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Mikhail Frunze "Unified Military Doctrine"
By: Long Knives 88 Date: January 13, 2016, 4:04 pm
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M. V. Frunze
"Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army" (1921), from
Izbrannye proizvedenie (Moscow, 1940), originally published in
Armiia i revoliutsiia, # 1 (July 1921).
Translation copyright David R. Stone 2006, revised 2012.
One of the most important questions attracting the attention of
our contemporary military thought is the question of the
so-called "unified military doctrine."
It has served as a subject for lively discussion in articles a
series of military specialists placed in the pages of the
now-defunct journal "Military Affairs"; army personnel have
approached this question earnestly, as witnessed by the
proceedings of many military conferences shedding light on the
questions of reorganization of the Red Army.
All this speaks of the presence of the deep theoretical and
practical interest aroused by this question. But, unfortunately,
the matter has not yet moved further than simple interest, for
up to this time we have not only not attempted the systematic
study of our military doctrine, but the very contents of that
concept are to a sufficient degree cloudy and indeterminate.
In particular, the articles of our old military specialists have
brought to light disagreement in opinions and views. It's gone
literally according to the proverb: "so many heads means so many
opinions." As recognized by the leading representatives of the
military world, it turns out that our old general staff does not
hold any kind of determined views on this basic question of
military theory, and even more than that, there is no clear
conception of what the very question substantively consists
of--the skill to properly pose it is lacking.
This fact, which speaks above all to the extremely thin
military-theoretical resources which we have inherited from the
old army, could lead to sad ruminations on the chances for
further efforts in that direction. We need to recognize,
doubtlessly, that there is some foundation for those kind of
fears, but only some.
It's worth remembering the social-political situation in which
our (19) old comrades in military affairs developed and worked
out their thinking. In the atmosphere of an autocratic police
state, which suppressed any social and personal initiative,
against a background of our general economic and political
backwardness, under the extremely ingrained habits and views in
all spheres of social activity, of course one couldn't speak of
some kind of broad scholarly creativity.
All these deformities appear especially sharply in the state of
our military affairs, where inquisitive thought was relentlessly
nipped in the bud and initiative was undercut. Therefore one
cannot objectively blame the old General Staff for that
confusion and helplessness it displayed on a series of
questions. Nevertheless, a fact remains a fact, and all those
who hold the interests of our Soviet republic dear and want to
see the further development and strengthening of its military
power must take it into account.
We think that on the basis of newly created social relations, in
a situation not only allowing but directly demanding from each
honest citizen maximal energy and initiative, that our military
theory will be able to develop quickly and grow stronger as
well. We think that in the midst of the old General Staff we
will find more than a few workers capable of tearing from their
spiritual selves the clothes of the Old Testament Adam, not able
to think differently than within the bounds of narrow frames and
habits presented by a bourgeois worldview, steeped in a spirit
of philistine dullness and stagnation.
The basic condition for fruitful work by our old specialists
consists of this ability to rid themselves of the remains of old
routines, to understand all the complexities of the destruction
of the old world going on around us, to take up the point of
view of the new social classes moving into the arena of life.
The practical experience many of them received in the ranks of
the Red Army will give sufficient material for this task.
All this, taken together with the activity of the newly-spread
wings of the young generation of our military workers, moving up
during the period of revolutionary wars from the lower ranks of
the population, gives complete assurance that in the near future
the business of analyzing our military experience will move
forward along with the working out of those unified views which
must serve as a basis for the Red Army's training and the
absence of which we now painfully feel from the top to the
bottom of the Red Army.
This article presented for the reader's attention is an attempt
to raise the question of a "unified military doctrine" from the
point of view of the interests of a workers' state and
revolution and to sketch as an example a path which, it seems to
us, the resolution of the problem must follow. (20)
II.
Before all else, what exactly do we mean by "unified military
doctrine"? What is the practical meaning of this idea?
An answer to this question is already evident from the most
superficial look at the essence of contemporary wars, the
character of current military tasks and the conditions of their
resolution.
Wars of the current historical period in comparison with
previous epochs have a whole series of characteristic features.
In previous times the outcomes of armed clashes depended on
comparatively small groups of the population, or on defined and
formed standing formations who considered war their profession,
or on those temporarily included in the ranks of troops for
these goals. Now, however, the participants of war are whole
nations almost to a man. It's not thousands and tens of
thousands fighting, but whole millions--wars themselves draw
into their sphere and decisively subordinate all sides of social
life, and drag in without exception state and social interests.
The theater of military operations is no longer a narrowly
bounded space, but a huge territory with tens and hundreds of
millions of inhabitants; technical means of struggle are
endlessly developing and becoming more complex, creating newer
and newer categories of specialties, types of arms, and so on
and so forth.
Under these conditions, the basic demand of military art and
science--the cohesiveness of the general plan and strong
coordination in its conduct--could indeed be left hanging. While
in previous wars the commander's direct leadership of individual
units of the overall formation was a normal occurrence, now
there can be no talk of that. Meanwhile unity, wholeness, and
agreement are needed more than at any previous time. And they
are needed not only in the period when military operations have
already developed, but also at that time when preliminary
preparations for those operations are going on, for, as a
general rule, this preparatory work both by the state as a whole
and its military apparatus in particular will play a decisive
role. The state must determine in advance the character of
general policy and, in particular, military policy, while noting
correspondingly possible objects of its military exertions,
working out and establishing a specific plan of general state
activities, taking into account future clashes and preparing
their tasks in advance by a propitious use of national energy.
As for the military apparatus, it must take the organizational
form most demanded by the general state aims, based on the
general state program, and by further work create a strong unity
of all the armed forces, connecting them from top to bottom by a
commonality of views on both the character (21) of military
tasks themselves, and on the means of their resolution.
This work on developing unity of thought and will in the ranks
of the army is an affair extraordinarily complex and difficult
and can succeed only when it is completed methodically
[planomerno], on the basis of the situation precisely formulated
and sanctioned by the general opinion of the class ruling the
country.
From what has been said above, it's clear that the study of
"unified military doctrine" has great practical significance for
the Republic's entire military development. This study must,
above all, indicate the character of those military clashes
which await us. Should we prepare ourselves for the passive
defense of the country, not setting or pursuing any kind of
active assignments, or must we have those active tasks in mind?
Military policy and the entire character of our armed forces'
development, the character and system of training for individual
soldiers and the largest formations, military-political
propaganda and in general the country's entire system of
education depends on the resolution one way or another of this
question.
This study must absolutely be unified as an expression of the
unified will of the social class in power.
Here is an illustrative list of general ideas and the practical
tasks proceeding from them, all of which must be included in the
understanding of "unified military doctrine."
It was already noted above that there is no more or less
generally accepted and exact formulation of this concept in our
military literature. But despite all the difference of opinion
expressed on the concept of "unified military doctrine," the
majority of the various formulations' basic points generally
coincide. Based on what's been said above, these basic points
may be divided into two categories: 1) technical and 2)
political. The first consists of those concerning the
organizational basis of the Red Army's development, the
character of troops' military preparation, and methods of
resolving military tasks. To the second relates the connection
between the technical side of the armed forces' development with
the general structure of state life, determining that social
environment in which military work must take place, and the very
character of military tasks.
In such a way, it's possible to propose this definition of
"unified military doctrine": "unified military doctrine" is the
instruction accepted in the army of a given state, establishing
the character of the country's armed forces' development, troop
training methods, their guidance on the basis of the state's
ruling views on the character of military tasks lying before
them, and the means of resolving those tasks, proceeding from
the state's class essence and determined by the level of
development of the country's productive forces. (22)
This formulation does not at all pretend to constructive
finality and complete logical consistency. That is simply not
the issue. What's important is the concept's basic content: its
final crystallization is a matter for further practical and
theoretical research.
III.
Having established the general logical content of "unified
military doctrine," we will move now to the question of concrete
practical content of this understanding in application to
really-existing armies in various states.
In connection with this, it's especially interesting to pause on
the example of three states which have sharply expressed
outlines of a single military ideology (military doctrine),
completely developed and embodied in precise form in their armed
forces. I have in mind Germany, France, and England. We begin
with the first.
Germany until very recently was the state with the most powerful
military apparatus, a structured system of organization of its
armed forces and a completely defined military ideology, unified
for both the leading elements of the army and the entire
country.
The basic line of German military doctrine in its technical part
(i.e. strictly military) is an extremely sharply expressed
aggressive spirit. The idea of activity, of striving to complete
military tasks via energetic, brave, and unwavering offensive
conduct permeates all German manuals and instructions for high
commanders. This idea also determined the structure of the
entire German military apparatus, emphasizing the resolution of
operational problems and creating in the German General Staff a
powerful and all-authoritative organ, managing all activities
for military planning and troop training. All troop education
and training went on in this tactically offensive spirit and in
the final result prepared such a perfectly structured and
prepared armed forces, that its preeminent combat qualities were
revealed in full measure on the fields of the imperialist war's
immense battles.
One asks: to what or to whom was Germany obliged for the
presence of such qualitatively superior armed forces?
The first answer has already been given: Germany developed its
army on the basis of a "unified military doctrine," constructed
in correspondence with the tenets of the military art. But this
is only a first answer. We must ask further: why did (23) the
German army have such a doctrine, why was that doctrine
inculcated from top to bottom, while at the same time in Russia,
say, there was nothing similar, although Russia also doubtlessly
possessed theoretical knowledge of the military art.
This question cannot be answered by pointing to the exceptional
military gifts of German military figures, who supposedly by the
strength of their genius discovered the secrets of victory and
created the German military doctrine which raised their army to
unattainable heights. Such an explanation is childishly naive,
but one must take note of it, for some of our military
specialists' articles consistently show attempts to link the
essence of creating a military doctrine to the individually
remarkable people's activities and talents of (see, for example,
such a definition: "military doctrine is the prophetic voice of
military genius" and similar nonsense.)
The basic outlines of German military doctrine are not at all an
accident; they turn out to be wholly and completely a product of
the general structure of German life in the period leading up to
the imperialist war.
What in fact was the German Empire until 1914? It was an
economically and politically powerful capitalist state with
sharply expressed imperialist coloring, a state conducting an
openly predatory policy, and, while relying on its material and
cultural strengths, striving for world hegemony. The presence of
strong competitors in the form of other imperialist countries
(France, England, Russia, and others), which had historically
created state-national unity earlier and successfully seized the
best morsels of world resources, forced imperialist Germany to
exert all its strength in the struggle for world position. The
ruling bourgeois class in Germany subordinated the country's
entire life to this basic state goal: victory over its
competitors.
The press, the sciences, the arts, the schools, the army--all
were organized and directed by the bourgeoisie to one goal. The
bourgeois succeeded in corrupting and subordinating to its
influence even significant layers of the German proletariat--a
class which was objectively opposed to that predatory line of
conduct taken by the bourgeoisie. And against this background,
in this atmosphere of general admiration for the army and fleet,
on the basis of the most active foreign policy, placing before
the army defined offensive tasks, no other kind of German
military doctrine could have been created besides that which we
have before us. In the personnel of the German general staff and
all the German army, in the very personality of Emperor Wilhelm
as never before, all Germany reflected the self-satisfied
burzhui [pejorative term for bourgeoisie] and landlords, sure in
their strength and their ecstatic dreams of world power.
"Germany over all"--that was the slogan which poisoned the
consciousness of the majority of the German nation in the era of
the imperialist war. And the German regiments were true to this
slogan as well, assuredly following the principles of their
doctrine, as they dashed in a shattering stream across the
plains of Belgium in 1914.
The very first clashes with enemy armies showed the strategic
and tactical correctness of the positions of German doctrine.
Such was the case with Germany. The conclusion one can made from
it is the following: all the military affairs of a given state,
up to and including training, on the basis of which are
constructed its armed forces, are a reflection of the entire
structure of its life, and, in the final analysis, its economic
way of life, as a first source of all its strength and
resources. The German generals would never have succeeded in
creating their military doctrine, and even if it had been done,
they would not have been able to inculcate it so thoroughly into
the German army if the corresponding conditions of German life
had not greeted it.
IV.
We move now to France.
This country also is a representative of predatory imperialism.
Just as with the German bourgeoisie, France was always ready to
seize foreign goods and acted in such circumstances no worse
than "militarist" Germany. But in actuality the French
bourgeoisie had significant differences from their eastern
neighbors. In disputes with competitors over resources they
lacked the open impudence and self-assurance which marked the
German ruling clique. It is worth remembering only the conflicts
of 1905, 1909, and 1911 with the very same Germany over Morocco
and the cowardly, predatory, and wily policy which France
followed in that case, clinging to the resources slipping from
its hands and at the same time not having the decisiveness to
start a dogfight.
This unique character of French foreign policy is determined in
general by the economic and political position of the Third
Republic. In its development, French industry had fallen far
behind from the industries of other leading countries; the
French population for a series of years had not grown, and the
phrase "the population remains in a stationary position" became
the usual characterization of the French population according to
the data of the yearly statistical account. In place of the open
seizure of foreign territory, accompanied by the risk of
becoming tied up in a difficult struggle, French capital looked
for different, calmer paths to the exploitation of foreign
labor, widely looking for deals of any sort with foreign capital
with a goal of a world division of resources. (25)
This spirit of the French bourgeoisie--opportunistic, unsure of
itself and its strength, passive--determined the general
character of French military doctrine. Regardless of the
presence in the French army of the richest military traditions,
beginning with the great Turenne (Henry de la Tour d'Auvergne)
and ending with Napoleon, regardless of the shining examples of
military art they had given in the spirit of brave, attacking
strategies and tactics, the military doctrine of the armies of
the Third Republic was inferior to Germany's. It was
characterized by a lack of confidence in its strengths, an
absence of broad offensive plans, an inability to bravely seek
decision in battle, instead seeking to tie its will to the enemy
and not considering the will of the latter. The positive content
of the doctrine governing the French army in the most recent era
essentially consisted of attempting to decipher the plan of the
enemy, occupying for this purpose a temporizing position, and
only with the clarification of the situation looking for
decision in a general offensive. Such were the essential lines
of French military doctrine, planting its impressions on the
entire image of activities of the French army in the last war,
especially in its first, maneuver period.
Here it is especially worth underlining that in their individual
gifts French commanders were hardly any worse than German ones.
Besides that, many of them theoretically sympathized not with
their own doctrine, but in fact with German doctrine and its
spirit of the greatest activity. Despite all that, they could
not change the general spirit of the French Army, its entire
internal structure, and the character of ruling views in it on
the method of resolving military problems, since this was a
product of more powerful factors than the strength of individual
personalities.
In such a way, the example of France confirms all that we said
on the question of doctrine in connection with Germany. The
military structure of a given state, the character of view and
outlooks in the military sphere, and finally the very content of
principles of military affairs is determined by the entire
structure of life of a given period and, in particular, the
essence and character of that social class holding power at the
given time.
As for England, its example is curious in that the geographical
and historical particularities of its position directed the
attention of its ruling classes not to ground forces, but to a
navy. England was and is a primarily colonial power. The
exploitation of colonies was the chief source for the enrichment
of the British bourgeoisie, and the support of colonial rule was
its greatest military task. In connection with this, the support
of control of the sea acquired for English capital the
significance of a question of life and death. The idea also
became the basic, foremost principle of English military
doctrine. This was concretely expressed in the formula mandatory
for all English governments of past epochs: to have a fleet,
equal in power to the next two naval powers combined. Until
recently this program was unswervingly followed, but now, with
the appearance on the field of competition of a rival like the
United States of America, the position has changed, and the
energies of the English bourgeoisie must look for some new
formula providing for its aggressive policy.
A few words on the military doctrine of the Russian army under
tsarism.
After what was said above about our military doctrine, even
posing this question may seem strange. Nevertheless a doctrine,
however unformed, did exist in the tsarist army, and although it
did not present any positive aspects, all the same this negative
example may show the close tie between thinking about war and
the general structure of life.
The political side of this doctrine consisted of the three-part
idea--Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality--beaten into the
heads of young soldiers in lessons of renowned sophistication.
As concerns its military-technical part, in our directive
instructions it consisted of simple borrowing of foreign
originals, the greater part only in abridged editions; but in
this as well the doctrine was the stillborn child of our few
military theorists, remaining foreign not only to the mass of
the officer corps, but to its highest leadership as well. This
sharply displays all the unparalleled mediocrity, all the
internal rottenness and flaccidity of late tsarist Russia. In
actual fact, the army was always the subject of the tsar's
special care, and nevertheless this same army in his hands
turned out to be completely unready for combat.
What's been laid out allows us to make some general conclusion
on the question interesting us:
The first of them is the thought we have repeated more than
once, that the military affairs of a given state, taken as a
totality, are not a self-sufficient quantity, but as a whole are
determined by the general conditions of the life of that state.
The second--that the character of the military doctrine accepted
in the army of a given state is determined by the character of
the social class which stands at its head.
The third--the basic condition of the vitality of military
doctrine consists in its strong correspondence with the general
goals of the state and those material and spiritual resources
which it has at its disposal.
Fourth--it is impossible to invent a doctrine capable of being a
vital organizational principle for an army. All basic (27)
elements of it are already given in the surrounding context, and
the work of theoretical investigation consists of the discovery
of those elements and their inclusion in a system in
correspondence with the fundamental positions of military
science and the demands of the military art.
Fifth--the basic theoretical task of the workers of the Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) must be the study of the character
of the social structures surrounding us; determining the
character and essence of the military tasks growing out of the
essence of that state; a study of the conditions providing for
their fulfillment with regard to both material and spiritual
prerequisites; a study of the particularities of the
construction of the Red Army and the application to this of
methods of struggle; harmonization of the demands of military
science and art with all those particularities which are
objectively and directly connected with the character of our
proletarian state and the revolutionary epoch we have lived
through.
V.
What basic elements must underlie the military doctrine of our
Workers'-Peasants' Red Army?
In order to answer this, we turn first to an analysis of our
state.
By its character and by its essence our homeland presents itself
as a state formation of a wholly new type. Differing from all
other states existing now on the globe, the RSFSR [Russian
Soviet Federal Socialist Republic] is the only state in the
world where power belongs to labor. Beginning from October 1917,
when the working class of Russia, united with the laboring
peasantry, seized power from the hands of the great and the
petty bourgeoisie, we live in a worker-peasant state, where the
leading role belongs to the working class.
The basic idea and sense of proletarian dictatorship consists of
the task of destroying capitalist production relations and
replacing them by a structure founded on socialized ownership of
the means of production and the planned distribution of the
products of that production. This idea is in unresolvable
contradiction with the foundations of existence of the world's
remaining states, where for now capital rules.
Proletarian dictatorship signifies the most wholehearted, most
merciless war of the laboring classes against the class of
rulers of the old world--the bourgeoisie who, relying on the
strength of international capital, on the strength and fortitude
of their international connections, and finally on the
spontaneous conservatism of the petty-bourgeois mass, are a
threatening and powerful enemy of the newly-born world. Between
our proletarian state and the entire remaining bourgeois world
there can be only one relationship: long, stubborn, desperate
war to the death--a war, demanding colossal endurance,
discipline, hardness, unwavering commitment, and unity of will.
The outer form of these mutual relations may change
superficially depending on the struggle's changing conditions
and course; a state of open warfare may give up its place to
some kind of treaty relations, allowing to a certain degree the
opposing sides' peaceful coexistence. But these treaty-based
forms are not able to change the basic character of mutual
relations. And it is necessary to completely realize and openly
recognize that joint, parallel existence of our proletarian
Soviet state with the state of the bourgeois-capitalist world in
the long term is impossible.
With energies multiplied tenfold by overthrow of the bourgeoisie
in only one country as a premonition of their fate, the
bourgeoisie cannot rest until they destroy the nest which serves
as the breeding ground and source of danger to their worldwide
domination. At the first convenient moment, the waves of the
bourgeois-capitalist sea surrounding our proletarian island will
dash against it, straining to wash away all the conquests of the
proletarian revolution. And at the same time the flame of the
revolutionary fire will spring up more often and more sharply in
various countries of the bourgeois world, and the threatening
tramp of proletarian columns preparing for a storm speaks of
some kind of attempts from the opposite direction. This
contradiction can be resolved and removed only by the strength
of arms in a bloody struggle of class enemies. There is no other
way out, nor can there be.
From this we come to the following conclusion: the consciousness
of every worker, every peasant, every soldier, and most of all
every member of the ruling communist workers' party must be
filled with the thought that at present our country is in a
state of siege and will remain in that state so long as capital
rules in the world, that the energy and will of the country must
be directed for now to the creating and strengthening of our
military might, that state propaganda must psychologically
prepare general opinion with the idea of unavoidable active
struggle with our class enemy, with taking care and providing
for the needs of the army. Only in such an atmosphere can the
matter of developing our armed forces be completed successfully.
This moment of general consciousness of the unavoidability and
importance of the military tasks lying before the state is the
first and most important element in the future unified military
doctrine of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.
Here it's worth noting still another particularity
characterizing the doctrine of a workers' army. Since the
world's bourgeoisie are forced to impel the working masses to
achieve military goals alien to them, they accomplish this with
the help of all possible subterfuges, built on either the
excitement of certain crowd instincts (ambition, the most
extreme national chauvinism, and others), or mass deception.
It's worth remembering, for example, the history of the "Keys to
the Holy Places," the Byzantine inheritance (Russia), the idea
of revanchism (France), and so on.
For a workers' state like Soviet Russia, there is no need for
these deceptive means. The class interest of laborers in
revolution's victory and the idea of their international
solidarity as a means of achieving victory is wholly adequate
for creating the strongest ties for the goals of general
struggle. Do we have plain evidence that this element has become
a living component part of the worldview of Russia's broad
laboring masses? Doubtlessly yes. Supplies of spiritual energy
among the working class, fighting for its freedom, are fully
sufficient. It is only necessary the expenditure of these
supplies be carried out in the proper direction and with
sufficient planning and coordination. Military propaganda,
organized on a statewide scale, must be the means for achieving
this.
The PUR (Political Directorate of the RKKA) must be the organ
working out everything connected with this question, and all the
organs of education under the general leadership of
Glavpolitprosvet [Main Directorate for Politics, Propaganda, and
Education] must be responsible for putting those measures into
practice. Only such an organization of responsibilities can
create the same propitious strengthening of the military might
of the Republic that took place in Germany. The role of German
schools in this matter is already well known. It's necessary
only to recall the well-known phrase that "the honor of victory
at Sadowa and Sedan belongs to the schoolteacher." It's equally
necessary for the honor of victory in the world revolution,
taking place before our eyes, to belong to our teachers and
propagandists, in school and out.
As for the concrete social-political content of this part of our
future military doctrine, it's found as a whole and fully
developed in the ideology of the working class, in the program
of the Russian Communist Workers' Party. The old formula of the
tsarist army--"Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality"--surrendered
its place to the ideas of revolutionary communism, soviet power
as a specific form of proletarian dictatorship, international
brotherhood and solidarity of labor. Three years of activity by
the political sections and communist cells of the Red Army have
already brought sufficiently tangible results in the sense of
the broad Red Army mass's political education in a new spirit,
and, continuing in the same direction, this activity must
prepare for us unified armed forces, strongly cohesive from top
to bottom thanks to a single political ideology.
Today's basic task in this connection, together with deepening
and expanding political work at the lower levels, is work on
joining our officer [commander] corps to the general Red Army
mass. (30) The state must throw all the weight of its influence
immediately into ending those remnants of disunity which are
still observed in the Red Army. People with an ideology opposed
to that of labor must be removed from it. This does not at all
signify the necessity for the entire officer corps to become
members of the Communist Party. But it does mean achieving a
position in which the officer corps has become essentially
Soviet, thereby removing any basis for suspicion directed at
them, so that they and the rank-and-file Red Army mass will feel
complete union and mutual understanding.
VI.
As for the question of the character of the military tasks that
we may face--that is, should they be of a strictly defensive
character or should the Red Army be ready if necessary to move
to the offensive--from the ideas presented above the conclusion
is clearly determined.
The general policy of the working class, a class active by
nature, a class striving for victory over the entire bourgeois
world, cannot NOT be active in the highest degree. It is true,
if one considered the material resources of our country alone,
that the limits of this activity become sufficiently narrow and
defined for the present time by that level of economic
development and the general position in which we currently
stand. It is therefore possible that for a certain interval of
time the actively revolutionary energies of the working class
will not be directed at the achievement of goals of the active
type. But this fact does not change the essence of the matter.
That principle of grand strategy applies fully to politics: "the
one who wins is the one who finds in himself the decisiveness to
attack; the side which only defends is inevitably headed for
defeat." The working class will be forced by the very course of
the revolutionary process to move to the offensive against
capital when the proper opportunity presents itself. In such a
way, at this point we have complete agreement between the
demands of the military art and general politics. As for the
material provision for the possibilities of conducting this
offensive line, it's worth considering that the base of our
offensive may not be Russia alone, but a whole series of other
countries as well. All depends on the degree of maturity of the
revolutionary process within these countries and the
capabilities of their working class to move to open struggle
with their class enemies.
The class character of the approaching clashes, providing us aid
in the interests of the general cause of all proletarian
elements, destroys to a significant degree the negative (31)
consequences of the indications given above of the difficult
economic position of our country. The proletariat can and will
attack, and alongside the proletariat, serving at its greatest
weapon, the Red Army will attack as well.
From this follows the necessity of educating our army in the
spirit of greatest activity, to prepare it for the completion of
revolutionary tasks via energetic, decisive, and bravely
conducted offensive operations.
If we turn to the combat experience the Red Army already has, we
see that it has long been conducting itself essentially in this
way. Almost all significant operations during the Civil War
carry traces manifesting a spirit of activity and initiative on
our side. It may even be said that at times our activity went
beyond all bounds, bordering on an inability to evaluate the
current situation and not avoiding the dangers of excessive
risk.
All this is completely natural, for in an army created and led
by the proletariat, a spirit other than the most active could
not exist.
The active character of approaching military clashes mentioned
above presents a whole series of practical demands to our
general staff. It's necessary to establish the procedures of the
higher staffs so that the Red Army can fulfill its duties
against any operational objective [napravlenie] and on any part
of the front. The limits of this front in the near future are
determined by the entire span of the old world.
By the way, the preparation of our officer [commander] corps
must include not only military training but also the economic
and political conditions of possible theaters of military
action. This presents the military apparat in general with
preparatory work immense in scope and importance.
Analyzing the probable nature of our future military clashes, we
may predict in advance that we will in technological terms be
weaker than our opponents. This circumstance has extremely
serious significance, and in addition to exerting all efforts
and means to achieving technological equality, we must look for
ways to equalize to some degree this disadvantage.
VII.
We have some means to do this. The first and most important of
them is the preparation and training of our army in the spirit
of maneuver operations on a grand scale. (32)
The extent of our territory, the possibility of retreating
significant distances without losing the ability to continue the
struggle, and other factors present suitable conditions for the
application of maneuvers of a strategic character, that is
outside the field of battle. Our officer [commander] corps must
be trained primarily in the ideas of maneuverability, and the
entire mass of the Red Army must be taught the art of quickly
and methodically carrying out march-maneuvers. The experience of
the recent imperialist war in its initial stages, and equally
the whole experience of our civil war (having on the whole a
maneuver character), gives us the richest material for study on
this.
In this connection (given the general scarcity of our military
means) engineering defense and assault [sic], playing such a
colossal role in the imperialist war, must move to last place in
our army. The auxiliary role which these methods must play
consists in serving as a supporting means for field operations.
Use of local conditions, broad application of artificial
fortifications, the creation of temporary artificial barriers,
providing for the completion of general march-maneuvers--this is
the proper sphere for the application of these methods and
measures. In particular, the role and significance of
fortifications in our future operations will be minuscule. It
will be much more cost-effective to strengthen our field forces
at the expense of fortifications.
Once again the experience of the Civil War gives us the richest
material from this standpoint. The activity of partisans in
Siberia, the struggle in cossack regions, the "basmachi" in
Turkestan, Makhno's uprising and in general banditism in Ukraine
and other regions presented an unlimited field for study and
general conclusions of a theoretical character. But a necessary
condition for the fruitfulness of this idea of "small war", I
repeat, is the timely development of a plan and the creation of
all conditions providing for its broad development. Therefore
one of (33) the tasks of our general staff must be the
development of the idea of "small war" and its application to
our future wars with enemies more technologically advanced than
we are.
The maneuver character of our future operations raises the
question of reevaluating the role and significance of cavalry in
contemporary battle. The positional character of the recent
imperialist war created in many minds the impression that
cavalry, as an independent, active force, cannot play a special
role and must move to a secondary place.
Truly, the experience of the civil war gave newly shining
examples of independent cavalry actions both on our side and on
our opponents', and gave cavalry back its former significance,
but it is well-known that not all consider the experience of the
civil war alone sufficiently convincing, and the question can
therefore not be considered clear to all.
By our deep conviction, in future operations Red cavalry will
have an extremely important role, and therefore care over its
preparation and development must be one of our first
responsibilities.
In order to best prepare cavalry for combat operations, special
attention must be directed to the colossal experience of the
Civil War and developing on the basis of this research special
directives for old cavalry commanders.
VIII.
Organizationally, a standing Red Army is the only possible basis
for our armed forces in the near future. This follows from what
we've said about the character of our military missions. This
question can now be considered definitively settled in
connection with the corresponding resolutions of the 10th
Congress of the Russian Communist Party and subsequent
governmental decrees. We can permit transition to a militia
system on the basis of Vsevobuch [organization responsible for
universal military training] only to a degree that provides for
specific savings on government expenditure while not undermining
the Red Army's capability to carry out active missions.
As concerns the internal life of the Red Army, it must be
organized to achieve the maximal convergence with the ideals of
communist society. Of course, given current levels of productive
forces, propaganda on the complete equality of the officer corps
with the rank-and-file is impossible, and could attract only
those interested in destroying the strength and power of the Red
Army. This is clear to the vast majority of Red Army soldiers;
nevertheless the internal structure and routines of the army of
the Workers-Peasants' Soviet state must be free from any
privileges not proceeding from the demands of service and not
flowing out of its character. Only on this basis is it
conceivable to create such comradely cohesion and mutual
understanding of high and low ranks in the army which is the
most important security for the physical and spiritual might of
the Red Army.
In unit training, the element of drill in the Red Army must move
to last place; in that, the very understanding of drill must be
completely changed. Drill in the old sense of the word--that is,
purely mechanical training of elements of the unit with the
application of harsh measures of discipline--we cannot even
speak of. We have no reason to strive to attain that level of
training of our soldiers, who would be ideal for lovers of
parades and shows. It is enough to achieve a certain level of
structure, quickness, and correctness in carrying out specific
activities. This should not be mechanical; it's necessary to
organize everything on the achievement of these effects through
the maximum development of the personal initiative and
independence of each Red Army soldier. In this regard, the
characteristic particularities of our state and our army open up
the widest possibilities. We have the chance to build the unity
of our army not through harsh discipline, but by the maximum
mental development of the Red Army soldiers. While every
bourgeois state must fear the introduction of the slaves of
capital to knowledge and spiritual development, for us this very
development is the truest guarantee of victorious achievements.
The entire apparatus of our training of the individual soldier
must be applied to this demand.
The maintenance of service discipline in the ranks of the army
is an obligatory and necessary condition of its might, and in
this regard the demands of the Soviet state are most decisive.
But at the same time there is an immense difference between our
contemporary understanding of discipline and that of the old
tsarist army. Discipline in the Red Army must be based not on
fear of punishment or naked compulsion, but instead on
voluntary, conscious fulfillment by each of his service duty,
and the first example of this kind of discipline must be the
officer [commander] corps.
How should discipline be maintained? First, by the
self-consciousness of the leading elements of the Red Army mass,
its communist cells, its political workers, and all of the
officer [commander] corps, their self-restraint, dedication to
the revolution, heroism, and self-sacrifice. Second, the ability
of the officer corps to connect, to approach, to some degree to
blend with the broad Red Army mass. Third, by the correctness of
the Red Army's political and technical leadership, strengthening
the faith of the Red Army mass in the complete match between the
[capabilities of] Red Army officers and their assignments.
Without these conditions, the maintenance of discipline in a
revolutionary army (36) like our Red Army is a hopeless task. Of
course, it is absolutely impossible to get along without some
elements of compulsion, but their application must be within the
strictest limits. Only that can be recognized as the true Red
Commander, who without any compulsion achieves complete
subjection to his will.
In general terms, these must be the basic elements of the
military doctrine which will form the basis for the development
and strengthening of the might of the Soviet federation. To
fulfill its purpose the ideas of our doctrine must penetrate and
permeate all our military manuals and instructions, must become
an organic part of the worldview of the Red Army mass and
especially its officer corps. It seems to me entirely proper to
present the basic practical concepts growing out of the doctrine
in a special manual, which would be a basic catechism of the Red
Army.
This is a rough circle of general ideas which, it seems to me,
those working on questions of military theory in its general
elements must all hold close. Doubtlessly, what's been presented
here is only an attempt to raise questions and attract
corresponding attention. As for final answers, they may only
come as a result of the lengthy and stubborn work of
military-theoretical thought on the basis of collective
experience.
I only wish to express my most fervent desire--that the
development of the question of the Red Army's doctrine would
occupy that place in our literature and our practical activities
that it rightfully deserves, thanks to its special significance
for the further development of the Republic's armed forces.
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