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H καπηλεία το&
#965; Αριστοτέλ_
1; από την Ayn Rand
By: Manos Zaratustras Date: January 11, 2016, 10:33 am
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The phenomenon of friendship, with its richness and complexity,
its ability to support but also at times to undercut virtue, and
the promise it holds out of bringing together in one happy union
so much of what is highest and so much of what is sweetest in
life, formed a fruitful topic of philosophic inquiry for the
ancients writes Lorraine Pangle in her introduction to Aristotle
and the Philosophy of Friendship. The fullest and most probing
classical study of friendship is to be found in Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, which devotes more space to it than to any
of the moral virtues, and which presents friendship as a bridge
between the moral virtues, and the highest life of philosophy.
Pangle contends that it is precisely in the friendships of
mature and virtuous individuals that Aristotle saw human love
not only at its most revealing, but also at its richest and
highest.
Philosophy since Kant has largely followed him in understanding
truly moral, praiseworthy human relations to be based on
altruism, a wholly selfless benevolence towards others, guided
either by absolute moral law or by a utilitarian pursuit of the
greatest good for the greatest number. When compared to
friendship, altruism directed to the good of humanity seems
higher, more selfless, more rational, and more fair Today we
reasonably assume that the enemy of morality is selfishness.
Starting from self-interest, we would find acquisition,
pleasure, and selfishness the primary threats to, and
alternatives to, virtue. But is altruism really possible? How
are our altruistic motives, related to our self-interested
motives? If we normally act with a view to our own good, but
sometimes choose actions that have nothing to do with our own
good, or even oppose it — is there any higher, unifying
principle or faculty of the soul that decides between these
contrary principles of action, judging them by a common
standard?
Ayn Rand rejected altruism, and in fact, blamed it for the
plight of human civilization, and with the presumed backing of
Aristotle, wrote fervently in support of self-interest and
rational egoism in The Fountainhead, Atlas Shrugged, and in her
other writings. Aristotle assumes neither the possibility nor
the impossibility of what we would call altruism, but instead
offers a sustained and sympathetic exploration of what is really
at work in the human heart when an individual seems to disregard
his own good to pursue the good of others. Aristotle does not
assume that the concern for a friend is necessarily tainted by
partiality; he argues that friendship can be rooted in a true
assessment of the friends’ worth and as such can be the noblest
expression of human relationship. He nonetheless insisted that
self-love was the highest love and maintained a conception of
selfishness, such that it not only contributed to, but was
requisite for, virtuous living. This particular understanding of
selfishness is best explained in his chapters on friendship in
the Nicomachean Ethics, but it is also referred to in numerous
other writings, such that there can be no doubt that he
sincerely held this belief. Ayn Rand holds Aristotle in the
highest regard and utilizes his conception of selfishness as the
philosophical underpinning for her version of egoism and
objectivism. While I agree that there are certain Aristotelian
ideas of selfishness which might lend support to some aspects of
her theory, for the most part, she has taken Aristotle out of
context or has been represented to have done so by authors
elaborating upon Rand’s ideas. My primary objective here, then,
is to refute Rand’s claim of Aristotelian support for her
beliefs and demonstrate how and where her interpretation went
astray through a careful analysis of Aristotle’s conception of
virtue and friendship
Aristotle
Central to Aristotle’s ethics is his concept of living well
(eudaimonia), which he describes as living in accordance with
the virtues. He places friendship as one of the virtues
necessary for living well, an essential ingredient for attaining
the virtuous life. Aristotle says, “A discussion of friendship
would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue,
and is besides most necessary with a view of living”. “For
without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all
other goods” (1155a). In fact, Aristotle sees friendship as an
essential aspect of a life of happiness and morality, “the
friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their
companionship; and they are thought to become better by their
activities and by improving each other; for from each other they
take the mold of the characteristics they approve” (1172a).
Friendship seems to have an especially close connection with
moral virtue, standing as a crucial link in a chain that the
treatment of the separate virtues has not yet completed. In the
lives of virtuous agents, friendship is far more involved and
significant than just good will, actually aiding their
progression towards fulfilling their ultimate end goal, which
for Aristotle is human flourishing. Aristotle is committed to
the unity of virtue and happiness and rejects the commonly held
notion that what is really good for us is not what is most
pleasant, and that what is right or noble is often neither good
nor pleasant. Aristotle argues, to the contrary, that the
activity of virtue is the very substance of human happiness and
this unity for Aristotle seems best achieved within the context
of serious friendship.
Aristotle also bases his political theory on friendship. Amity
among people in the society is requisite for the proper function
of the social order, which for him, of course, was the Athenian
polis. Eugene Garver, in Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics, points
out that “the task of the Politics is to show how nature and
habit can produce citizens who care about the good life. The
task of the Ethics is to show how our rational powers and our
thumos can be fulfilled through virtuous activity.” A love of
honour propels people into activities that are their own end
rather than directed at given ends. Since, for Aristotle,
activity is the ultimate expression of virtue, action motivated
in this way serves, in addition to its external end, as an end
in itself, furthering the individual’s habituation of virtuous
decision-making. “Aristotle must show how the thumos will be
fulfilled in doing virtuous actions for their own sake, not
through theory alone, as Socrates argues, and not, as many of
his students must have thought, through political ambition for
domination. The Nicomachean Ethics is that demonstration.”
Alastair McIntyre writes in After Virtue that the type of
friendship which Aristotle has in mind is that, which embodies a
shared recognition of, and pursuit of, a good. It is this
sharing which is essential and primary to the constitution of
any form of community, whether that of a household or that of
the city.
Lawgivers, says Aristotle, seem to make friendships a more
important aim than justice (1155a24); and the reason is clear.
Justice is the virtue of rewarding desert and of repairing
failures in rewarding desert within an already constituted
community; friendship is required for that initial constitution…
Friendship on Aristotle’s view involves affection. But that
affection arises within a relationship defined in terms of a
common allegiance to and the common pursuit of goods. The
affection is secondary, which is not in the least to say,
unimportant. This contrasts with our modern perspective in which
affection is often the central issue. Friendship has become for
the most part the name of a type of emotional state, rather than
that of a type of social and political relationship. Indeed,
from an Aristotelian point of view, a modern liberal political
society can appear only as a collection of unconnected men who
have banded together for their common protection. That they lack
the bond of friendship is of course bound up with the self
avowed moral pluralism of such liberal societies.
One can clearly see from the aforementioned discussion that
Aristotle’s ethics are rooted in a social context, in which the
virtuous man participates with the other citizens to ensure a
just and amicable social order. What a stark contrast to Ayn
Rand’s character John Galt who, in Atlas Shrugged, rejects any
obligation to his fellow man in a lengthy 60-page speech in
which Rand introduced her view of egoism and her brand of
philosophy which she called objectivism. Rand cannot cite
Aristotle in support of her ethical prescription — “do what
maximizes your self-interest”, or her assertion that “man must
exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others
nor sacrificing others to himself.” Aristotle’s emphasis on
virtue and upon man’s attainment of the highest goal in life
through virtuous action revolves around living in friendship and
community with others, as a social creature.
Aristotle’s view of the world is teleological, and man’s telos
is firstly that of rational animal, and secondly, and almost as
importantly, that of social animal. This is the case for man,
because in order to live a life of flourishing, which for
Aristotle is man’s purpose, one requires the company of others
with whom one stands in relation, such that, “by doing what is
noble he will at once benefit himself and others.” Aristotle has
also said that a friend is another self, and I see myself in
him. Simply by interacting with others, one’s values when shared
with another are revealed, thus providing a concrete experience
of those traits valued abstractly by the individual.
“Furthermore, it is quite true to say of the good man that he
does many things for the sake of his friends, and his country
and will even die for them if need be. He will throw away money,
honor, and in a word all good things for which men compete,
claiming the noble for himself.”
The contrast between these quotes of Aristotle and Rand seem to
draw a distinction between Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Rand’s
rational egoism. Much recent discussion in ethics has amassed
around the edges of egoism, as renewed attention to virtue
ethics, eudaimonia, and perfectionism naturally raises questions
about the role of self-interest in a good life, notes Tara Smith
in the introduction to Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics (Cambridge,
2006). She quotes Rosalind Hursthouse from her book, On Virtue
Ethics (Oxford 1999), “much virtue ethics portrays morality as a
form of enlightened self-interest.” Although the Aristotelian
conception of ethics that is currently enjoying a revival does
not fit stereotypes of egoism, admits Smith, she claims that it
certainly does not advocate altruism. Smith has written an
elegant and thorough text of Rand’s ethics in which she gives it
a more robust and developed philosophical footing than Rand did
herself. In fact, between Smith, Leonard Peikoff, and Fred
Seddon, Rand’s ethics have become far more palatable and far
less polemical. It is Smith who has borrowed heavily from
Aristotle in fleshing out the ethics attributed to Rand. She
asks a number of provocative questions, which I too would like
to address: “ Is eudemonia a selfish end? What does selfishness
actually mean? What sorts of actions does it demand? What are
the implications of pursuing eudaimonia for a person’s
relationships with others?” Aristotle has answered these
questions in his ethical writing, particularly in the
Nichomachean Ethics.
It is worth delving into Aristotle’s concept of character
friendships, which are those friendships of the highest order
and those in which selfishness plays a significant role, while
concomitantly developing the egoism of Rand, distinguishing the
similarities and differences between the two philosophers and
addressing the questions raised above. Aristotle has crafted an
ingenious theory, which results in the synthesis of selfishness
and altruism. Aristotle’s idea of thumos is also quite important
for us to better understand what he means by selfishness.
Friendship holds a very important position in Aristotle’s
ethics, for his ethics are practical and are based upon the
human goals and interrelationships commonly encountered in
everyday life. The centrality of friendship extends beyond the
personal life of the individual and even household relations to
serve as the crux of political and societal flourishing and
success. Aristotle’s definition of friendship, broadly speaking,
is a practical and emotional relationship of mutual and equal
goodwill, affection, and pleasure. Through an analysis of end
love in friendship, distinguishing it from means love, we can
begin to unpack Aristotle’s notion of self-love and its primacy.
For Aristotle, the highest most complete form of friendship is
referred to as character friendship and is distinct in that
friends love and wish each other well as ends in themselves, not
solely or even primarily as a means to further ends. Friendship
consists in loving and being loved (1381a1-2), but more in
loving (1159a33-34). Aristotle claims that friendship is, in
fact, necessary if we are to attain a life of flourishing.
Initially, he explains this in the Magna Moralia, asserting that
character friendship is necessary for self-knowledge and is
essential for avoidance of self-delusion and false assessment of
one’s own virtuousness. We need the objectivity of a friend to
see what we cannot, or often do not, see in ourselves. Aristotle
clearly is emphasizing our human vulnerability and weakness, for
it is in the propensity to uncertainty and doubt about oneself
that the need for such a friendship becomes clear. Aristotle is
here acknowledging deficiencies in the psychological makeup of
human nature, such that the individual, in isolation, is
insufficient to achieve a life of virtue and happiness.
In this type of friendship, we care for our friends’ material
health, spiritual health and state well-being as an end in
itself and as an expression of our love. This level of caring
concern has often been described as altruistic and cannot be
achieved unless we distinctly recognize and love the moral
goodness in the friend, viewing his life as worthwhile in the
same way as our own. Aristotle feels that only in this way, and
through such relationships, does one become able to love and
value himself.
When asked whether it is right that a man love himself more than
he loves others, Aristotle responds in the affirmative. He
asserts that the prevailing theory that a good man, out of
regard for his friend, neglects his own self-interest, disagrees
with the facts, as well it should. He states that we would all
agree that we should love him most who is most truly a friend
and should wish him well for his own sake. All these
characteristics that go to define a friend are found to the
highest degree in oneself, and it is from our relationship with
ourselves that our friendly relations are derived and man is his
own best friend. A man must therefore love himself better than
anyone else. The term self loving can be used as a criticism if
a man takes more than his fair share of money, honor, and bodily
pleasures for in this case he indulges his animal appetites and
the irrational part of his nature. This, unfortunately, he says,
applies to the mass of men. The man, who set himself on the
course of justice and virtue, temperate, moderate, and noble,
would not be called self loving by others, yet he is even more
self loving for he takes for himself what is noblest and most
truly good. For Aristotle, our reason and our rational self is
most truly ourself and, when a man acts under the guidance of
his reason, he is thought in the fullest sense to have done the
deed himself and of his own free will. The good man, then, ought
to be self loving, pursuing the virtuous and noble. The needs of
the community would be perfectly satisfied, and simultaneously
each individual would achieve virtue, which is the greatest of
all good things. Such a man will surrender wealth to enrich a
friend; for while his friend gets money, the man gets what is
noble and thus takes the greater good for himself. Similarly,
this holds with regard to honors and offices. (1168a29-1169)
For a character friend to be able to positively influence our
growth requires that he have a deep knowledge and understanding
of our true nature as well as the trust and connectedness
necessary to be able to honestly criticize us. For Aristotle,
self-assessment is a key ingredient in attainment of virtue and
its habituation. He envisions this friendship as one in which
much time is spent together both pursuing mutually enjoyable
activities and in contemplation and conversation. This type of
friendship obviously requires considerable time to develop and
may have begun as a friendship of utility or amusement, growing
into a deeper, mutual, commitment as the nature and depth of
each character is revealed. Such a friendship is a lasting
friendship and is based in part upon each individual’s integrity
and in part upon mutual trust.
Garver notes that thumos is the source of ambition, aggression,
love, and personal identity for Aristotle. People must be both
intelligent (dianoetikous) and spirited (thumoeideis) if they
are to be led easily toward virtue.
Thumos is the faculty of our souls, which issues in love and
friendship. An indication of this is that thumos is more aroused
against intimates and friends than against unknown persons. When
it considers itself slighted…. both the element of ruling and
the element of freedom, stem from this capacity for every one.
(1327b40-1328a7)
In his chapter entitled “Passion and the Two Sides of Virtue”,
Garver asks the question what is thumos, and how does it lead to
such things? “I leave thumos untranslated, because spirit,
ambition, anger and assertiveness all seem partially right, but
more importantly, I need to leave open its status, possibly, as
simply a posit. Maybe we refer affectionateness, the power to
command, and the love of freedom to thumos, because we can’t
explain them.” In a footnote, Garver writes that in Christian
moral psychology, to oversimplify, thumos is replaced by the
will as the supplement to reason and passion. In modern moral
psychology, ‘thumos’ is replaced as the supplement to reason and
passion by self-interest. It is the ‘thumos’ that renders the
classical Aristotelian theory of friendship explicitly self-
centered. The thumos, i.e. the prideful, self-vindicating and
self-policing faculty or part of the soul, the part in which the
sense of self most resides, also happens to be the part that
creates affection.
Thumos then seems to provide an answer to why people generate
personal ends and love the noble for its own sake. It is through
this conception of ‘thumos’ that, for Aristotle, affection is
seen as an extension of the self to encompass concern for
another or for others. Aristotle’s ethical theory then addresses
the contemporary egoist/altruist dilemma, implicitly, by denying
that it exists. ‘Thumos’ does have a downside in Aristotle’s
usage, and it is perhaps the interpretation of ‘thumos’ as
“drive” which captures Aristotle’s concern that thumos, in the
absence of virtue, may lead to the desire to rule despotically
and live tyrannically. “Yet only ambition, and spiritedness
(thumos), can push people from life into good life.” Without
ambition, people would not have the ethical problems that the
ethical virtues are designed to overcome. Coupled with this
drive then, must be reason (logos), such that thumos then both
allows us to love, and to engage in actions that are their own
end (Garver, pg.120). Explaining why people should want to do
things for their own sake is equivalent to explaining why good
people should love and not just want to be loved.
All people or the majority of them wish noble things, but choose
beneficial ones; and treating someone well, not in order to be
repaid, is noble, but being the recipient of a good service is
beneficial.” (1162b34-1163a1). “It is rather the part of virtue
to act well than to be acted upon well. (1120a1112)
Rooting friendship in thumos has advantages over modern
discussions of altruism. We today take selfishness as a given
and then try to explain altruistic behavior. For Aristotle all
friendship (philia) is rooted in self-love (philautia). The
right kind of self-love is an achievement, love for what is best
in us, motivated by self-love. Aristotelian friendship is unlike
altruism in that there is no sacrifice of the self to others.
Friendship and the desire for the noble then, are the good
development of the thumos. Love for the noble, is senseless
under the wrong conditions. Only in the right community, which
for Aristotle is the polis, in which virtue is praised and vice
punished and in which one’s natural ambition can be satisfied in
activities within that community, can one reasonably choose to
engage in activity for its own sake and thus pursue the noble.
This sheds some light upon why the ideas of Aristotle were not
readily adaptable to the tumultuous world of Ayn Rand.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle provides a comprehensive
course on the meaning and significance of friendship. He
addresses the possibility of altruism and egoism in the context
of friendship, concluding that, “the prevailing theory is that a
good man, out of regard for his friends, neglects his own self
interest. However, the facts are not in harmony of these
arguments, and that is not surprising (1168a29). In defense of
this rather egoistic assertion, Aristotle posits the following
argument:
it is said that we should love our best friend, and the best
friend, is he who when he wishes for someone’s good does so for
that person’s sake even if no one will ever know. Now a man has
this sentiment, primarily toward himself, and the same is true
of all the other sentiments of which a friend is defined. For as
we have stated, all friendly feelings toward others are an
extension of the friendly feelings a person has for himself. All
these sentiments will be found chiefly in a man’s relation to
himself, since a man is his own best friend, and therefore
should have the greatest affection for himself. (1168b)
Aristotle goes on to clarify that the term self loving can be
used as a criticism if a man takes more than his fair share of
money, honor or bodily pleasures, for in this way he indulges
his animal appetites and the irrational part of his nature:
Hence, the pejorative use of the term is derived from the fact
that the most common form of self love is base, and those who
are egoists in this sense are justly criticized.” “If a man were
always to devote his attention above all else to acting justly
himself, to acting with self-control, or to fulfilling whatever
other demands virtue makes upon him, and if in general, he were
always to try to secure for himself what is noble, no one would
call him an egoist and no one would find fault with him. He
assigns what is supremely noble and good to himself, he
gratifies the most sovereign part of himself, and he obeys it in
everything. Consequently, he is an egoist or self lover in the
truest sense, who loves and gratifies the most sovereign element
in him.” “His self love is different in kind from that of the
egoist with whom people find fault: as different, in fact, as
living by the guidance of reason is from living by the dictates
of the emotion, and as different as desiring what is noble, is
from desiring what seems to be advantageous. If all men were to
compete for what is noble, and put all their efforts into the
performance of the noblest actions, all the needs of the
community will have been met, and each individual will have the
greatest of goods, since that is what virtue is. Therefore a
good man, should be a self lover, for he will profit, by
performing noble actions, and will benefit his fellow man. It is
also true that many actions of a man of high moral standards are
performed in the interest of his friends and of his country, and
if there be need, he will give his life for them. He will freely
give his money, honors, in short, all the things that men
compete for, while he gains the nobility for himself…. So we see
that in everything praiseworthy a man of high moral standards
assigns himself a larger share of what is noble. It is in this
sense, then, as we said, that he ought to be an egoist or self
lover, but he must not be an egoist in the sense in which most
people are. (1168b20-33)
Selfishness for Aristotle does not hold negative connotation,
when considered in the context of a good or virtuous man., but
rather motivates human action. The development of rational
goodness, through virtuous living, serves to produce alignment
of his self interest with that of the community, such that his
actions inure to the benefit of family, friends, and society.
Aristotle is very clear when discussing selfishness in the
context of character friendship to point out that it is only the
good and virtuous, which are capable of having such character
friendships and are thus capable of being selfish. This is the
only way in which selfishness is appropriate and desirable for
Aristotle. He quickly points out that those who are not good
cannot have friendships of the highest type, and for them
selfishness is most unacceptable.
When reading Aristotle’s chapters on friendship, if one were to
cherry pick certain passages, one could easily fabricate an
endorsement of egoism. In context, however, Aristotle is
speaking selectively to men of the Athenian polis, and even more
selectively to those citizens who are already leading a
reasonably virtuous life. Even more selectively, because most of
his writings indeed were lecture notes, Aristotle is speaking to
the sons of the citizens of Athens, with instructions for their
future lives as productive citizens of the polis. When we read
the entirety of his treatment of friendship, we note that
included in this context is the relationship of parent and child
and the relationships within the household. I interpret
Aristotle’s teaching regarding character friendship and
self-love to be a prescription for developing and maintaining
relationships in adulthood, which will continue to provide a
similar form of feedback to that which one receives in childhood
and adolescence from one’s parents and teachers.
It is not hard to see how a character friendship would be
immeasurably beneficial in the attainment of, and furthering of,
self-knowledge and virtue for those already aiming for a life of
virtuous living. The modeling of virtuous behavior readily
observable in our friend surely contributes to our ability to
assimilate and habituate virtuous behaviors of our own. A study
of Aristotle’s conception of virtue qua virtue, and of
happiness, which derives from it, would be helpful at this point
to understand more fully the interconnectedness of friendship
and the virtuous life.
Aristotle identified two virtues of thought, otherwise known as
moral virtues. The first is practical wisdom and is the virtue
of the practical intellect truly inseparable from virtues of
character. The second, which he calls philosophy, is the virtue
of the speculative intellect. Practical wisdom enunciates the
rules which virtues of character carry out. Particularly, if we
wish to comprehend how Aristotle comes to the conclusion that
friendship is indispensable for human happiness and flourishing
we must understand how these two activities of the mind (soul)
function as co-chairs, presiding over all other activities of
the human being.
Practical wisdom exercises command and thus rules over desire,
that is, over the body and its animalistic appetitive
characteristics. Similarly philosophy, as the activity of
contemplation has its own realm, namely that of spectator of
itself. This function is regulative of action in a sense,
issuing orders, and also serves to inform us about ourselves,
but is not the initiator of any action. Parenthetically, one can
readily see that this concept of reason was adopted by Kant.
Practical wisdom perfects not only the subject and its desire by
teaching it to obey well, but also perfects the mind teaching it
to command well.
Virtues are for Aristotle, dispositions, and are developed
through habituation. Virtue of character is a state of habit
through which we are disposed toward the highest virtues in a
certain way to a certain set of stimuli or situations. Virtue as
habit is not innate, though certainly there is a predisposition
to virtue in our human nature. Virtue has two aspects, an
objective experiential one and a subjective or mental one.
Actions for Aristotle are not virtuous (though they may have the
appearance of virtuosity to the observer), unless they
concomitantly emanate from a certain state of mind. This has
alternatively been stated such that virtuous action requires
right action for the right reasons in the right situation.
Neither “good intentions” nor accidental good acts qualify as
virtuous.
A more precise understanding of virtue should become evident as
we look at its development in the life of the human subject,
which is precisely where friendship comes into play for
Aristotle. From the earliest points of development, the social
and interactive nature of the human species is no more evident
in Aristotle’s biology than in our learning, and particularly
our learning to manifest our “predispositions” as
“dispositions”, resulting in “right” or “virtuous” action. The
very apparent mimicking and mirroring of the actions and
attitudes of their parents by young children does not end in
childhood from Aristotle’s point of view, but persists
throughout life.
It is for this reason, that in his discussion of friendship he
includes the relationship and philia of parents for children,
and children for parents, in the category of friendship.
Understanding the primary role of friendship is essential and
necessary for attainment of the virtues, which then can be
properly utilized toward the attainment of a life of
flourishing.
The benchmark for assessing the virtuousness of an action is
referred to as the mean, however Aristotle does not envision a
quantitative mean, such as described by Plato and other
pre-Socratics. For Aristotle, the mean simply represents the
moral ought without a quantitative component, because virtue for
Aristotle was situated between two vices but not necessarily
equidistantly. “The mean is to do what one ought, when one
ought, in the circumstances in which one ought, to the people to
whom, which one ought, for the end for which one ought, in the
way, that one ought.” Thus the “mean” is duty (1121b12), and
“ought” is what the moral rule prescribes. The mean is to act as
the “right rule” says, but what is the right rule for Aristotle?
He certainly did not have in mind any underlying determinant
measure such as Kant’s categorical imperative.
For Aristotle, the standard is the ideal of the “virtuous man”
(1113a33; 1176a15-17). The virtuous man is also a wise man
(1107a1-2) from whom practical wisdom generates the rule as
specific for a given situation (1144b27-28).
All the virtues have as their object, interior passions and
simultaneously exterior actions or activities, and they moderate
certain passions in order to moderate certain activities.
Aristotle however is not prone to overtly rely on this “golden
mean” as the solution to all moral dilemmas, or as the basis for
all “right action”. He is much more inclined to allow the
“virtuous man”, properly prepared through the learned behaviors
and attitudes acquired through social contact from childhood to
the present, and through contemplative reflection, to properly
and correctly interpret that which is at hand, and to choose
that action, which is responsively indicated. One can see from
this that we have formulated a description of what has come to
be known as “Virtue Ethics”. Aristotle now has connected the
necessity of friendship in achieving this virtuous living and a
life of flourishing.
Ayn Rand
Tara Smith is clearly a proponent of Rand’s rational egoism,
elucidating and defending it in her book. Rand did not write her
moral philosophy in lengthy treatises. Rather her views were
presented in her fiction, particularly in the speech by John
Galt near the end of Atlas Shrugged, and in her single most
important essay “The Objectivist Ethics”. In addition to The
Fountainhead, and Atlas Shrugged, we should also look at two
collections of her essays titled, The Virtue of Selfishness
(Signet 1964) and The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist
Thought (Signet 1988) for a fuller understanding. Rand’s ethics
can be summarised by directly quoting from her essay, “The
Objectivist Ethics”:
The objectivist ethics, proudly advocates and upholds rational
selfishness –which means: the values required for man’s survival
qua man — which means: the values required for human survival.
The Objectivist ethics holds that human good does not require
human sacrifices and cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of
anyone to anyone yet holds that the rational interests of men do
not clash—that there is no conflict of interests among men who
do not desire the unearned, who do not make sacrifices nor
accept them, who deal with one another as traders, getting value
for value. The principle of trade is the only rational ethical
principle for all human relationships, personal and social,
private and public, spiritual and material. Each trader is a man
who earns what he gets and does not give or take the undeserved.
He deals with man, by means of a free, voluntary, unforced,
uncoerced exchange—an exchange which benefits both parties by
their own independent judgment.
Love, friendship, respect and admiration are the emotional
response of one man to the virtues of another, the spiritual
payment given in exchange for the personal, selfish pleasure
which one man derives from the virtues of another man’s
character.
To love is to value. Only a rationally selfish man, a man of
self – esteem, is capable of love—because he is the only man
capable of holding firm, consistent, uncompromising, unbetrayed
values. It is only on the basis of rational selfishness that man
can be fit to live together in a free, peaceful, prosperous,
benevolent, rational society.
The only proper, moral purpose of a government is to protect
man’s rights, which means to protect them from physical
violence. Today the world is facing a choice: if civilization is
to survive, it is the altruist morality that men have to reject.
Aristotle would clearly stand in opposition to the conception of
trader or to the belief that a man should neither give nor get
the undeserved. Aristotle explicitly states that if the
friendship is between unequals and the help or benefaction is
mostly one way, that is, if one party is always giving and the
other always receiving, then the giver’s affection grows as he
invests both materially and emotionally in the other. The
recipient must obviously do nothing to damage that bond, but
benefactors can even come to care about recipients, ignorant of
the source of their good fortune. In the end, the recipient
becomes a part of the giver, partially a product of his activity
and life. By way of example, if I have gone to the expense of
helping to put someone through college, their successes after
college give me more joy than if I had done nothing to help
them.
Turning now to Rand’s philosophy of love and friendship, I will
quote from her essay, “The Ethics of Emergencies”:
Love and friendship are profoundly personal, selfish values:
love is an expression and assertion of self-esteem, a response
to one’s own values in the person of another. One gains a
profoundly personal, selfish joy from the mere existence of the
person one loves. It is one’s own personal, selfish happiness
that one seeks, earns and derives from love. Concern for the
welfare of those one loves is the rational part of one’s selfish
interests.
The proper method of judging when or whether one should help
another person is by reference to one’s own rational
self-interest. If it is the man or woman one loves, that one can
be willing to give one’s own life to save him or her—for the
selfish reason that life without the loved person would be
unbearable.
The same principle applies to relationships among friends. If
one’s friend is in trouble, one should act to help them by what
ever non-sacrificial means are appropriate. But this is a
reward, which men have to earn by means of their virtues. If he
finds them to be virtuous, he grants them personal, individual
value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues.
Rand again seems to stumble over her conception of affection and
love because of a false dichotomy which she has drawn with
utility. Her need for the constant reassessment of the mutuality
of benefit from the relationship, robs it of its spontaneity and
its humanity.
I thought it most appropriate to quote Rand’s essay’s directly,
and in context, thereby obviating the possibility of being
subject to the complaints voiced by a number of her proponents.
Those sympathetic to her philosophy, such as Fred Seddon who
wrote Ayn Rand, Objectivists, and the History of Philosophy, and
Tara Smith complain about how severely misunderstood and
misinterpreted her writings have been. Regardless of their level
of sympathy for Rand, they agree that she works from the premise
that life does not require sacrifice. She is an egoist, and she
preaches an ethic of rational self-interest. For her, the
primary virtue is rationality, the ultimate value is life and
the primary beneficiary is oneself. Both Seddon and Smith argue
that when she speaks of ‘life’ as the standard of value, she
means a flourishing life, Smith even using the Aristotelian word
eudaimonia.
Throughout her writings, notably those cited above, Rand uses
verbiage not dissimilar to that of Aristotle. There are
significant differences however, in addition to the tone of her
voice, which in itself is more contentious and abrasive. Rand
wishes to hold friendship entirely hostage to self-interest and
egoism, reducing it to the relationship between traders.
Aristotle clearly describes this type of friendship in the
Nicomachean Ethics as a friendship of utility, which is not at
all that which he refers to as character friendship. Each
reference to feelings or emotions and relationships of
friendship or of love, for Rand is immediately couched in
self-interest and selfishness. One can’t help but interpret her
as viewing all those with whom one may potentially be in
relationship as objects, and as clearly other. Aristotle has
attempted to describe the connectedness in the highest
relationships as extensions of ourselves. Our friend becomes
another self whom we love, nurture, and protect as we do
ourselves. It is only in this way, that Aristotle justifies
selfishness; interpreting the growth in virtue and nobility that
we attain while giving freely of ourselves to our friends as
taking the best for ourselves. This becomes then, an act of
selfishness, but only in the highest sense.
It is interesting to note that Smith’s book primarily entails a
description of the seven virtues, which, in addition to the
Master virtue of rationality, are viewed as the cornerstones of
her ethics. It is almost as if the Nicomachean Ethics have been
rewritten in the language of a 20th century Objectivist. Smith
even addresses friendship in the appendix of the book,
describing it in the Aristotelian terms, which Aristotle himself
used, “By friendship, I mean a relationship between two people
marked by mutual esteem and affection, concern for the other’s
well-being, pleasure in the other’s company and comparatively
intimate levels of communication.” She goes on to state “I am
here concerned with what Aristotle considers the best and truest
type of friendship, sometimes called friendship of character.”
Smith and Rand seem to have different interpretations of
Aristotle, and Smith seems to soften and humanize the seemingly
more base egoism of Rand. Smith herself does claim that “for a
rational egoist, to value something is to recognize it as in
one’s interest, as personally beneficial in some way. Loving
another person, in so far as it reflects valuing, is a
thoroughly self-interested proposition.” These two statements
sound very much like the position of Ayn Rand. Much of Smith’s
book interprets Aristotle in a light with which I am far more
sympathetic than I am with Rand. I will conclude this discussion
of Rand’s philosophy with a quote from Atlas Shrugged taken from
a speech of John Galt in which the bulk of her theory is
expounded:
The symbol of all relationships among men, the moral symbol of
respect for human beings, is the trader. Just as he does not
give his work except in trade for material values, so he does
not give the values of his spirit — his love, his friendship his
esteem — except in payment and in trade for human virtues, in
payment for his own selfish pleasure…. (pg.949)
Do you ask what moral obligation that I owe to my fellow men?
None — except the obligation I owe to myself, to material
objects, and to all of existence: rationality. I seek or desire
nothing from them except such relations as they care to enter of
their own voluntary choice. It is only with their mind that I
can deal and only for my own self interest. I win by means of
nothing but logic and I surrender to nothing but logic. (pg.948)
To love is to value. Love is the expression of one’s values, the
greatest reward you can earn for the moral qualities you have
achieved in your character and person, the emotional price paid
by one man for the joy he receives from the virtues of another.
(pg.959).
Ayn Rand said of Aristotle, “If there is a philosophical Atlas
who carries the whole of Western civilization on his shoulders,
it is Aristotle”. “Whatever intellectual progress man had
achieved rests on his achievements”. (Review of J. H. Randall’s
Aristotle, “The Objectivist Newsletter”, May 1963, 18) From
these statements it is clear that he has had a profound
influence upon her and her philosophy. She was also greatly
influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, though doesn’t seem to wish
to acknowledge this fact. While I won’t claim that all of her
conceptions of self-interest are Nietzschean, I do think there
is a significant Nietzschean influence, which may be why her
arguments do not seem fully consistent with Aristotle. The
ethics of ’Objectivism’ has been regarded as self interest by
Rand and is commonly referred to as rational egoism. It is
interesting that she claims to find support and justification
for this ethical theory in the teachings of Aristotle, with no
mention of Nietzsche, “The only philosophical debt I can
acknowledge is to Aristotle. I most emphatically disagree with a
great many parts of his philosophy — but his definition of the
laws of logic, and of the means of human knowledge is so great
an achievement that his errors are irrelevant by comparison.”
She goes on to claim that “there is no future for the world
except through a rebirth of the Aristotelian approach to
philosophy.” Leonard Peikoff, a student and follower of Rand for
thirty years writes, “Aristotle and Objectivism agree on
fundamentals and as a result on the affirmation of the reality
of existence, of the sovereignty of reason, and of the splendor
of man.”
In Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Rand writes, “Let
us note the radical difference between Aristotle’s view of
concepts, and the objectivist view, particularly in regard to
the issue of essential characteristics. It is Aristotle who
first formulated the principles of correct definition. It is
Aristotle who identified the fact that only concretes exist. But
Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences,
which exist in concretes as a special element or formative
power, and he held that the process of concept-formation depends
on a kind of direct intuition by which man’s mind grasps these
essences and forms concepts accordingly. Aristotle regarded
essence as metaphysical; objectivism regards it as the
epistemological.
Placing Aristotle contextually in the great Athenian city-state
has been necessary for a fuller appreciation of, and more
accurate interpretation of, his writings. So too with Rand, a
few words of contextualization are in order. Born Alissa
Rosenbloom, in 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia, where the social
horizons of human possibility were shrinking around her. Her
father had become a chemist, despite quotas on Jews studying at
the university. She witnessed the first shots of the Russian
Revolution from her balcony in 1917, and her family was
virtually overnight reduced to crushing poverty. While a student
at Petrograd State University, she was expelled at the age of 17
as anti-proletariat. Managing to escape Russia, she arrived in
the United States in 1926. Her first novel, We the Living (1936)
portrays life in post-communist Russia. In the preface Rand
points out the autobiographical similarities between her own
youth and the life of her protagonist. The Fountainhead, her
first major success, was published in 1943 and epitomized
American individualism in the character of architect Howard
Roark. This novel first presented Rand’s provocative morality of
rational egoism, in which Roark eventually triumphs over every
form of “spiritual collectivism.”
In comparison to Aristotle, Ayn Rand’s driving relentless
egoistic selfishness seems harsh, competitive, and antisocial,
probably arising from the psychological trauma she must have
experienced in her youth. She does allow for friendship, and
even for love, but gives it value only when one is able to
clearly see the benefit to self of the relationship. When one’s
conception of relationship is that of trader, and one is
continually asking the question—what’s in this for me? — the
opportunity to achieve the type of character friendship
envisioned by Aristotle seems remote, if not impossible. Egoism
and selfishness in the Aristotelian sense seems rather to be
only discernible when one carefully dissects man’s activities
and relationships, recognizing that his ultimate goal is his own
enlightenment, virtuousness, and eudaimonia. The actual
behaviors and the day-to-day living of such a man would not be
observable as selfishly motivated nor egoistic. For Aristotle,
self-love and selfishness motivate us only in so far as the
achievement of virtuousness and nobility result in our own
self-fulfillment and happiness or eudaimonia. Rand’s egoism is
overriding, demanding, and in-your-face. It is all about
self-interest, self-preservation, and self-promotion. That she
is also able to view the ultimate human goal as fulfillment of
self does not justify drawing any significant similarity with
Aristotle. These are two very different views of the self , its
motivation, and its relationship to others. I see little or no
justification for Rand’s claim to Aristotelianism as the root of
her rational egoism or of her objectivism.
#Post#: 20278--------------------------------------------------
Re: H καπηλεία τ	
59;υ Αριστοτέλ
η από την Ayn Rand
By: Pinochet88 Date: January 12, 2016, 5:42 am
---------------------------------------------------------
Δεν υπάρχει
καμία
καπηλεία
του
Αριστοτέλη
από την Ayn Rand.
Εκφραστικέ`
2;
ελλείψεις
και
εσφαλμένες
προτεραιότ_
1;τες
έχουν
οδηγήσει
στο να
δημιουργού_
6;ε
θέματα εκ
του μη όντος.
Αρχικά, ας
εξηγήσουμε
το
αυτονόητο:
Αλτρουισμό`
2;
δεν υπάρχει
και δεν
μπορεί να
υπάρξει,
ποτέ και
πουθενά. Ο
άνθρωπος
και κάθε
ζωντανός
οργανισμός
είναι
φτιαγμένος
για να
εξυπηρετεί
το συμφέρον
του και το
συμφέρον
του είναι, εξ
ανάγκης, η
διαιώνιση
όλων των
γονιδίων
του ατόμου.
Εγκέφαλος
που
σκέφτεται
με
διαφορετικa
2;
τρόπο δεν
μπορεί να
ζήσει πάνω
στη Γη.
Επομένως
όλες οι
πράξεις των
ανθρώπων
(και των ζώων)
είναι
εγωιστικές.
Ακόμα και η
αυτοθυσία
είναι
εγωιστική.
Όταν για
παράδειγμα
ένας
πατέρας
αυτοθυσιάζ^
9;ται
για τα
παιδιά και
τη γυναίκα
του, αυτό που
κάνει είναι
να δίνει τη
ζωή του για
να
εξασφαλίσε_
3;
τη ζωή των
γονιδίων
του που
είναι στα
παιδιά του.
Το κίνητρο
είναι
εγωιστικό.
Όταν ένας
άνθρωπος
αυτοκτονεί
επειδή δεν
αντέχει μια
κατάσταση,
το κάνει
αυτό επειδή
έχει
πειστεί πως
δεν θα
επιβιώσουν
τα γονίδιά
του. Το να
επιβιώσουν
τα γονίδιά
του είναι ο
απόλυτος
και ο
μοναδικός
σκοπός, που
χωρίς αυτόν
δεν έχει
σημασία
τίποτα
απολύτως.
(Και αυτό το
έχει
αναλύσει η Ayn Rand
αλλά ο
συγγραφέας
σκοπίμως το
παραβλέπει)
Δεν υπάρχει
αλτρουιστι_
4;ή
πράξη. Οι
πράξεις οι
οποίες
χαρακτηρίζ_
9;νται
αλτρουιστι_
4;ές
γίνονται
από ένα
άτομο
επειδή αυτό
το άτομο
έχει
πειστεί ότι
έτσι
εξυπηρετεί`
4;αι
το δικό του
συμφέρον,
ενώ, γενικά,
θεωρείται
ότι κάνει το
αντίθετο
(ακόμα και
από αυτούς
που το
πείσανε).
Αλλά το κάθε
άτομο κάνει
ότι κάνει
για να
εξηπυρετήσ^
9;ι
το συμφέρον
του, όπως και
να το
αντιλαμβάν^
9;ται.
Ο μόνος
λόγος που
καθόμαστε
και
διαβάζουμε
τέτοιες
φλύαρες
αναλύσεις
είναι
επειδή η
Ραντ (επειδή
ήταν
γυναίκα και
δεν έκανε
για
ιδεολόγος)
το παράκανε
με τον
εγωισμό-αλτ	
61;ουισμό,
κατέληξε να
αφορίζει
τον
αλτρουισμό
γυναικολογa
4;ντας
(φλυαρώντας),
αλλά δεν
έκαστε να
δεί την
αληθινή του
φύση: Όλες
αυτές οι
πράξεις που
χαρακτήριζ^
9;
η Ραντ
αλτρουιστι_
4;ές,
γίνονταν
από άτομα τα
οποία το
Κράτος είχε
πείσει πως,
αν
ενεργήσουν
κατά
κάποιον
τρόπο, θα
εξυπηρετήσ_
9;υν
το συμφέρον
τους.
Αντιστοίχω`
2;,
ούτε ο
Αριστοτέλη`
2;
είχε
καταλάβει
πλήρως πως
κάθε
εθελοντική
πράξη που
δεν είναι
άμεσα υπέρ
του
συμφέροντο`
2;
ενός
ανθρώπου,
εξυπηρετεί
έμμεσα το
συμφέρον
του ιδίου
ανθρώπου. Αν
και ίσως να
κατάλαβε
ότι οι
άνθρωποι
που βιώνουν
τη φιλία
εξυπηρετού_
7;
το συμφέρον
τους, δεν
εντόπισε το
όλο
πρόβλημα
στον ορισμό
του
συμφέροντο`
2;
από κάθε
άτομο, με
αποτέλεσμα
εκείνοι οι
άνθρωποι οι
οποίοι δεν
διαθέτουν
την αρετή
της
φιλικότητα`
2;
να έχουν,
απλούστατα,
λανθασμένο
ορισμό του
συμφέροντό`
2;
τους.
Επομένως το
θέμα δεν
είναι το
ποιο
συμφέρον
εξηπυρετού_
7;
οι πράξεις
ενός ατόμου,
αλλά το πως
αντιλαμβάν^
9;ται
το εκάστοτε
άτομο το
συμφέρον
του και
ποιοι άλλοι
μετέχουν
του
συμφέροντο`
2;
αυτού. Αν για
παράδειγμα
ένα άτομο
εκλαμβάνει
ως συμφέρον
του το
συμφέρον
του Κράτους
και θεωρεί
πως το
συμφέρει να
παρασιτεί
από τον
καρπό της
εργασίας
των
υπολοίπων,
έχει έναν
εσφαλμένο
ορισμό του
συμφέροντό`
2;
του, γιατί,
μέσα από
αυτές τις
πράξεις, θα
καταλήξει
μίζερο και
τα γονίδιά
του θα
χάσουν τις
δυνατότητε`
2;
που θα είχαν
εάν είχε
υιοθετήσει
έναν άλλον,
καπιταλιστ_
3;κό
ορισμό του
συμφέροντο`
2;.
Το ίδιο θα
γίνει αν ένα
άτομο
εξυπηρετεί
το συμφέρον
του
εξηπυρετών`
4;ας
παράλληλα
το συμφέρον
εγκληματικa
4;ν
ή
υπάνθρωπων
στοιχείων,
όπως στην
περίπτωση
ενός
ανθρώπου ο
οποίος
θεωρεί ότι
το συμφέρει
να υπάρχει
το Κράτος ή
κάποιον
ανθρωπιστή
που
πιστεύει
ότι τον
συμφέρει να
ζει σε μια
"πολυπολιτι	
63;μική"
κοινωνία.
*****************************************************