These are detected changes in cable 09UNVIEVIENNA540 based on small subset of available CableGate WikiLeak torrents.
WikiLeaks was willing to hide this from you. But cats has found following changes in 09UNVIEVIENNA540:
Cable 09UNVIEVIENNA540 is missing on December 04, 2010 12:47, but was present on December 03, 2010 15:01
Cable 09UNVIEVIENNA540 is missing on December 04, 2010 14:09, but was present on December 03, 2010 15:01
Cable 09UNVIEVIENNA540 was restored on December 04, 2010 18:11
Changed on December 04, 2010 18:11 compared to December 03, 2010 15:01
`VZCZCXRO5630
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0540/01 3361717
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021717Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0355
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
Wednesday, 02 December 2009, 17:17
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 UNVIE VIENNA 000540
SIPDIS
FOR P, T, H, ISN, S/SANAC, IO, NEA, SCA, EAP
H PLS PASS STAFFDEL AS APPROPRIATE
DOE FOR S2 AND NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, RYU, TALWAR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PREL, KNNP, AORC, IR, SY, KN, IN
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES IRAN, SYRIA, AND
MULTILATERAL VIENNA'’S FRUSTRATING NAM DYNAMIC
REF: EMBASSY VIENNA 1450
Classified By: Mark Scheland, Counselor for Nuclear Policy; reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: HFAC staffers Richard Kessler and David Fite
received from IAEA Secretariat November 10 information on the
Iran case that tracked with the tone of the subsequent
Director General'’s reporting on Iran to the Board of
Governors. The STAFFDEL heard that contact with Iran over
"“possible military dimensions"” of the nuclear program was at
an "“absolute stalemate." ” According to Safeguards regional
division director Herman Nackaerts, IAEA inspectors'’ first
visit to the enrichment facility under construction near Qom
had run predictably but without extraordinary responsiveness
on Iran'’s part; the Secretariat was still trying to
understand the motivation to build the plant as now designed.
Nackaerts described the frustrating limitations of Iran'’s
cooperation with the Agency, and the STAFFDEL deduced that
Iranian officials held back because they were uncertain about
what lines of inquiry the IAEA was best equipped to exploit.
Questioning then-DG ElBaradei'’s remark to media that the
Agency had found "“nothing to worry about"” in Qom, STAFFDEL
asked if the Secretariat would report on how it judged the
plant did or did not fit into Iran'’s publicly explained
nuclear program. Nackaerts expressed appreciation for the
precision and usefulness of U.S.-supplied information in the
Qom case and generally.
¶2. (C) Summary contd.: On Syria, Nackaerts said the
Secretariat had told Damascus its first explanation for the
presence of anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron
Source Reactor was not credible. Further, the Secretariat
still could not yet present the case for how what was being
built at Dair Alzour fit in as "“part of a Syrian program or
part of someone else'’s program." ” On DPRK, IAEA/EXPO'’s Tariq
Rauf said the IAEA, when it could, would ultimately have to
"“go back to the early 1990s"” to reconstruct accountancy of
plutonium and could not accept a "“political"” compromise
setting material "“off to the side." ” To get to a finding of
"“no diversion"” would take several years and extensive
resources and forensics.
¶3. (SBU) Contd.: Treating Technical Cooperation, the
STAFFDEL received the same briefing on the Safeguards
Department'’s project review process and internal database
that was provided to a GAO review team in 2008. IAEA
External Relations Director Rauf asserted, "“We are not a
denial organization." ” STAFFDEL related how segments of the
GAO report had reduced Congressional confidence in the
efficiency of TC. U.S. national labs were afforded too
little time to review projects for our national
decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk.
Secretariat also described hindrances it faces in having UN
and national development officials recognize and integrate
nuclear applications.
¶4. (SBU) Contd.: The STAFFDEL also engaged P5-plus-1 heads
of mission over lunch on the means to draw or impel Iran to
open up on its nuclear program and on dynamics in Vienna
between blocs of Member States. End Summary.
Fordow/Qom and Iran PMD: Frustration,
but Good Support from the U.S.
-------------------------------------
¶5. (U) House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Majority Staff
Director Richard Kessler and Professional Staff Member David
Fite (STAFFDEL) spent ninety minutes with IAEA staff on
November 10. Principal issues were safeguards verification
in Iran and Syria, the screening of IAEA Technical
Cooperation (TC) projects for proliferation risk, and TC
Department efforts to improve project design and integration
into national and UN development activities. STAFFDEL
affirmed to Secretariat officials that the HFAC under
Chairman Berman: was strongly supportive of the IAEA; put
emphasis on counter-proliferation issues in countries of
concern (indeed, was weighing legislation to impose further
U.S. sanctions on Iran); had advocated an increase in NADR
funding for extrabudgetary contributions to the IAEA,
including for the Safeguards Analytical laboratory; and,
supported "“getting the U.S. up to date"” on payment of its
assessments to the IAEA'’s regular budget. Following the
meeting at the IAEA, STAFFDEL consulted Ambassador and
Mission staff and had a working lunch with P5-plus-1 heads of
mission focused on Iran and the dynamics of multilateral
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 002 OF 005
diplomacy in Vienna. STAFFDEL'’s UNVIE program followed a day
of consultations with Austrian officials (reftel).
¶6. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B (AOR
Mideast, South Asia, parts of Europe, the Americas, and all
nuclear weapons states) Director Herman Nackaerts briefed
STAFFDEL on the inspection he had led a few weeks before to
the recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom
in Iran. Nackaerts said Iranian officials had been open to
allowing inspectors access. The Secretariat was still trying
to understand, he said, why Iran would build this facility,
scaled as it was for 3000 centrifuges in contrast to the much
large Natanz facility. It was positive, Nackaerts pointed
out, that Fordow was now under safeguards. He noted that the
IAEA had "“at least two"” safeguards inspectors at work in Iran
"“every day of the year"” and would henceforth plan to visit
Fordow regularly. Asked how "“complete"” the plant was or when
it would be operational, Nackaerts said, "“The information we
got from Member States proved to be very precise"” on this
point. Asked about permission to take samples at Fordow,
Nackaerts replied that Iranian officials had permitted the
inspectors to perform the same safeguards procedures they
typically undertook at Natanz.
¶7. (S) STAFFDEL asked if the Agency enjoyed full access to
the Arak IR-40 plant. Nackaerts related there had been no
access for a 12-month period but normal access in August and
October 2009. However, the Iranians "“claim they cannot go
back on the decision of their parliament, and hence grant the
IAEA a "“visit"” but do not call it Design Information
Verification. On possible military dimensions (PMD),
Nackaerts said the Secretariat'’s approach was to follow lines
of inquiry that could involve use of nuclear material, for
example, the documents treating uranium metal or green salt.
The Iranians, he said in a tone conveying his skepticism,
asserted the uranium metal document was "“mistakenly"” included
in a packet of information they received from the AQ Khan
network but was nothing Iran had asked for or used. The
"“green salt"” documentation Iran dismissed as a forgery.
Indeed, Nackaerts went on, Iran replied basically on the form
of documents, not on their substance. The Secretariat had
not been "“impressed"” by the 117-page rejoinder Iran had
provided to the initial presentation of PMD documentation.
It had told Iran the information hung together too much for
it all to have bee fabricated and asked that, if some of the
documentation were "“doctored,"” Iranian officials should show
the Secretariat "“where the truth ends." ” Since August 2008,
(when Ahmadinejad personally shut off Nackaerts'’s previously
approved visit to workshops indicated in the documentation),
Nackaerts concluded, there remained a high-level decision not
to cooperate. STAFFDEL member Fite took from this that the
Iranians were holding back "“because they don'’t know where any
opening will lead." ” Nackaerts agreed, saying they knew that
every question they answered would bring another question.
¶8. (S) Fite alluded to then-DG ElBaradei'’s remarks of a few
days before in U.S. media to the effect that the inspectors
had found "“nothing to worry about"” in Fordow. Acknowledging
the practical meaning of this remark -- that there were no
centrifuges or nuclear material present -- Fite nevertheless
regretted the headline and asked if the DG'’s formal report to
Board members (Note: subsequently released as GOV/2009/74,
deresticted by the Board November 27, and available to the
public at www.iaea.org) would deal with how Qom fits or does
not fit into Iran'’s explained nuclear program. Nackaerts
replied, "“We will identify the issues we'’re working." ” He
went on that understanding the timeline of Fordow'’s
development was hindered by Iran'’s practice never to involve
people who really know the facts or the government'’s
intentions in discussion with the Agency. The officials with
whom inspectors meet clearly are "“steered"” by unseen
observers, who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during
meetings. Iran recorded the meetings, he added, but did not
permit the IAEA to do so. Further, the Secretariat never
received original design documents, but ones produced for the
Secretariat that were technically true to the facilities they
found upon inspection. Against this Iranian practice,
Nackaerts added, the Secretariat received very precise
information from Member States that helped inspectors decide
what to ask about. The organization of this information was
good and, while the Agency was satisfied, it had inquired if
more information could be shared with the Agency, "“not
necessarily for release to Iran,"” he said.
Syria Stalemate
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 003 OF 005
---------------
¶9. (SBU) The Syria case, Nackaerts said, was starting to
look like Iran in that the government provided "“good
cooperation"” on some areas but presented a "“stalemate"” on
others. The Secretariat challenged Syria'’s proposed
explanation for the presence of uranium at Dair Alzour/Al
Kibar (i.e., that Israeli depleted uranium munitions could be
the source), but the inquiry was at a roadblock. Syrian
officials had been told their first explanation for
anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR) was not credible, and the Agency had inquired what
nuclear material Syria could have had that was not previously
declared. Overall, the IAEA still "“did not understand"”
(meaning, it could not yet present the solid case for) how
Dair Alzour fit in as part of a Syrian nuclear program "“or
part of someone else'’s program."
”
Return to DPRK?
Safeguards in India?
--------------------
¶10. (SBU) Asked how quickly IAEA inspectors could resume
work in North Korea if re-admitted by the government, Tariq
Rauf of IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordination
(EXPO) observed that the last resumption had taken a week
(for technical set-up, re-activation of cameras, etc.).
Safeguards Operations A division had a program set out for
what steps to undertake "“under circumstances the DPRK may let
us back in." ” Rauf continued that the Agency would to go back
to the early 1990s'’ plutonium revelation to reconstruct
material accountancy. When most recently in the DPRK, the
IAEA had been monitoring facility shutdown processes but not
implementing NPT safeguards on DPRK material. The Agency
could "“not accept"” political compromises that would set some
nuclear material "“off to the side"”. Then-DG ElBaradei had
called for implementation of the Additional Protocol in DPRK,
but even if Pyongyang cooperated fully it would take several
years and much in the way of resources and forensics to be
able to get to a finding of "“no diversion."
”
¶11. (SBU) Asked about progress toward safeguards
implementation in India, Rauf confirmed the GOI had submitted
a "“formal list"” of facilities that was not a document the
Agency would characterize as a formal declaration under its
safeguards agreement. India was under no mandatory timeline
to make its declaration as it was not an NPT signatory.
(Comment: Rauf'’s characterization was flat wrong. Mission
had learned from the Safeguards Department three weeks before
this meeting that India had officially "“notified"” two new
facilities (Raps 5 and 6) under its 2008 safeguards
agreement, that surveillance systems had been installed, and
the facilities were under safeguards. End Comment.)
Scrutinizing and Promoting
IAEA Technical Cooperation
--------------------------
¶12. (U) Renaud Chatelus of the Safeguards Division of
Information Management (SGIM) acquainted STAFFDEL with IAEA
screening of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for their
potential to afford access to sensitive technologies.
Grounded in a 1979 Agency Information Circular, INFCIRC/267,
the practice is to focus on projects related to enrichment,
heavy water production, reprocessing of spent fuel, and
plutonium or mixed oxide fuel. Chatelus said SGIM reviewed
projects submitted, project approved, individual procurement
actions, and overall implementation of projects. Reviews are
conducted completely in-house, he said in reply to a
question. Using the same PowerPoint slides that were
presented to a GAO review team in 2008, Chatelus illustrated
with screen shots from the Agency'’s staff access-only
database the system of flagging projects for: compliance with
INFCIRC 267, compliance with INFCIRC 540 (Additional
Protocol), transfer of "“sensitive items"” on the Nuclear
Suppliers Group or dual-use lists, general interest, or
possible relation to a safeguarded facility. In subsequent
discussion of the impact of screening and Member States'’
sense of entitlement to TC, EXPO'’s Tariq Rauf affirmed, "“We
are not a denial organization."
”
¶13. (U) STAFFDEL member Fite observed that segments of the
GAO report treating transfers to state sponsors of terrorism
as well as on program management had reduced Congressional
confidence about TC. Fite said he had approached
Appropriations staff about using a supplemental funding bill
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 004 OF 005
to resolve slow U.S. payment of assessments and do more for
the Agency, but was rebuffed because the GAO report on TC had
"“poisoned the waters." ” Apart from political objections to
certain TC recipients benefitting from U.S. funding, he
added, a persisting "“Achilles heel"” was that U.S. national
labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our
national decision-making on their merit and proliferation
risk. TC Department representative Johannes Seybold replied
that the Agency aimed to provide Member States six weeks time
for review, but was also at the mercy of requesting states
providing the relevant project information. Just the
compendium of project titles and short descriptions became a
very thick document in each biennial cycle, Seybold went on,
and the Agency was "“struggling"” with some Member States'’
national policies to be able to go beyond this level of
transparency.
¶14. (U) STAFFDEL'’s meeting with Secretariat officials
concluded in an exchange with Seybold, TC'’s section head for
strategy and partnerships, about the IAEA'’s awkward position
in development efforts coordinated by the UN or by developing
countries'’ national institutions. Seybold laid out the
following. The IAEA'’s cooperation with TC recipient states
occurs through National Liaison Officers, generally in the
atomic energy commission or government ministry responsible
for nuclear power or radiological sources. Generally,
neither the IAEA nor the corresponding national entity is a
participant in UN development team or host government
deliberations about development in the recipient country.
Two-thirds of TC projects address development issues for
which the IAEA is not the responsible lead agency in the UN
system, e.g., water quality and availability, food security,
climate. In many cases, national authorities and the UN team
responsible for these areas in a given country lack awareness
of IAEA capabilities, and/or they maintain a distance from
things "“nuclear." ” Seybold related Agency efforts to
integrate with these authorities through the UNDAF (UN
Development Assistance Framework) process and other
partnering efforts. STAFFDEL expressed encouragement for
bringing nuclear applications to greater impact in the
development field.
P5-plus-1 Ambassadors Regret Iranian Paralysis
on TRR; Depict Grim Dynamic with G-77/NAM
--------------------------------------------- -
¶15. (C) STAFFDEL was the guests of honor at lunch hosted by
the Ambassador with his counterparts from China, Germany,
Russia, and the UK and the French Charge d'’Affaires. Kessler
and Fite laid out HFAC'’s interest and Chairman Berman'’s
supportive posture toward the Agency, as they had for
Secretariat staff. Opening discussion of Iran, UK Ambassador
Simon Smith said the Iranian answer on the ElBaradei-brokered
deal on refueling the Tehran research reactor (TRR) "“had to
be '‘yes'’ or '‘no,'’ not waffling"” as it had been. German
Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking posited that the U.S.
Administration had confounded Iranian internal processes and
the latest EU3 proposal had "“cornered"” Iran. Agreeing that
Iran faced an imperative between "“yes"” and "“no,"” Luedeking
observed, "“they can'’t answer." ” HFAC Staff Director Kessler
noted the committee had tried to follow up a Larijani
approach conveyed one year before for a meeting with Chairman
Berman, but found that the Iranians backed off.
¶16. (C) Russian Ambassador Alexander Zmeyevskiy asserted
that confidentiality was a major concern for Iran. He noted
its TRR counter-proposals, either to keep its LEU on its
territory under IAEA safeguards until released in exchange
for fuel rods, or to swap outgoing LEU piecemeal for incoming
fuel assemblies. Moving beyond the TRR issue, UK Ambassador
said he was severely disappointed that Member States had been
unable to "“apply consequences for the breaking of rules"” of
the organization. We needed to convince some other Member
States, he continued, that tolerating rule breaking as on Qom
and Code 3.1 (of the Subsidiary Arrangement of Iran'’s
Safeguards Agreement) risked bringing the organization into
discredit. STAFFDEL member Fite asked if Iran'’s Arab
neighbors were among the problem interlocutors in Vienna; he
asserted that officials of Arabian Peninsula countries told
the Congress they see Iran as an "“existential threat." ” While
they may seek the cover of international signals or sanctions
imposed by others, they say they do want action against Iran.
¶17. (C) Segueing from Iran to DPRK, Chinese Ambassador Hu
Xiaodi said the main difference between the cases was that
progress with DPRK had been achieved when the North Koreans
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 005 OF 005
wanted something specific, whereas he (Hu) had never heard
Iranian officials say that they wanted a settlement, or that
they wanted anything specific. Although we did not at
present know "“how"” to reach a deal with Iran, Hu concluded,
we were not in the worst situation, in which Iran explicitly
does want something -- nuclear weapons. Asked if he
genuinely thought the DPRK would give up its weapons program
for aid, Hu said "“hope"” (as opposed to "“think."”) Ambassador
Davies seriously questioned that Pyongyang would give up a
weapons capability in exchange for a significant material
improvement in our relations, as the government would likely
calculate it had been its possession of weapons that won the
concessions.
¶18. (SBU) Ambassador turned the discussion to the dynamic
between groups of Member States, as illustrated in the
ongoing discussion of a Technical Cooperation project to
advance IAEA use of "“results based management." ” The German
Ambassador observed that NAM positions on many issues were
characterized by "“myths"” and they were clearly being dictated
by Iran and Egypt. Ambassador Davies asked if the dynamic
was further charged by states beginning to suspect that the
U.S. seriously intends to strengthen the Agency in all its
functions -- with the uncertain shifts in practice and
distribution of resources and clout that could mean.
STAFFDEL lead Kessler said the Congressional perception was
one of a "“lightning change"” from the last Administration to
the present one in U.S. approaches to the IAEA, to
development assistance globally, and to multilateralism.
German Ambassador agreed and said this was a complication for
NAM states that know they are the immobile ones now. Yet, TC
was a "“sacred cow"” and the NAM'’s impulse was to reject
"“illegitimate intrusion"” into its distribution.
¶19. (SBU) French Charge Philippe Merlin discouraged STAFFDEL
from expecting diplomatic gains, say in the NPT review,
through greater generosity on IAEA peaceful use programs.
"“TC is the price we pay,"” he said, for developing countries'’
acquiescence toward the safeguards regime, the thing we
really want. Fite asked if a reasoned discussion with
development officials in capitals about making TC deliver
more impact could translate into different instructions to
the obstreperous missions in Vienna. German Ambassador took
the view that any effort to change TC would be seen in
capitals as "“per se bad." ” It was more advisable to advocate
to NAM states what their own interests in the safeguards
regime were. UK Ambassador agreed there were no points to be
scored by asking NAM capitals about TC effectiveness; he
added that the UK Government "“doesn'’t give two hoots"” about
TC, given the small funding level (from the UK Energy
Ministry) in comparison to Britain'’s official development
assistance. TC was, also in the UK view, the price we pay
for the IAEA we want.
¶20. (U) STAFFDEL did not review this report.
DAVIES
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