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Mikhail Frunze "Front and Rear in Future War"
By: Long Knives 88 Date: January 13, 2016, 4:06 pm
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M. V. Frunze
"Front and Rear in Future War," from "Front i tyl v voine
budushchego," Na novykh putiakh, 1925, as reprinted in M. V.
Frunze, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Moscow, 1940)
Translation copyright David R. Stone 2006, 2012.
The basic and most important conclusion from the experience of
the past imperialist war of 1914-1918 is the reevaluation of the
question of the role and significance of the rear in the general
course of military operations.
The position that "the outcome of war will be decided not only
directly on the battlefront, but on those lines where the
civilian strength of the country stands" has now become a common
axiom. The experience of war showed that achieving a war's aims
in contemporary conditions has become a significantly more
complicated matter than previously. Contemporary armies have
colossal endurance [zhivuchest']. This endurance is wholly
connected with the general state of the country. Even the
complete defeat of an enemy army, achieved at a particular
moment, will still not bring final victory, so long as the
defeated units have behind them an economically and morally
strong rear. Given time and space, providing for the new
mobilization of human and material resources necessary for
reestablishing an army's combat readiness, the defeated army can
easily recreate a front and carry on the struggle with hope for
success.
From the other side, the difficulty of providing for an army's
mobilization preparedness has risen to improbable levels. The
measures necessary for this are measured not in hundreds of
millions but billions of rubles. No budget, understandably, is
capable of matching these figures, even in the richest country.
Finally, the rapid progress of contemporary military technology
acts in the same way. What is recognized as most advanced today
will tomorrow already be obsolete and incapable of bringing
victory. From this follows the inadvisability and actual danger
of colossal financial outlays on the preparation of mobilization
stockpiles. The center of gravity has moved to the corresponding
organization of industry and in general to the country's
management.
From this we can conclude the necessity of reexamining the very
principles of strategy. In a clash of first-rank opponents, a
decision cannot be reached with the first blow. War will take on
the character of a lengthy and harsh contest (69), testing all
economic and political resources of the warring sides. Expressed
in the language of strategy, this signifies a shift from the
strategy of decisive, lightning blows to a strategy of
attrition.
This conclusion, while basically correct, must be supplemented
by a correction coming from the class character of future war.
The essence of this correction is that under a deep
intensification of class contradiction, the moral stability of
one of the warring sides may turn out to be quite weak and may
not withstand the active of the first serious military blow.
Especially characteristic on this point is the position of
warring sides of opposed class structures--e.g., the clash of
any bourgeois state with our Soviet Union. It is obvious that as
result of a strong military blow from our side, a spontaneous
class-proletarian movement in the opposing side could find its
hands untied, the seizure of power by the working class could
become possible, which would signify an immediate end to the
war.
Doubtlessly, this kind of discussion is applicable to us as
well, in so far as internal enemies of worker-peasant rule can
rear their heads. This is explained, moreover, by the fact that
the remnants of the armed White Guards (Wrangelites) and others
continue to this day to enjoy the well-known patronage of the
governments of bourgeois countries.
Thus, from the discussion above, there is no need for us to
conclude that we need to absolutely reject a strategy of
preemptive strikes (this strategy, by the way, in not rejected
in bourgeois states either). On the contrary, the stronger the
class contradictions in enemy states, the greater the chances
and grounds for success and profit of just this strategy.
Despite all this, the need to prepare for a long and difficult
war is still obligatory for us. Insofar as we're discussing the
clash of two different worlds, this means the fight will be to
the death. The worker-peasant Republic has many enemies, and
therefore the struggle will under any conditions be a long one.
Therefore, the connection of the front with the rear in our day
must become much closer, more direct, and more decisive. The
life and work of the front at every moment is determined by the
work and state of the rear. And in this sense the center of
gravity of conducting war moves from the front backwards--to the
rear.
There is still another point in this direction, connected with
the development of military technology and the perfection of
destructive forces. The transformation of aviation into a
decisive branch, the improvements in chemical weapons, the
possible use of infectious agents, and so on, and so on--all
(71) this essentially overturns the very concepts of "front" and
"rear" in the old meaning of the terms.
"Front" in the sense of a region directly encompassing military
actions has lost its previous character as a living barrier
blocking enemy access to the "rear." If not completely, then in
any event at least in part (depending mainly on the size of the
territory of a given country), the rear has now blended with the
front. From this there must be new missions and new methods of
preparing the country's defense and, in particular, a new role
for the rear itself as a direct participant in the struggle. If
the direct weight of conducting a war falls on the entire
nation, the entire country, if the rear acquiriessuch
significance for the general course of military operations, then
naturally the task of preparing it comprehensively and
systematically in peacetime takes top priority.
This preparation must have as its first goal the uninterrupted
supply to the front of everything necessary for the conduct of
military operations; second, the supply to the rear of
everything necessary to maintain its working energy and moral
stability at the necessary level. The task is understood in that
way in all contemporary world powers, straining to give it
practical expression.
For us, this problem--the problem of organizing the Soviet state
for the eventuality of war--has exceptional significance. The
size of our territory, the comparatively low population density,
the insufficient railroad net, the weak development of industry,
general technical backwardness, and so on--all this puts us in
an extremely disadvantageous position in terms of mobilization
preparation by comparison with potential enemies.
Our standing army must be the means providing for the planned
conduct of the country's mobilization. But no one in our Union
can be under illusions on this score. We have gone to extremes
in our efforts to reduce the military burden on the population.
In 1924 we cut the army by an additional 50,000 troops, and so
instead of our previous 610,000 we now have only 560,000 men.
And since a significant number of these are in the rear
services, in all kinds of supporting positions, the share of
actual combat elements in the army remains a much smaller
figure. In such a situation it's clear that we do not have a
standing army in the true sense of the word: a sufficient armed
force in being and ready to accept the blows of the enemy. We
have only a cadre, only the skeleton of a future army, and even
that is insufficiently strong.
From that, our urgent, burning, immediate task: to strengthen
(71) general efforts at preparing the country for defense; to
organize the country in peacetime so that it can quickly,
easily, and painlessly move to military rails. The path to this
lies in taking even in peacetime a firm course to the
militarization of the functions of our entire civil apparatus.
What this must mean, we will now see.
The task of preparing the country for defense in contemporary
conditions lies far outside the current capabilities of the army
and the military bureaucracy alone. The task must become the
concern of the entire country, the entire Soviet apparatus. The
matter may seem impossible at first glance, but that is not
correct. The difficulties here, it is true, are very great, but
in fact the character of our state power will make overcoming
them easier than for all others.
Here are some examples to indicate the direction in which our
work must now go.
Preparation of the officer [commander] corps. To date this has
been the exclusive responsibility of the military. A whole
network of military-educational institutions of all types for
all specialties and ranks already exists for this purpose. Is
this system satisfactory? Hardly. First, it is extremely
expensive. Second, those being prepared for the needs of war
(the reserve officer corps) are nevertheless insufficient.
Can this task be handled differently? Doubtlessly, it can. A
living example of this can be found in America, where the
preparation of reserve officers lies entirely within Comrade
Lunacharskii's responsibility [People's Commissar of
Enlightenment / Education]. We can look at a description in the
journal _War and Peace_ [White emigre journal], where we read:
"The method of producing reserve officers from among the youth
of institutions of higher education has achieved a high degree
of development in America as a result of the system's democratic
nature and low expense. At the present time, 123 institutions of
higher education in the United States carry out the military
training of student volunteers, who constitute the 'student body
of reserve officers,' numbering as many as 60,000 people.
"The military preparation itself in the university is structured
so that it brings the students benefits: relaxation, physical
and sport training, calling forth competition and interest. As a
result, passing through a military course is regarded as a
special reward and is accompanied by clear benefits (prizes,
material assistance, and so on). Finally, the study of military
science is set up in a model and interesting manner.
Distribution among specialties is carried out in correspondence
with the specialization of the university or department (72):
for example, students of the mechanical engineering department
are prepared for service in shore artillery and so on. Each
university or college is put into a specific number of groups by
branch of service or specialty in correspondence with the
department's specialty and its number of students. All the
groups together make up the 'military department' of the
educational institution. An officer heads the department as a
professor of military science, having under his command teachers
of military science, as was as line officers and junior
officers.
"The rector of the university assigns a certain number of hours
in the week for study of a course in military science and
allocates the necessary facilities for holding the courses'
material elements (artillery pieces, tractors, rifles, and so
on) belonging to the military department"
All the general activities of the Commissariat of National
Enlightenment must be structured so that they fully account for
and serve the needs of defense. Its militarization is necessary
at all levels and branches.
It's possible that some part of the personnel of the educational
establishment may be frightened by this "militarism." This only
shows the presence of sentimental, petty-bourgeoisie moods and a
complete misunderstanding of the essence and character of the
tasks facing our Republic's workers and peasants. The deep and
principled contradiction existing between the nature of the
Soviet Union and the remaining bourgeois-capitalist world must
sooner or later take the form of a open and decisive clash. Thhe
facts of contemporary international life are a sharp
demonstration of this. One cannot say with certainty that the
result of the new anti-Soviet bloc now being organized by
England will become a new intervention in the near future. But
one can and must with all decisiveness underline that in the
long term such a clash is unavoidable. The initiative to attack
will not be ours. As far as concerns us, we could calmly await
the results of our cultural and economic successes. Sooner or
later, this would inevitably lead to the flowering of socialist
ideals in other countries as well. But our enemies would hardly
allow us the possibility of peaceful socialist development,
which threatens the very existence of capitalism. And therefore
our task--to firmly, methodically, and unwaveringly prepare for
this struggle, to prepare the conditions of our victory.
Organizing and directing the Commissariats of Enlightenment of
the union republics is among the most important of these types
of conditions. As a result of this work, the army must receive
cultured, literate, and politically-educated soldier-citizens.
When this is achieved, it will nine-tenths decide the outcome of
any threatening clash. Each success in this direction at present
endlessly benefits our work in wartime itself. Liquidating
illiteracy in the next draft cohort must be this coming year's
concrete task. Up until now the army has had to deal with this
issue, which has done great damage to other priorities. It can
and must be dealt with by the Commissariat of Enlightenment
before the moment of call-up.
A different immediate task must be the inclusion in primary and
secondary schools programs of a minimal course in military
knowledge and training. This is especially important in the
countryside, providing the overwhelming majority of the of armed
forces. At the present time, thanks to its low cultural level
and at times simple illiteracy, this contingent does not present
the best material for the conditions of contemporary battle.
These shortcomings must be addressed by corresponding changes in
education, beginning with the school bench. The role of our
teachers in this is immeasurable. With a small addition of
resources, they can provide colossal services to the defense of
the country.
Another example--transport [oboz]. The demand for transport in a
mobilized army will be enormous. To think of preparing
mobilization stockpiles on the military budget alone is the
purest illusion, for its resources are insufficient to satisfy
even day-to-day necessities. And the very system of accumulating
these mobilization reserves is extremely impractical in view of
its expense. But the needs of mobilization could be completely
satisfied if our economic organs were, in place of the
impossible task of creating such reserves, to address themselves
instead to the development and distribution among the peasantry
of vehicles of such types which would both completely satisfy
the economic demands of the population and at the same time be
suitable for military needs. The introduction of a system of
supportive measures and broad backing for this, starting with
the army, would ensure success.
Another example. We've begun to develop a tractor industry. As
is well-known, the tractor will play an important role on future
battlefields. In addition to the obvious role of tanks, the
caterpillar tractor has broad application in other spheres of
military affairs: for example, in a series of countries the
transition for horse-drawn to tractor-drawn artillery is
beginning. Given our poverty, thinking about the accumulation of
that technology in peacetime exclusively for the needs of the
army would be a fool's game. But to ensure that the types of
tractors applied to peacetime ends would also satisfy certain
minimal military demands--that's a completely necessary and
practicable measure.
Means of communication and transport will play an especially
important role in the course of military activities. In essence,
all the mobilization-preparatory work in this area lies outside
the sphere of the military. To provide the wartime army with
mobilization reserves of communications equipment and transport
at the expense of the civilian budget is a utopia, and a harmful
one. All this must be prepared in the process of the normal,
peacetime work of the corresponding People's Commissariats. This
work has already received the necessary attention. We can
already see some results, especially in communication. In a
whole series of forms of production, we've already freed
ourselves from foreign dependence. We need to move still more
energetically and broadly on this path. We need to
organizationally establish and strengthen a still closer link
between the relevant People's Commissariats and the
corresponding sections and directorates of the military. The
latter must become the mobilization-instructional staff for the
former.
Such "militarization" is fully achievable, but only under two
necessary conditions: first, with a clear consciousness by the
rear, and especially the civilian apparat, of its role in future
war and necessity of timely preparation for it. Second, through
the establishment of a vital, direct connection between the
military and the civilian apparatus. This connection must be
strengthened organizationally, through the introduction of
representatives of the army to corresponding civil organs and
institutions relevant to their specialties.
Our economic managers will have an especially important role.
They must remember that war requires the mobilization of all the
country's economic resources, agricultural, industrial, and
financial. These must be organized, coordinated, and directed by
the same strategy that directs the operation of the armed
forces.
The leaders of our trusts and conglomerates [kombinaty], the
directors of our plants and factories, in all their peacetime
activities must start from these points-of-view. With each new
undertaking--economic, cultural or otherwise--they must always
ask the question: what's the relation between this project and
the need to provide for the country's defense? Isn't it
possible, without damage to peacetime demands, to do things that
provide for the achievement of certain military goals?
From the other side, our military managers must review the types
of items supplied to both the peacetime and wartime armies. We
need to strive to the maximal use of those models which are
objects of broad consumption in peacetime, if possible, where
mass production is already instituted. Here all non-essential
details must be ignored. The possibility of mass supply in
wartime without any additional exertion or outlay fully excuses
any secondary defects. (75)
Understandably, we cannot demand from our managers such
preparation, such knowledge of military affairs, which would
automatically produce the fulfillment of these demands. To help
them is above all the task of the military. The military is
obliged, with the help of certain organizational forms of the
work of the apparatus, and also the agency of various social
organizations (Society of Friends of the Air Fleet, Dobrokhim,
VNO, and others) to influence the character and direction of the
work of economic organs.
Finally, the question of the mobilization of industry and in
general of the country's economy. Experience of the imperialist
war gives us rich material in this regard. Our civil war, in its
turn, provided a series of valuable data, flowing from the
particular structures of our state. I must complain that our
experience here is little studied in the corresponding post-war
literature. The work of our supply organs--Chusosnabarm and
Oprodkomarms--has the greatest practical interest in addition to
great historical significance.
The particular importance of systematic, planned, and
painstaking investigation and preparation on the question of
industrial mobilization is clear to all. Meanwhile we must
recognize that we have done extremely little on this. This work
must be set up just as it is in general staffs with regard to
purely military questions. The same operational plan that we
draw up for troops we must assemble for the deployment of our
national economy in wartime. This plan must take into account
all our demands and all our resources. The proper and
uninterrupted supply of the front and rear must be provided for.
This work is incredibly complex, but it is necessary and
possible. It's worth noting that carrying this out is far easier
for us thanks to the state character of the basic branches of
our industry. This is our great superiority to bourgeois states,
and it would be unforgivable to not know how to use this
advantage in the proper way.
Scholarly works that shed light on the development of these
important themes are almost entirely absent, but this must not
continue. It's worth wishing that research on these questions
would occupy a fitting place in our military and civil press.
This is, above all, the duty of our supply officials. I would
like to remind them again and again to quickly and radically
abandon the remains of views which have sunken into oblivion.
The task of our supply officials is not merely to distribute
production among various units: it would be far simpler if it
were only distribution. The center of gravity of their work is
in state procurement orders [zagatovka]. State orders are
located in the hands of civil and state organs. To take all this
into military hands simply and directly is a utopia. (76) It is
necessary to approach the issue somewhat differently, to not
only be in on how they do things "there" [in the civil sector?]
but to influence the character of production itself, proceeding
from the demands of defense. Given this, supply must not just
concern itself with providing for the army's current needs, but
to no less a degree concern itself with mobilization stockpiles.
But in order to do this we must realize very well the
truth--that the center of our attention must be transferred to
the organization of corresponding branches of industry. Our
supplying directorates must have as their primary task the
provision of an original mutual link with the entire industrial
world of the country, and equally with the scientific-technical
world. This connection must not be limited to central organs--it
must take place at the local level as well. An exceptionally
important role will then fall on our territorial [militia]
units. They must, above all, not wait for prodding from above,
but strongly connect themselves with the local apparatus,
stubbornly carrying through the line indicated from above.
Any productive work is conceivable only in the presence of
corresponding organization, habits, skills, and methods. Work on
such a grand scale, a systematic sketch of which I gave above,
demands this to an even greater degree. We are not especially
rich in good organizers. The entire practice of our work is
threatened by thousands of kinds of shortcomings. Many of them
are not the result of misunderstanding, but simple disorder,
slovenliness, and the absence of a systematic approach. Bringing
about the program sketched above is made much easier by the
state character of the basic elements of our economy. It would
be a scandalous crime if given such an advantage we were unable
to elevate the defense of the Soviet Union to the necessary
heights. We need only good will on the part of civil and
military officials, and then, planned, systematic, stubborn
work.
Only with such an approach will the mobilization of the country
for the needs of defense be set up as it should.
The significance of the rear, that is the preparation of the
entire economic and state apparat of the country, presents a
serious challenge to the personnel of civil institutions--in the
sense of accounting for the demands of future war and
harmonizing production with its needs--and to military personnel
in establishing the closest ties with corresponding civil
institutions. Together with this, the exceptionally important
role of the rear does not in any way diminish, but on the
contrary in many ways increase the requirements and concerns of
the cadres of the standing army.
The problem of indoctrination and education of millions of
reserves with uninterrupted difficulties in military affairs and
a comparatively short term of service, the problem of the best
organization of troops under current technological conditions
and our real technological possibilities; the task of daily
verification and unwavering improvementof the basis of military
affairs from the point of view of future mass war; finally, the
establishment in the Red Army of a firm tone of precise,
systematic, and unstinting work down to the smallest screw--all
these tasks must be carried out by nothing less than the entire
Red Army, in order that future mobilization will give the
possibility of providing with the least exertion of energy for
the creation of strong and organized army of war.
That's why the permanent personnel of the Red Army--above all,
of course, the officer, political, and administrative-managerial
corps, bear an especially great responsibility. Each unit of the
Red Army now existing has in the event of war a sufficiently
significant multiplier which, when put into action, will many
times over increase its strengths and its weaknesses. The
leadership of the Red Army must take this into account and work
sincerely, work creatively, for from their work in a very, very
significant measure depends our victory, the victory of the
international proletariat in the looming clash with capital.
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