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Gr 6 ST Ta 1 T2 12 Resource
DIR By: misplon
Date: May 15, 2012, 6:14 am
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Comparison of the Amundsen and Scott Expeditions
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The routes to the South Pole taken by Scott (green) and Amundsen
(red), 1911–1912.
The reasons for Roald Amundsen's success with his South Pole
expedition and the reason for Robert Falcon Scott's failure in
returning from the simultaneous Terra Nova Expedition to the
South Pole have always been the subject of discussion and
controversy. The contrasting fates of the two teams seeking the
same prize at the same time invites comparison. This article
focuses on some common points that have been raised in the
literature.
Contents
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[edit]Overview
The causes of Scott's disaster have been much discussed and many
contributing factors cited.[1] For example:

Cherry-Garrard surmised that the rations of Scott's team were
inadequate and did not provide enough energy.[2]

are ill-suited to work on snow and ice: their relatively small
hooves (compared to their weight) caused them to sink into
anything other than very firm snow or ice, and their coats
easily became soaked through thus making the ponies very
vulnerable to wet and cold - the precise conditions that would
be encountered. Further, unlike dogs who could eat the abundant
seal and penguin meat found in Antarctica, the ponies' food had
to be carried forward from the ship, vastly increasing the
stores that had to be transported as Scott's expedition moved
towards the Pole.

could be hauled to the depots. Of 19 ponies brought south to aid
in laying depots on the Ross Ice Shelf (traversed during the
first and final quarters of the trek) nine were lost before the
journey began.

planned, Scott and his two surviving companions could have
reached it on their return march. Instead, because of the
weakness of the ponies, it was placed some 31 miles short of
there. Scott’s party died only 11 miles away.

to the planned four-man pole party may have strained the
rationing plans.

party was so weak, even before reaching the Pole, that Scott
wrote before the return march, “I wonder if we can do it.”

were found to be partly empty, which forced the men to eat
frozen food. Shortage of fuel to melt water likely caused the
men to become dehydrated. Apparently the heat of the sun had
vaporized part of the fuel, enabling it to escape past the
corks.

unusually bad. Scott wrote, in his final “Message to the
Public”: “. . . our wreck is certainly due to this sudden advent
of severe weather. . . .”

vulnerable. It depended in part on motor-sledges, ponies, and
dogs. However, three quarters of the distance was to be covered
by man-hauling.
Sullivan states that it was the last factor that probably was
decisive.[1] He states "Man is a poor beast of burden, as was
shown in the terrible experience of Scott, Shackleton, and
Wilson in their thrust to the south of 1902–3. However, Scott
relied chiefly on man-hauling in 1911–12 because ponies could
not ascend the glacier midway to the Pole. The Norwegians
correctly guessed that dog teams could go all the way.
Furthermore, they used a simple plan, based on their native
skill with skis and on dog-driving methods that were tried and
true. The moon was reached by expending a succession of rocket
stages and then casting each aside; the Norwegians used the same
strategy, sacrificing the weaker animals along the journey to
feed the other animals and the men themselves.[1]
[edit]Objectives of the respective expeditions
Scott and his financial backers saw the expedition as having a
scientific basis, while also wishing to reach the Pole. However,
it was recognised by all involved that the South Pole was the
primary objective ("The Southern Journey involves the most
important object of the Expedition" – Scott), and had priority
in terms of resources, such as the best ponies and all the dogs
and motor sledges as well as involvement of the vast majority of
the expedition personnel. Scott and his team knew the expedition
would be judged on his attainment of the Pole ("The ... public
will gauge the result of the scientific work of the expedition
largely in accordance with the success or failure of the main
object" – Scott). He was prepared to make a second attempt the
following year (1912–13) if this attempt failed and had Indian
Army Mules delivered in anticipation. In fact the mules were
used by the team that discovered the dead bodies of Scott, Henry
Robertson Bowersand Edward Adrian Wilson in November 1912, but
proved even less useful than the ponies, according to
Cherry-Garrard.
Amundsen's expedition was planned to reach the South Pole. This
was a plan he conceived in 1909.[3] Amundsen's expedition did
conduct geographical work under Kristian Prestrud who conducted
an expedition to King Edward VII Land while Amundsen was
undertaking his attempt at the Pole.
[edit]Base camps
Amundsen camped on the Ross Ice Shelf at the Bay of Whales which
is 60 miles (96 km) closer to the Pole than Scott's camp (which
was 350 miles west of Amundsen). Amundsen had deduced that, as
the Trans-Antarctic Mountains ran north-west to south-east then
if he were to meet a mountain range on his route then the time
spent at the high altitude of the Antarctic plateau would be
less than Scott's.[4] Scott's base was at Cape Evans on Ross
Island, with access to the Trans-Antarctic mountain range to the
west, and was a better base for geological exploration. He had
based his previous expedition in the same area. However, he knew
it to be poor as a route to the Pole as he had to start before
sea ice melted and had suffered delay in returning while waiting
for the sea ice to freeze. They also had to make detours around
Ross Island and its known crevassed areas which meant a longer
journey.
[edit]Methods of transport
[edit]Motor sledges
The major comparison between Scott and Amundsen has focused on
the choice of draft transport – dog versus pony/man hauling. In
fact Scott took dogs, ponies and three "motor sledges". Scott
spent nearly seven times the amount of money on his motor
sledges than on the dogs and horses combined. They were
therefore a vital part of the expedition. Unfortunately Scott
decided to leave behind the engineer Lieutenant Commander
Reginald William Skelton[5] who had created and trialled the
motor sledges. This was due to the selection of Lieutenant
E.R.G.R. "Teddy" Evansas the expedition second in command. As
Evans was junior in rank to Skelton he insisted that Skelton
could not come on the expedition.[5] Scott agreed to this
request and Skelton's invaluable experience and knowledge was
lost.[6] One of the original three motor sledges was a failure
even before the expedition set out; the heavy sledge was lost
through thin ice on unloading it from the ship. The two
remaining motor sledges failed relatively early in the main
expedition because of repeated faults. Skelton's experience
might have been valuable in overcoming the failures.[7]
[edit]Ponies vs dogs
Scott had used dogs on his first (Discovery) expedition and felt
they had failed. On that journey, Scott, Shackleton, and Wilson
started with three sledges and 13 dogs. But on that expedition,
the men had not properly understood how to travel on snow with
the use of dogs. The party had skis but were too inexperienced
to make good use of them.[8] As a result, the dogs travelled so
fast that the men could not keep up with them. The Discovery
expedition had to increase their loads to slow the dogs down.[8]
Additionally, the dogs were fed Norwegian dried fish, which did
not agree with them and soon they began to deteriorate.[8] The
whole team of dogs eventually died (and were eaten), and the men
took over hauling the sleds.[8]
Scott's opinion was reinforced by Shackleton's experience on his
Nimrod expedition that got to within 97.5 nautical miles (180.6
km; 112.2 mi) of the Pole. Shackleton used ponies. Scott planned
to use ponies only to the base of the Beardmore Glacier (25% of
the total journey). Scott then planned to man haul the rest of
the journey. Scott's team had developed snow shoes for his
ponies, and trials showed they could significantly increase the
daily mileage. However, Lawrence Oates, whom Scott had made
responsible for the ponies, was reluctant to use the snow shoes
and Scott failed to insist on their use.[9]
There was plenty of evidence that dogs could succeed in the
achievements of William Speirs Bruce in his work in the Arctic,
Antarctic and the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition,
Amundsen in the Gjøa North West passage expedition, Fridtjof
Nansen's crossing of Greenland, Robert Peary's three attempts at
the North Pole, Eivind Astrup's work supporting Peary, Frederick
Cook's discredited North Pole expedition, and Otto Sverdrup's
explorations of Ellesmere Island. Moreover, Scott ignored the
direct advice he received (while attending trials of the motor
sledges in Norway) from Nansen (the most famous explorer of the
day) who told Scott to take "dogs, dogs and more dogs".[10]
At the time of the events, the expert view in England had been
that dogs were of dubious value as a means of Antarctic
transport.[11] Broadly speaking, Scott saw two ways in which
dogs may be used—they may be taken with the idea of bringing
them all back safe and sound, or they may be treated as pawns in
the game, from which the best value is to be got regardless of
their lives.[11]He stated that if, and only if, the comparison
was made with a dog sledge journey which aimed to preserve the
dogs' lives, 'I am inclined to state my belief that in the polar
regions properly organized parties of men will perform as
extended journeys as teams of dogs.'[11] On the other hand, if
the lives of the dogs were to be sacrificed, then 'the dog-team
is invested with a capacity for work which is beyond the
emulation of men. To appreciate this is a matter of simple
arithmetic'.[11] But efficiency notwithstanding, he expressed
'reluctance' to use dogs in this way: "One cannot calmly
contemplate the murder of animals which possess such
intelligence and individuality, which have frequently such
endearing qualities, and which very possibly one has learnt to
regard as friends and companions."[11]
Amundsen, by contrast, took an entirely utilitarian
approach.[11] Amundsen planned from the start to have weaker
animals killed to feed the other animals and the men
themselves.[1] He expressed the opinion that it was less cruel
to feed and work dogs correctly then shoot them than to starve
and overwork them to the point of collapse.[8] Amundsen and his
team had similar affection for their dogs as those expressed
above by the English, but they "also had agreed to shrink from
nothing in order to achieve our goal"[12] Such a procedure was
claimed to be distasteful to the British. At the same time the
British were willing to eat their ponies.[1]
Amundsen had used the opportunity of learning from the Inuit
while on his Gjøa North West passage expedition of 1905. He
recruited experienced dog drivers. In order to make the most of
the dogs he paced them and deliberately kept daily mileages
shorter than he need have for 75% of the journey,[13] and his
team spent up to 16 hours a day resting. His dogs could eat
seals and penguins hunted in the Antarctic while Scott's pony
fodder had to be brought all the way from England in their ship.
It has been later shown that seal meat with the blubber attached
is the ideal food for a sledge dog.[8]
What Scott did not realize is a sledge dog, if it is to do the
same work as a man, will require the same amount of food.[8]
Furthermore, when sledge dogs are given insufficient food they
become difficult to handle.[8] The advantage of the sledge dog
is its greater mobility.[8] Not only were the Norwegians
accustomed to skiing, which enabled them to keep up with their
dogs, but they also understood how to feed them and not overwork
them.[8]
[edit]Walking vs skiing on snow
Scott did take Tryggve Gran on the recommendation of Nansen in
order to train his expedition to ski. But he made no
arrangements for compulsory training. He would subsequently
complain in his diary, while well into his journey and therefore
too late to take any corrective action and after over 10 years
since the Discovery expedition, that "Skis are the thing, and
here are my tiresome fellow countrymen too prejudiced to have
prepared themselves for the event".[14] Amundsen recruited a
team of experienced skiers, all Norwegians who had skied from an
early age. He also recruited a champion skier, Olav Bjaaland, as
the front runner.
[edit]Weather conditions
Scott and Shackleton's experience in 1903 and 1907 gave them
first-hand experience of "normal" conditions in Antarctica.
Simpson, Scott's meteorologist 1910–1912, did a huge amount of
research into the weather during the time of their expedition,
often taking two readings a day. On their return to the Ross Ice
Shelf, Scott's group experienced a prolonged period of low
temperatures from 27 February until 10 March which have only
been matched once in 15 years of modern records.[15] The
exceptional severity of the weather meant they failed to make
the daily mileages they needed to get to the next depot. This
was a serious position as they were short of fuel and food. When
Scott, Wilson and Bowers died (Petty Officer Edgar Evans and
Lawrence Oates had died earlier during the return from the South
Pole) they were 11 miles short of One-Ton Depot, which was 140
miles from Corner Camp, where they would have been safe.
On the other hand, Cherry-Garrard had traveled nearly three
hundred miles in the same area, at the same time period and same
temperatures, using a dog team.[16] Scott did also blame "a
prolonged blizzard". But while there is evidence to support the
low temperature period, there is only evidence for a "normal"
two to four day blizzard, and not the ten days that Scott
claims.[17]
[edit]Route marking and depot laying
During the depot laying in February 1911, Amundsen had his first
(and last) 180 miles of his route marked like a Norwegian ski
course using marker flags initially every eight miles. He added
to this by using parts of empty food containers that had been
prepared by painting the outside black resulting in a marker
every mile. From 82 degrees on Amundsen built a 6 ft cairn every
three miles with a note inside recording the cairn's position,
the distance to the next depot, and direction to the next
cairn.[18] In order not to miss a depot considering the snow and
great distances, Amundsen took precautions. Each depot laid out
up to 85 degrees (laid out every degree of latitude) had a line
of bamboo flags laid out transversely every half mile for 5
miles either side of the depot.
Scott relied on depots much less frequently laid out. For one
distance where Amundsen laid seven depots, Scott laid only two.
Routes were marked by the walls made at lunch and evening stops
to protect the ponies. Depots had a single flag.
As a result Scott has much concern recorded in his diaries over
route finding, and experienced close calls about finding
depots.[19] It is also clear that Scott's team did not travel on
a number of days, because the swirling snow hid their three
month old outward tracks. With better depot and route marking
they would have been able to travel on more days with a
following wind which would have filled the sail attached to
their sledge, and so travel further, and may have reached
safety.
[edit]Food and fuel
Already when they arrived at the pole, the health of Scott's
team had significantly deteriorated. While the team managed to
maintain the scheduled pace for most of the return leg, and
hence was virtually always on full rations, their condition
continued to worsen rapidly. (The only delay occurred when they
were held for four days by a blizzard, and had to open their
summit rations early as a consequence.[20])
Apsley Cherry-Garrard in his analysis of the expedition
estimated that even under optimistic assumptions the summit
rations contained only a little more than half the calories
actually required for the man-hauling of sledges.[2] A carefully
planned 2006 reenactment of both Amundsen's and Scott's travels,
sponsored by the BBC, confirmed Cherry-Garrard's theory; the
British team had eventually to abort their tour due to the
severe weight loss of all members.[21] The experts hinted that
Scott's reports of unusually bad surfaces and weather conditions
might in part have been due to their exhausted state which made
them feel the sledge weights and the chill more severely.
Scott's calculations for the supply requirements were based on a
number of expeditions, both by members of his team (eg. Wilson's
trip with Cherry-Garrard and Bowers to the Emperor penguin
colony which had each man on a different type of experimental
ration), and by Shackleton. Apparently, Scott didn't take the
strain of prolonged man-hauling at high altitudes sufficiently
into account.
Scott also had to fight with a shortage of fuel due to leakage
from stored fuel cans which used leather washers. This was a
known phenomenon that had been noticed previously by other
expeditions, but Scott took no measures to prevent it. Amundsen,
in contrast, had learned the lesson and had his fuel cans
soldered closed. A fuel depot he left on Betty's Knoll was found
50 years later still full.[22]
Dehydration may also have been a factor. Amundsen's team had
plenty of fuel due to the better planning and soldered fuel
cans. Scott had a shortage of fuel and was unable to melt as
much water as Amundsen. At the same time Scott's team were more
physically active in man-hauling the sledges.
[edit]Clothing and goggles
It has been said (by the present-day explorer Ranulph Fiennes
amongst others) that Scott's team was appropriately dressed for
man-hauling in their woolen and wind-proof clothing, and as
Amundsen was skiing it was appropriate he wore furs. Skiing at
the pace of a dog team is a strenuous activity. Yet Amundsen
never complained about the clothing being too hot. That is
because the furs are worn loose so air circulates and sweat
evaporates. Scott's team, on the other hand, made regular
complaints about the cold.
Amundsen's team did initially have problems with their boots.
However, the depot-laying trips of January and February 1911 and
an abortive departure to the South Pole on 8 September 1911
allowed changes to be made before it was too late.
Scott's team suffered regularly from snow blindness and
sometimes this affected over half the team at any one time.[23]
By contrast, there was no recorded case during the whole of
Amundsen's expedition. On the return journey, Amundsen's team
rested during the "day" (while the sun was in front of them) and
traveled during the "night" (while the sun was behind them) to
minimize the effects of snow blindness.
[edit]Other reasons for Scott's Failure
Geology samples
Scott's team continued to haul over 14 kg (30 lb) of rock
samples. This would appear to be a major handicap when pulling a
sledge in a race against the weather and a shortage of food and
fuel. Scott could have left the samples at one of the cairns
along the way to be picked up later. However, Ranulph Fiennes
has suggested that the extra weight would not have been a major
handicap.[24] Tryggve Gran on the other hand thought "they might
have saved themselves the bother".[25]
Final 5-man team
Scott's planning, equipment and rations had been based on three
sledge teams of four men ascending the Beardmore, with a team
turning back every 10 days or so as rations required finally
leaving one four man team to attempt the Pole. At the last
moment when down to two teams (Scott's and Evans's) Scott
decided to send a returning party of three, and take on five.
This increased the cooking time for the team of five and
affected the fuel supply.[26] It also meant the Evans party of
three had to try and split the ration pack (at a time when they
were cold and tired and later when one member was suffering from
scurvy) to leave an allowance for the 5th man in Scott's party.
This also will have affected the seepage of fuel from cans which
were opened and then re-closed and left for several weeks before
Scott's team got to them. Moreover, for some unexplained reason
Scott had ordered Evans's team to depot their skis a week before
so Bowers (the 5th man) walked to the Pole and back to the
depoted skis (360 miles) while the rest of Scott's team skied.
Misuse of the dog team
For no clear reason Scott took the dogs on 140 miles further
than originally planned. This meant killing the ponies early
(and starting man-hauling earlier) to feed the dogs for no
obvious benefit to the overall expedition. Scott also gave
conflicting and changing orders for their use to each returning
party. It was only in late February 1912 that it was discovered
that the final supplies needed by Scott's returning party had
not been delivered to One Ton Depot. Cherry-Garrard was sent
with these supplies on the 25th February 1912 and he was
relieved to discover that he had beaten Scott's team to the
depot.[16] He also found that promised supplies of dog food were
not in place. Cherry-Garrard remained at the depot (within 60
miles of Scott) 4–10 March 1912 when he could possibly have
saved Scott, Wilson, Bowers and Oates if the management of the
dog team had been better.
Navigation
Amundsen used prepared navigation sheets that simplified the
calculations for his team when they were tired and cold. Four
out of his team of five were qualified navigators. Amundsen's
expedition also used a sextant during the journey, which is a
relatively light and simple piece of equipment. He also attended
a symposium that reviewed how to fix position at high latitudes.
Scott used a theodolite which is heavier and requires more
mental arithmetic.[27] Scott also lacked navigators having only
one per team. Scott dismissed Cherry-Garrard's request for
navigational training and Wilson only attempted to learn how to
read latitudes at the last moment.[28]
Camp routine
Amundsen used canisters that left his sledges permanently lashed
and loaded. Scott's team had to unload, and load and relash
their sledge at every camp, no matter what the weather.
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