These are detected changes in cable 09BAGHDAD1103 based on small subset of available CableGate WikiLeak torrents.
WikiLeaks was willing to hide this from you. But cats has found following changes in 09BAGHDAD1103:
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 is missing on December 02, 2010 09:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 is missing on December 02, 2010 10:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 is missing on December 02, 2010 11:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 is missing on December 02, 2010 12:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 is missing on December 02, 2010 13:01, but was present on December 02, 2010 08:01
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 was restored on December 02, 2010 14:01
Changed on December 02, 2010 14:01 compared to December 02, 2010 08:01
`VZCZCXRO8610
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1103/01 1141618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241618Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2829
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Friday, 24 April 2009, 16:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001103
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2029
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, ECON, ETRD, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF
REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 150
¶B. 07 BAGHDAD 488
¶C. BAGHDAD 289
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'’Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds
Force (IRGC-QF) officers are active in Iraq, conducting
traditional espionage and supporting violent extremists as
well as supporting both legitimate and malign Iranian
economic and cultural outreach. Iraqis and their government
have demonstrated increasing willingness to push back against
malign Iranian influence in the last year. Working with the
Iraqis, we have succeeded in stopping some IRGC-QF activity
through military operations and diplomatic engagement, while
we prevented some IRGC-QF officers from entering Iraq through
explicit warnings that we would target them unilaterally.
However, under the Security Agreement effective January 1,
all operations in Iraq must be conducted in conjunction with
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and our previous unilateral
warnings carry less weight. As Coalition Forces continue the
period of responsible drawdown, we will rely increasingly on
the GOI to keep the pressure on the IRGC-QF. We intend to
support the GOI in these efforts through continued diplomatic
engagement, intelligence sharing, and our security
partnership of Coalition Forces working by, with, and through
the ISF. End summary.
-----------
Background:
-----------
¶2. (S/NF) IRGC-QF leadership took advantage of the vacuum
which surrounded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the entry of
Coalition Forces into Iraq in 2003, using the opportunity to
send operatives to Iraq when little attention was focused on
Iran. In January 2007, Coalition Forces raided an unofficial
Iranian consulate in Erbil, detaining five Iranians who
claimed to be diplomats but in reality held no diplomatic
status. They were suspected of operations aimed at killing
Coalition and Iraqi security forces (refs A and B). The
original targets of the raid, IRGC-QF officers Abbas Hoseyni
(of the Erbil office) and Hormat Faruqi (of the Sulaimaniyah
office), escaped and fled to Iran. The Iranian government
immediately pulled back most IRGC-QF officers from Iraq and
shuttered its "“consulates"” in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah until
mid-2007; consulates in Basrah and Karbala remained open.
Since 2007, Iran has submitted diplomatic visa applications
for Hoseini and Faruqi to return to Iraq. In 2008 the
Embassy and MNF-I convinced the GOI not to approve these
applications, making it clear if they returned to Iraq, they
would be targeted by Coalition Forces.
¶3. (S/NF) Since 2008, the MFA has passed names of Iranians
applying for diplomatic visas to the US Embassy for vetting.
Background checks have revealed that about 20 percent have
possible ties to the IRGC or Iran'’s Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS) (ref C). The MFA has informed us that it
denies visas to all new suspected intelligence officers, but
we have not been able to verify such claims. In January
2009, the MFA passed a list of 35 names to the USG of Iranian
diplomats already in country before the vetting process
began. Of those, eight had ties to IRGC or MOIS.
--------
Strategy
--------
¶4. (S/NF) As U.S. forces continue a period of responsible
draw down, we will seek to ensure that the GOI understands
that IRGC-QF activity harms Iraq -- which should be
self-evident if the IRGC-QF continues to conduct malign
activity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
Qactivity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
Engagements with political and security leadership at the
national and provincial level, intelligence sharing, and
security cooperation will be key to explaining the dangers of
IRGC-QF activity and providing Iraqis the information they
need to defend their own interests. The following are
diplomatic, political, military, intelligence, and public
information options which either the GOI can pursue
unilaterally, or in concert with the USG, to target IRGC-QF
activity in Iraq.
---------
Diplomacy
---------
BAGHDAD 00001103 002 OF 003
¶5. (S/NF) We intend to continue working closely with the MFA
to deny visas to Iranian intelligence officers. We may also
consider suggesting that the MFA use another diplomatic tool,
albeit one with more consequences -- the "“persona non grata"”
designation. The MFA may be reluctant to take this step
because Iraqi diplomats in Iran would face retaliation and
the dispute would inevitably become public. Since the fall
of Saddam, the GOI has avoided most public disagreements with
Iran.
--------------------
Security Partnership
--------------------
¶6. (S/NF) The role of the ISF in countering IRGC-QF in Iraq
is critical, yet complex. We can encourage the Iraqi Army to
take the lead on kinetic action against IRGC-QF agents, with
Iraqi police monitoring and reacting to suspicious activity
at the local level. We intend to continue to strengthen our
partnership with the ISF to counter pro-Iranian elements who
have infiltrated the security forces such as Kata'’ib
Hizbollah and Asa'’ib Ahl al-Haq. While the US combat mission
will end by August 31, 2009, we will continue to assist the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) with training, equipment, mentoring
and other bilateral military-to-military programs and
engagements. Military sales, such as the recent Iraqi
interest in purchasing F-16s and plans to transition from
AK-47 to M-4 rifles, will increase US influence through
training and support in Iraq for years to come, although the
MOD will continue to consider weapons purchases from other
sources as well.
---------------
Border Controls
---------------
¶7. (S) The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) can help
limit IRGC-QF activity by combating smuggling and
scrutinizing people and cargo crossing legitimate routes from
Iran into Iraq. While the DBE currently has a strong
commander, Major General Mohsen Abdul Hasan Lazim,XXXXXXXXXXXX corruption
at the ports of entry (POEs), unwillingness of inspectors to
do their jobs, and poor leadership and professionalism at the
supervisory level keep the DBE from being fully effective.
The USG can assist, however. Personal Identification Secure
Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which checks
travelers'’ biographic data, is already in use at many land
and air POEs around Iraq. Additional training at sea ports,
airports, and land borders could help Iraqi officials detect
smugglers of cash, weapons, weapons components and other
contraband. An Iranian IRGC-QF officer was briefly detained
at Baghdad International Airport in November 2008 when his
name was flagged in PISCES. In January 2009, KRG'’s Minister
of the Interior Karim Sinjari praised PISCES and asked for
the system at two more land border entry points the KRG
shares with Iran, Khalil Ibrahim and Hadjer Meran.
¶8. (S) As of April 2009, there were 200 PISCES units in
operation at 15 different POEs in Iraq. Current guidance
states that every traveler entering or exiting Iraq is
processed through PISCES. On occasion however, travelers
will pay a small "“fee"” to enter or exit without going through
PISCES. If a potential match is found to someone on the
"“stop list,"” the screen freezes, and only INIS can unlock the
screen and conduct a secondary inspection. INIS notifies the
GOI or USG when the identity of a wanted person is confirmed.
PISCES is operated by Immigration officers assigned to the
Department of Travel and Nationality, and the GOI will
continue to use PISCES after the military drawdown.
Collection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
QCollection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
GOI is already using at POEs, although Biometric Automated
Toolset (BAT) system is run by U.S. forces and will not stay
in Iraq after their departure.
¶9. (S/NF) A timely example of cooperation with DBE in
countering Iranian lethal aid smuggling occurred April 14. A
DBE brigade in Maysan Province, partnered with Multi-National
Division-South (MND-S) forces, captured an unmanned boat
carrying explosive devices floating in the Huwayza Marsh.
The patrol found three explosively formed projectiles (EFPs)
and other military equipment. MND-S said it was the first
time the DBE had reported success against this type of
smuggling.
--------------------
Intelligence Sharing
--------------------
BAGHDAD 00001103 003 OF 003
¶10. (S/NF) Coordinating with GOI intelligence agencies to
stop IRGC-QF activity is complicated by the fact that the
Iraqi intelligence establishment is extremely fragmented.
Intelligence offices affiliated with the Ministry of the
Interior (MOI), DBE, and the Ministry of State for National
Security Affairs (MSNSA) do not trust each other and often
work in opposition. The USG could further assist Iraqi
intelligence by negotiating and approving a bilateral
US-Iraqi intelligence sharing agreements and further
providing the GOI with intelligence that demonstrates the
involvement of IRGC-QF officers in lethal assistance to
extremists. US Forces in Iraq have established positive
relationships with their ISF counterparts and are developing
appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms. The USG can also
assist the GOI to further develop its intelligence
infrastructure to monitor malign Iranian influence and
counter the IRGC-QF. INIS currently interacts closely with
the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA). The establishment of a
Defense Attach'’s Office at the Embassy will also help
facilitate intelligence sharing and is under consideration by
Chief of Mission.
-------------------
Public Information
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Highlighting nefarious Iranian activity to GOI
leadership and the Iraqi public has had a significant impact
on increasing GOI willingness to confront Iran, as well as
public rejection of Iranian attempts to dominate Iraq'’s
political and economic sectors. Provincial elections
demonstrated that perceived fealty to Iran is a political
liability for Iraqi politicians, and they are increasingly
sensitive to it. Continued USG assistance in uncovering and
publicizing Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq will
make the country a much more inhospitable environment for
IRGC-QF operatives.
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (S/NF) The Iranian government may sense that the drawdown
of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents an opportunity to
expand IRGC-QF activity, although the broader regional
dynamic will undoubtedly also influence Iranian decision
making. Without the ability to conduct unilateral military
action against IRGC-QF operatives in Iraq, we will leverage
our evolving diplomatic, intelligence, security, and military
partnerships with Iraq to maintain pressure. Many USG
agencies will be involved in assisting the Iraqis in this
critical area, and must actively engage in order to counter
IRGC-QF officers and their lethal aid.
BUTENIS
`
Changed on December 04, 2010 12:47 compared to December 03, 2010 15:01
`VZCZCXRO8610
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1103/01 1141618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241618Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2829
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Friday, 24 April 2009, 16:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001103
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2029
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, ECON, ETRD, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF
REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 150
¶B. 07 BAGHDAD 488
¶C. BAGHDAD 289
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d’'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds
Force (IRGC-QF) officers are active in Iraq, conducting
traditional espionage and supporting violent extremists as
well as supporting both legitimate and malign Iranian
economic and cultural outreach. Iraqis and their government
have demonstrated increasing willingness to push back against
malign Iranian influence in the last year. Working with the
Iraqis, we have succeeded in stopping some IRGC-QF activity
through military operations and diplomatic engagement, while
we prevented some IRGC-QF officers from entering Iraq through
explicit warnings that we would target them unilaterally.
However, under the Security Agreement effective January 1,
all operations in Iraq must be conducted in conjunction with
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and our previous unilateral
warnings carry less weight. As Coalition Forces continue the
period of responsible drawdown, we will rely increasingly on
the GOI to keep the pressure on the IRGC-QF. We intend to
support the GOI in these efforts through continued diplomatic
engagement, intelligence sharing, and our security
partnership of Coalition Forces working by, with, and through
the ISF. End summary.
-----------
Background:
-----------
¶2. (S/NF) IRGC-QF leadership took advantage of the vacuum
which surrounded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the entry of
Coalition Forces into Iraq in 2003, using the opportunity to
send operatives to Iraq when little attention was focused on
Iran. In January 2007, Coalition Forces raided an unofficial
Iranian consulate in Erbil, detaining five Iranians who
claimed to be diplomats but in reality held no diplomatic
status. They were suspected of operations aimed at killing
Coalition and Iraqi security forces (refs A and B). The
original targets of the raid, IRGC-QF officers Abbas Hoseyni
(of the Erbil office) and Hormat Faruqi (of the Sulaimaniyah
office), escaped and fled to Iran. The Iranian government
immediately pulled back most IRGC-QF officers from Iraq and
shuttered its “"consulates”" in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah until
mid-2007; consulates in Basrah and Karbala remained open.
Since 2007, Iran has submitted diplomatic visa applications
for Hoseini and Faruqi to return to Iraq. In 2008 the
Embassy and MNF-I convinced the GOI not to approve these
applications, making it clear if they returned to Iraq, they
would be targeted by Coalition Forces.
¶3. (S/NF) Since 2008, the MFA has passed names of Iranians
applying for diplomatic visas to the US Embassy for vetting.
Background checks have revealed that about 20 percent have
possible ties to the IRGC or Iran’'s Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS) (ref C). The MFA has informed us that it
denies visas to all new suspected intelligence officers, but
we have not been able to verify such claims. In January
2009, the MFA passed a list of 35 names to the USG of Iranian
diplomats already in country before the vetting process
began. Of those, eight had ties to IRGC or MOIS.
--------
Strategy
--------
¶4. (S/NF) As U.S. forces continue a period of responsible
draw down, we will seek to ensure that the GOI understands
that IRGC-QF activity harms Iraq -- which should be
self-evident if the IRGC-QF continues to conduct malign
activity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
Qactivity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
Engagements with political and security leadership at the
national and provincial level, intelligence sharing, and
security cooperation will be key to explaining the dangers of
IRGC-QF activity and providing Iraqis the information they
need to defend their own interests. The following are
diplomatic, political, military, intelligence, and public
information options which either the GOI can pursue
unilaterally, or in concert with the USG, to target IRGC-QF
activity in Iraq.
---------
Diplomacy
---------
BAGHDAD 00001103 002 OF 003
¶5. (S/NF) We intend to continue working closely with the MFA
to deny visas to Iranian intelligence officers. We may also
consider suggesting that the MFA use another diplomatic tool,
albeit one with more consequences -- the “"persona non grata”"
designation. The MFA may be reluctant to take this step
because Iraqi diplomats in Iran would face retaliation and
the dispute would inevitably become public. Since the fall
of Saddam, the GOI has avoided most public disagreements with
Iran.
--------------------
Security Partnership
--------------------
¶6. (S/NF) The role of the ISF in countering IRGC-QF in Iraq
is critical, yet complex. We can encourage the Iraqi Army to
take the lead on kinetic action against IRGC-QF agents, with
Iraqi police monitoring and reacting to suspicious activity
at the local level. We intend to continue to strengthen our
partnership with the ISF to counter pro-Iranian elements who
have infiltrated the security forces such as Kata’'ib
Hizbollah and Asa’'ib Ahl al-Haq. While the US combat mission
will end by August 31, 2009, we will continue to assist the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) with training, equipment, mentoring
and other bilateral military-to-military programs and
engagements. Military sales, such as the recent Iraqi
interest in purchasing F-16s and plans to transition from
AK-47 to M-4 rifles, will increase US influence through
training and support in Iraq for years to come, although the
MOD will continue to consider weapons purchases from other
sources as well.
---------------
Border Controls
---------------
¶7. (S) The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) can help
limit IRGC-QF activity by combating smuggling and
scrutinizing people and cargo crossing legitimate routes from
Iran into Iraq. XXXXXXXXXXXX corruption
at the ports of entry (POEs), unwillingness of inspectors to
do their jobs, and poor leadership and professionalism at the
supervisory level keep the DBE from being fully effective.
The USG can assist, however. Personal Identification Secure
Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which checks
travelers’' biographic data, is already in use at many land
and air POEs around Iraq. Additional training at sea ports,
airports, and land borders could help Iraqi officials detect
smugglers of cash, weapons, weapons components and other
contraband. An Iranian IRGC-QF officer was briefly detained
at Baghdad International Airport in November 2008 when his
name was flagged in PISCES. In January 2009, KRG’'s Minister
of the Interior Karim Sinjari praised PISCES and asked for
the system at two more land border entry points the KRG
shares with Iran, Khalil Ibrahim and Hadjer Meran.
¶8. (S) As of April 2009, there were 200 PISCES units in
operation at 15 different POEs in Iraq. Current guidance
states that every traveler entering or exiting Iraq is
processed through PISCES. On occasion however, travelers
will pay a small “"fee”" to enter or exit without going through
PISCES. If a potential match is found to someone on the “
"stop list,”" the screen freezes, and only INIS can unlock the
screen and conduct a secondary inspection. INIS notifies the
GOI or USG when the identity of a wanted person is confirmed.
PISCES is operated by Immigration officers assigned to the
Department of Travel and Nationality, and the GOI will
continue to use PISCES after the military drawdown.
Collection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
QCollection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
GOI is already using at POEs, although Biometric Automated
Toolset (BAT) system is run by U.S. forces and will not stay
in Iraq after their departure.
¶9. (S/NF) A timely example of cooperation with DBE in
countering Iranian lethal aid smuggling occurred April 14. A
DBE brigade in Maysan Province, partnered with Multi-National
Division-South (MND-S) forces, captured an unmanned boat
carrying explosive devices floating in the Huwayza Marsh.
The patrol found three explosively formed projectiles (EFPs)
and other military equipment. MND-S said it was the first
time the DBE had reported success against this type of
smuggling.
--------------------
Intelligence Sharing
--------------------
BAGHDAD 00001103 003 OF 003
¶10. (S/NF) Coordinating with GOI intelligence agencies to
stop IRGC-QF activity is complicated by the fact that the
Iraqi intelligence establishment is extremely fragmented.
Intelligence offices affiliated with the Ministry of the
Interior (MOI), DBE, and the Ministry of State for National
Security Affairs (MSNSA) do not trust each other and often
work in opposition. The USG could further assist Iraqi
intelligence by negotiating and approving a bilateral
US-Iraqi intelligence sharing agreements and further
providing the GOI with intelligence that demonstrates the
involvement of IRGC-QF officers in lethal assistance to
extremists. US Forces in Iraq have established positive
relationships with their ISF counterparts and are developing
appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms. The USG can also
assist the GOI to further develop its intelligence
infrastructure to monitor malign Iranian influence and
counter the IRGC-QF. INIS currently interacts closely with
the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA). The establishment of a
Defense Attach’'s Office at the Embassy will also help
facilitate intelligence sharing and is under consideration by
Chief of Mission.
-------------------
Public Information
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Highlighting nefarious Iranian activity to GOI
leadership and the Iraqi public has had a significant impact
on increasing GOI willingness to confront Iran, as well as
public rejection of Iranian attempts to dominate Iraq’'s
political and economic sectors. Provincial elections
demonstrated that perceived fealty to Iran is a political
liability for Iraqi politicians, and they are increasingly
sensitive to it. Continued USG assistance in uncovering and
publicizing Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq will
make the country a much more inhospitable environment for
IRGC-QF operatives.
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (S/NF) The Iranian government may sense that the drawdown
of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents an opportunity to
expand IRGC-QF activity, although the broader regional
dynamic will undoubtedly also influence Iranian decision
making. Without the ability to conduct unilateral military
action against IRGC-QF operatives in Iraq, we will leverage
our evolving diplomatic, intelligence, security, and military
partnerships with Iraq to maintain pressure. Many USG
agencies will be involved in assisting the Iraqis in this
critical area, and must actively engage in order to counter
IRGC-QF officers and their lethal aid.
BUTENIS
`
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 is missing on December 05, 2010 10:16, but was present on December 04, 2010 18:11
Cable 09BAGHDAD1103 was restored on December 05, 2010 19:45