clotilde Reiss and Nazak Afshar as a means
to punish the French for their criticism of Iran's recent
election results. More importantly, the Iranians hoped to
muzzle future French criticism: "They want to paralyze us,"
Paoli said, explaining that the Iranians had failed in this
attempt. Of course, he added, the regime also wanted to use
French and British hostages to validate their allegation that
foreign agents organized the mass post-election protests.
Paoli and Richier both reported that the Iranians continue to
harass and intimidate the local employees of their Embassy in
Tehran. They described the burden on resources required to
respond to each arrest: "The time we have had to devote to
this is absolutely ridiculous," Richier said.
ADAPT YOUR APPROACH FOR EACH HOSTAGE
------------------------------------
¶12. (S) Before offering accounts of the French experience
with hostages in Iran, Richier and Paoli were both at pains
to avoid offering any absolute advice. They noted
significant differences in the cases of Stephane Lherbier,
Reiss, Afshar, the Americans captured near the border with
Kurdistan, and other U.S.-Iranian dual nationals currently in
custody. Paoli said the French made a concerted, and
successful, effort to keep the case of Stephane Lherbier
"apolitical." (NOTE: Lherbier, a French fisherman arrested
by the Iranians in 2006, spent almost a year in prison prior
to his release in 2007. END NOTE.) Since the Iranians have
already accused the French and British hostages of espionage,
Paoli and Richier suggested the USG make strenuous efforts to
distance those cases from the situation of the U.S. hikers
currently in captivity. Moreover, in 2007, Iranian leaders
did not perceive the French as negatively as they do now,
which they said has further complicated the recent hostage
cases. Richier and Paoli both warned that the USG must make
every effort to dissuade the Iranians from politicizing the
case of the American hikers; thus far, they noted, Iranian
officials have not formally linked them to the case against
opposition members and the British and French hostages.
Richier reported that the French found the Iranian "system"
to be "perverse and complex but stable" in 2006, when seeking
the release of Lherbier. "Now it is still perverse and
complex," Richier said, "but unstable, and this makes
everything more difficult."
BRACE FOR UNCERTAINTY
---------------------
¶13. (S) Paoli stressed in particular the uncertain and
unpredictable nature of French dealings with Iran in hostage
situations. There are no procedural certainties, and the
timing of various steps appears arbitrary. Progress toward a
trial could take months, depending on variables such as the
political environment and the whims of key actors inside
Iranian institutions. "Anything is possible and we know next
to nothing," Paoli said, citing the recent arrest and quick
release of a French citizen who told Iranian provincial
police he was a researcher following the paths of the
dinosaurs. In the face of this uncertainty, Paoli and
Richier said that constant pressure from foreign leaders and
the media appears to be the only means to accelerate
decision-making in Iran.
¶14. (S) Paoli and Richier described their continuing
uncertainty about the case of Clotilde Reiss. They both
stopped short of confirming that she would soon be
transferred from Evin prison to the French Embassy in Tehran,
although they expressed strong optimism. Richier added that
this step will require the GOF to pay the Iranians a large
sum, to ensure that Reiss stays in the country pending
further legal action against her (reftel). Richier would not
say whether the French will permit the Iranians to take Reiss
back to court, or to prison: "We're focused on our short-term
objective right now -- getting her out of jail." He said
that the French worry the Iranians could decide to arrest in
the near future another one of the approximately 1,800 French
citizens living in Iran.
EU HAS NO PLANS TO RECALL AMBASSADORS
-------------------------------------
¶15. (S) Paoli noted that the EU relations with Iran are
extremely tense at the moment. He said the Iranians
currently refuse to receive the Swedish Ambassador, even in
his capacity as representative of the EU Presidency.
Nonetheless, barring extreme actions by the Iranians, such as
expulsion of one of the EU Ambassadors, Paoli predicted that
the EU will not/not decide to withdraw its Ambassadors from
Tehran. (NOTE: Deputy MFA Middle East Director (PDAS
equivalent) Jean-Franois Paucelle provided background on
this issue in an earlier meeting. He served as French Charge
d'Affaires in Tehran in 1997, after the EU withdrew its
Ambassadors to protest the assassination in Berlin, by
Iranian government agents, of four members of the Iranian
opposition-in-exile. European Embassies, after their
Ambassadors had departed, soon learned that Iranian officials
refused to receive European Charges d'Affaires, and so all
communication between EU members and Iran slowed down or
halted altogether. The Europeans also realized that the
politics of returning Ambassadors to Iran can become complex.
Following the withdrawal of their Ambassadors at present,
Paucelle said, the Europeans would need to determine ahead of
time when and under what conditions they would return.
Possible criteria range widely, from returning the
Ambassadors after the regime changes, as a long-term
deadline, to after the release of Clotilde Reiss, as the
shortest possible window. In addition, after the EU decided
to return its Ambassadors in 1997, the Iranians refused to
allow some of them to return, in an attempt to sow division
among EU members. This chastening experience, Paucelle said,
continues to inform EU discussions about whether or not to
recall their Ambassadors from Iran. END NOTE.)
¶16. (SBU) Post will continue to liaise with the GOF on
hostage issues and update Washington offices as events unfold.
PEKALA
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