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       #Post#: 77--------------------------------------------------
       What is the ECB to Do?
       By: fxvictory Date: October 2, 2014, 6:27 am
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       [move]What is the ECB to Do?[/move]
       The European Central Bank meets tomorrow.   The focus is on the
       details of the asset-backed securities and covered bond plan
       that was announced last month.
       There are three key issues related to this new initiative:  What
       instruments will be purchased,  how much will be bought, and how
       long will the purchase program last?
       The ECB will buy the safest tranche of the asset-backed
       securities.  The initial proposal that it could buy riskier
       tranches if guaranteed by national governments was quickly
       rebuffed not only by Germany, which has been critical of the
       purchase plan, but also France.
       Since the crisis erupted several years ago, the ECB has reduced
       the quality of the assets it will accept as collateral,
       including ABS.   Greek and Cypriot ABS still does not meet even
       these relaxed criteria.  There was a report this week that
       intimated an effort to make an exception of these two countries.
       However, this seems unlikely as such exceptions are not fair
       and would probably not have sufficient support.
       Indeed, it could have very well been an intentional leak to
       toughen the resolve of German and creditor nation resistance.
       Recall that the decision to cut interest rates last month and
       the purchase program was not unanimous.  Draghi referred to it
       as a "comfortable majority".  This does not sound as if Germany
       was the sole dissenter.
       After the low use of the new Targeted Long Term Repo Operation
       facility,  there was initially some thought that this would
       increase the pressure on the ECB to "shock and awe" with the
       "modalities" of its asset purchase program.  A Reuters polls
       found a consensus expectation that the ECB would buy 200 bln
       euros of ABS and covered bonds over the next 12 months.  In a
       poll shortly after last month's ECB meeting, the consensus was
       for a 300 bln euro program.
       We see some risk that the ECB does not announce the size of its
       purchase program.  This would maximize it operational
       flexibility.  Once it announces the criteria of its purchases,
       the market can deduce the potential size.  This is true of
       covered bonds as well.  The prior two covered bond purchase
       programs were 40-60 bln euros, which would be the lion's share
       of the outstanding supply.
       One significant wrinkle is that ABS and covered bonds have been
       used extensively for collateral at the ECB.  For example, banks
       retain part of the covered bonds, but these are used as an
       emergency liquidity backstop and the banks may be reluctant to
       part with these.  The weakness of the housing market through
       much of the eurozone  and the asset encumbrance rules, argue
       against a surge in new supply of covered bonds.
       Draghi had indicated desire to lift the ECB's balance sheet back
       toward 2012 levels.  We have cautioned against making a fetish
       of this target.  It is not clear that it is an official policy
       target; more a desire, perhaps, than a commitment.  Still, some
       argue that this is not quantitative easing, as if quantitative
       easing has an agreed upon definition.  In the US, for example,
       Bernanke did not call the Fed's long-term asset purchases
       quantitative easing, but credit easing.
       Some argue that to qualify as QE, sovereign bonds need to be
       purchased.   The Bank of Japan buys government bonds but also
       buys REITs, ETFS, and corporate bonds.  The different policy
       responses in among the major economies is partly a function of
       different types of capitalisms.  The US and UK, for example,
       rely more on markets to distribute capital, but Japan and the
       euro area remain bank-centric.
       Not only is the definition of QE not agreed upon, but its
       purpose has varied.  When long-term assets were initially
       purchased, it was to alleviate financial market stress by
       pushing down interest rates and displacing investors out of
       risk-free assets.  Its goal was later broadened to include
       resisting deflationary impulses, and then used to stimulate the
       real economy.
       The goal of the ECB's asset purchase plan is to arrest
       disinflation, re-anchor inflation expectations, and help boost
       lending to small and medium businesses and households.   While
       Draghi, like all central bankers, are loath to limit policy
       options a priori, those looking for a hint that the ECB is
       considering a sovereign bond purchase scheme will likely be
       disappointed.  It is not just because of German (and creditor)
       opposition.  The ECB has overruled German objections several
       times, including the initial bond purchase plan (SMP), the
       Outright Monetary Transactions, and again with the recent rate
       cuts and asset purchase plan.
       It is not just the legal hurdles, as the market awaits the
       European Court of Justice ruling on the OMT, for which the
       Bundesbank's Weidmann testified against.   Weidmann himself
       previously indicated that under certain conditions QE might be
       acceptable.  There are non-political and non-legalistic reasons
       to be suspicious of a sovereign-based QE.    What is the point?
       Eight eurozone members have negative 2-year yields, including
       Ireland and Slovakia.     Germany's 10-year bond yield is below
       90 bp.  Italian and Spanish sovereign yields are at record lows
       though debt levels are at record highs.
       Of the ECB's challenges, high sovereign bond yields are not
       among them.  It is not clear that buying sovereign bonds will
       boost inflation.   The weaker euro may have a greater impact on
       boosting price pressures than lower nominal interest rates.  The
       link between sovereign rates and rates paid by households and
       SMEs is not very tight.
       During the Great Depression, when the US was also more
       bank-centric, the Federal Reserve dis-intermediated the banks.
       They moved into the breach created by banks either unwilling or
       unable to lend.  The Federal Reserve lent directly to small and
       medium sized businesses.  While the ECB does not have that
       experience in its short history, some of the national central
       banks have made loans to businesses.
       In a larger sense, what ails the eurozone might not be amenable
       to monetary policy.  And the only reason that monetary policy is
       being over active is that fiscal policy is frozen.    The cult
       of austerity means that most countries do not have scope to use
       fiscal policy.  Those countries that have the scope, like
       Germany, do not have the will.  The grand coalition government
       in Germany has agreed to deliver a balanced budget next year.
       The recent and sharp decline in the yen is expected to reignite
       the upward pressure on prices.  The decline in the euro may do
       the same for the eurozone.   Earlier this year, we suggested
       that the ECB should consider taking a page out of the Swiss
       National Bank’s play book.  When it wanted to ease policy, the
       SNB was constrained from a QE operation by the lack of
       sufficient domestic bonds.  It bought foreign bonds.
       Rather than take the controversial step of buying member bonds,
       the ECB could buy foreign bonds.  It would not have to do a
       large size.  An announcement to buy a relatively small amount of
       Treasuries is well within the ECB’s mandate and would have a
       dramatic effect.
       It would likely annoy US officials.  The Treasury’s report
       earlier this year urged foreign officials not to buy US
       government bonds.  This, they argued, prevents the adjustment
       process to which the G20 are committed.  A weaker euro simply
       borrows (or steals, depending on your vantage point) growth from
       elsewhere.  It does not create the conditions for sustainable
       growth, the way that structural reform can.      However, if the
       ECB’s foreign bond purchases were part of a larger commitment
       to pro-growth policies and structural reforms, it would likely
       be more palatable
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