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#Post#: 69--------------------------------------------------
Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question Response!
DIR By: LouFederer
Date: July 13, 2012, 2:56 pm
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Hi all
I am slightly nervous about posting this as it is my first ever
Philosophy essay which I wrote this afternoon at work. I decided
to answer the practice examination question: "How well does
Justice fit Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean?" I would be so
grateful to have any feedback at all on this essay. I am going
to be starting the course in September and I thought the best
way to get to grips with the subject was to read, assimilate and
write. So here it goes:
How well does Justice fit Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean?
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an enquiry into what
constitutes the ultimate good for human beings. In short,
Aristotle believes that the proper function of humans is to act
in accordance with reason, exercising the virtues under the
guidance of reason, in order to achieve the ultimate end of
eudaimonia – the state of having had a successful, flourishing,
happy life. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives detailed
accounts of the established Virtues, and institutes the doctrine
of the Mean to place the Virtues into a comprehensible
framework: between two disparate, polar vices. Essentially,
virtues are states of one’s character in the presence of which
eudaimonia can be realised. It is unarguable that Justice is
synonymous with virtue, with what is ultimately good for man,
enabling and facilitating the achievement of eudaimonia, but it
does not fit into Aristotle’s very exacting, and very
particular, ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ without a degree of
difficulty.
As intimated already, the Doctrine of the Mean states that each
virtue is an intermediate state between two different, polar
vices: one of excess and one of deficiency. For example, the
virtue of patience lies between two vicious states of
irascibility and lack of spirit. In this case, the virtue
clearly falls, almost with mathematical perfection between two
clear vices. Justice, it would seem, does not have two disparate
polar vices, it has just one opposite: injustice. Aristotle
would argue, however, that Justice is about getting what one
deserves: injustice, then, of the excessive kind would be giving
more than is deserved, injustice of the deficient kind would be
not getting what is deserved. Receiving more or less than one’s
fair share is unjust, and in this fashion, the Doctrine of the
Mean is a comfortable fit.
I would argue that, unlike other virtues, however, justice and
injustice could take the form of an archery board – the centre
circle of the board is justice, it has no blurred edges, it is
perceptibly distinct from injustice, which surrounds it in all
directions. To deviate at all from absolute justice is to be
devoid of justice, which has no other name but injustice.
Therefore, the Doctrine of the Mean, which is postulated on the
idea of a quantitative-like continuum, seems inappropriate.
Justice cannot be like other virtues that run gradually from hot
to cold, from naught to ten; with justice you cannot simply add
and subtract to reach the virtuous answer. Justice cannot exist
in degrees; it is discrete and absolute, either it exists
entirely or it is absolutely absent. In this way, Aristotle’s
doctrine does not accommodate Justice. However, Aristotle does
qualify degrees of Justice in the Nicomachean Ethics by looking
at actions in terms of their degrees of voluntariness, dictating
that only deliberate, voluntary actions are ever capable of
being wrong, or unjust. This is still problematic, however, with
regard to the Doctrine of the Mean, as ‘voluntariness’ exists
superordinate to both Justice and the accepted virtues. The
Doctrine of the Mean appears too crude a model to fully
accommodate Justice.
For Justice to be the case in any instance, preceding actions
need to have occurred. Justice needs qualifying where other
virtues do not. Justice depends on whether the action taken was
involuntary, voluntary, or deliberate; it also depends on what
the action was. For there to be Justice at all, the appropriate
virtue needs to have been acted on, voluntarily and
deliberately. There are several links to the chain in the
pursuit of satisfying Justice. Even then, however, Justice is
only compatible with the Doctrine of the Mean for reasons that I
shall now explain.
Aristotle defines Justice as desert: people getting what they
deserve according to merit, which, in Aristotle’s system of
Virtue Ethics, those who merit most are the most virtuous. So,
when the virtues are exercised appropriately (as the situation
warrants, in accordance with reason, as the virtuous person
would act), Justice is clearly inherent. Justice, in this way,
is vicariously accommodated by the Doctrine of the Mean, as it
is superordinate to all other virtues: when virtues are
performed in accordance with reason, Justice is being done.
Furthermore, since Aristotle claims the unity of virtues, the
possession of one virtue is the possession of all virtues; this
again accommodates Justice, as all other virtues are subordinate
to Justice. Therefore, the satisfaction of the subordinate
virtues, which unilaterally fit the Doctrine of the Mean,
inherently means that Justice too is satisfied, vicariously
satisfying the Doctrine of the Mean thereby.
On the contrary, however, it is conceivable that virtues could
come into conflict, which disturbs and invalidates Aristotle’s
suggestion that all virtues always exist in unity. If the action
required by virtue A conflicts with the action require by virtue
B, which action should be taken, and how will Justice be
realised in this instance? It seems impossible that Justice
should satisfy the Doctrine of the Mean either directly or
vicariously when the virtues are in conflict. Potentially, when
these conflicts arise, the decision-procedure espoused by
Aristotle of ‘asking the phronimos’, or the virtuous man, is the
only means of settlement, but there is still no real possibility
that the unity of virtues (and therefore Justice) could be
satisfied in this instance, thereby leaving the Doctrine of the
Mean an unsuitable ethical framework.
Furthermore, Aristotle’s account of Justice is elaborate and
multifaceted, making it an extremely awkward fit into the neat
and finite mould of the Doctrine of the Mean. There exists many
forms of Justice according to Aristotle: universal, particular,
political, legal, natural, distributive and rectifectory.
Perhaps where it is hardest for Justice to satisfy the
subordinate virtues, and therefore making the possibility of
achieving Justice difficult, is where the interests of the
individual and the State differ; what it means to be a just
person, versus a just citizen. It should be noted that Aristotle
himself states that it means something very different to be a
just man and a just citizen. Clearly, every individual lives in
some sort of society, so how easy is it to bifurcate the notions
of the just man and the just citizen – surely they are the same
thing if they exist in the world? Surely the intersection on the
proverbial Venn diagram shows the ‘just man’ and ‘just citizen’
sharing almost identical characteristics in the intersection?
Aristotle places as much emphasis on the need for a flourishing
State as he does flourishing individuals – but to achieve the
former, how does the latter need to change, and vice versa, on
the understanding that, as Aristotle avers, the just man and
just citizen are two very different entities. Furthermore, if
virtues exist only in unity, whereby this unity allows the
individual the chance of eudaimonia, is this rule broken for the
State’s ‘eudaimonia’? It seems that if the requisite virtues
themselves change when the ends change (i.e. the pursuit of
individual flourishing changes to the pursuit of the State’s
flourishing) surely (if Justice is inherent in the exercise of
all virtues only) Justice is not being exercised, as this rule
has to be broken? If Justice is not even present, it has no
chance of fitting into the Doctrine of the Mean.
To conclude and summarise the reasons aforementioned, Justice,
although doubtlessly a virtue, is a poor fit for Aristotle’s
rigid Doctrine of the Mean. It seems that Justice may
vicariously satisfy the Doctrine by being the superordinate,
overarching virtue, ‘the virtue of all other virtues’, but of
itself it does not satisfy the Doctrine’s narrow criteria.
Perhaps the Doctrine is too crude a model, or perhaps Justice is
too complex a notion, but it appears to be conclusive at least
that Justice is the ultimate, inherent end of the good life.
LouFederer / Louise Chapman 2012
#Post#: 74--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: waveletter
Date: July 17, 2012, 12:42 am
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Hi LouFederer (and everyone):
This is a great start. Your writing style is fluid and
sophisticated; it must come from quite a bit of practice and
reflection. Noted! I'd give it a high-60s to low-70s score.
One thing I wanted to point out to everyone on CreateaForum (and
the VLE, if you're listening), though, is that this particular
question has not occurred on any of the recent exam papers. It
is on p. 39 of the Student Handbook for 2011-12. This is a fork
in the road that I incorrectly followed in my first year in the
UoL External Programme. I studied the sample questions, wrote
sample essays on them, and then found out with only a little
time left before May that the questions on the exam were in all
likelihood to be quite different. And they were. Watch out.
It's not easy entering through the front door of the UoL
website, but you can find past exam papers and reports out on
the back porch:
HTML https://philosophy.elearning.london.ac.uk/mod/folder/view.php?id=1223
There is a pattern to the topics on the exam questions. Read the
original works, the actual past exam questions, the examiners'
reports, and then the commentaries on the thinkers (Guthrie on
Aristotle, for example). You can fairly accurately guess what
should appear on the exam you sit.
OK, that being said, this is still a pretty interesting sample
question. I don't think I can say everything that I ought to say
in one post, so I'll number my remarks and attempt a later
continuation in sequence.
1. I'm probably going to take the Ethics 1 module, belatedly as
Tim points out, next year, and Aristotle is one of My Guys, so I
really ought to think about this question. I did a little. First
off, I thought that the Doctrine of the Mean was indeed
applicable to a number of virtues. Let's take courage--right out
of Plato's Laches and the Intro to Phil module. You've got
cowardice on one end and foolhardiness on the other end and
genuine courage in the middle, pretty much as an Aristotelian
balance beam might suggest. Good. Same with a lot of other
things: patience (irascibility/indifference), generosity
(stinginess/indulgence), nurturing (spoiling the
child/neglecting the child), and so on. So, initially Aristotle
seems to have a nice idea. (Maybe a little to mathematical for
the biologist Aristotle, but we give him some slack here.) But
with Justice it seems harder to identify the extremes of excess
and deficit, as LouFederer notes (2nd paragraph into the
answer).
2. But Aristotle must have in mind Plato's more complex analysis
of Justice as the harmonious interaction of wisdom, courage, and
moderation. The Mean Doctrine seems to favor the moderation
aspect of Plato's Republic theory, and then wisdom and courage
get knocked off as individual virtues, accounted for as means of
their own particular kind. This was my next thought, just
ruminating on the practice question.
3. Now I start reading the essay, and LouFederer pretty much
demolishes Aristotle. Ouch. If Justice is a Mean, what are the
polar extremes between which Justice might intermediately fall?
It's hard to say. Maybe Justice and Injustice are more like an
archery target, with varying degrees and kinds of injustice
lying on concentric circles distant from the bulls-eye of
Justice. That seems right.
4. A question: Does Aristotle subscribe to a Unity of Virtues
concept (as Louise says in para. 5)? I think that Plato did, but
I'm asking, does this translate over into the Nicomachean
Ethics? Hmm....
5. Another question: Does Aristotle not see the fundamental
problem that LouFederer gestures at here? He's pretty slippery,
like Locke say, and his analytical development might turn out to
be more subtle than the first few readings would suggest.
It's getting pretty late for me, so I'll stop here and try to
continue tomorrow night. Thanks! --Ron
#Post#: 79--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: waveletter
Date: July 18, 2012, 12:44 am
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Hello again LouFederer and everyone else on the Forum:
I'm continuing to reflect upon LouFederer's practice essay from
the UoL Student Handbook question, whether Aristotle's Doctrine
of the Mean fits well with the concept of Justice.
6. One of the great classical scholars of the last (20th)
century, Sir David Ross, also held that Aristotle was wrong to
see Justice as working as a mean between two extremes. There is
a very useful section of his book Aristotle, (London: Methuen,
1923), which covers Justice (pp. 209-215). There are two broad
types of Justice: Universal Justice (what is lawful; it is
coextensive with the whole of virtue...see my point #5 above)
and Particular Justice, which resolves into two kinds,
distribution of honors and wealth among citizens (distributive
justice) and remedial justice (corrective of material imbalances
from dealings between citizens); cf. Ross, pp. 209-210.
7. It appears, according to Aristotle, that justice and
injustice determine each other. "...it follows for the most part
that if one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be
ambiguous; e.g. if 'just' is so, that 'unjust' will be so too."
[Nicomachean Ethics, 1129a24-6; Barnes, ed., Complete Works of
Aristotle, v. II, p. 1782]
8. Now it turns out that Aristotle isn't really too keen on
analyzing Universal Justice: "Evidently, therefore, there is
apart from injustice in the wide [sc. universal] sense another,
particular, injustice which shares the name and nature of the
first, because its definition falls within the same genus; for
the force of both lies in a relation to others but the one is
concerned with honour or money or safety--or that which includes
all these, if we had a single name for it--and its motive is the
pleasure that arises from gain; while the other is concerned
with all the objects with which the good man is concerned." [NE,
1130a32-b5; Barnes, p. 1784]
9. Aristotle states his preference for analyzing Particular
Justice in terms of its contrary, but the one characterizes its
opposite, as I try to show Aristotle's argument (plausible,
given the subject perhaps, but from a particular case to the
general case (!) in (7)).
10. Anyway, here we go. Ross goes on to explain how Aristotle
explains instances of Particular Justice; "The three types of
person, then, whom Aristotle describes as acting justly are (1)
the statesman, in distributing honours and rewards, (2) the
judge, in assessing damages, (3) the farmer or manufacturer, in
exchanging his goods at a fair price." [Ross, p. 213]
11. Ross argues that "The discussion [sc. above] has made it
clear, Aristotle says, that just action is a mean between acting
unjustly and being unjustly treated. This is inconsistent with
the previous discussion [sc. in (10)]. The statesman and the
judge, who distribute goods or assess damages justly, are in no
danger of being unjustly treated; and the private citizen, who
may be given too much or too little by the unjust act of the
statesman or the judge, does not, so far as this goes, act at
all, but is purely passive. The two points of view are confused.
The only person who really chooses between the too much, the too
little, and the right act is the man who chooses either to
fulfil his contract or to depart from it to his own advantage or
disadvantage. And he does not behave viciously. Thus the attempt
to exhibit justice as a mean breaks down." [Ross, pp. 213-4].
12. Thus, David Ross, one of the premier Aristotelian scholars
of the 20th century, also expresses deep misgivings about the
virtue of Justice as being given by way of Aristotle's Doctrine
of the Mean.
Well, I'll try as best I can to try to salvage something for
Aristotle in the next few posts. Hope this helps! --Ron Allen
(waveletter)
#Post#: 81--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: LouFederer
Date: July 18, 2012, 10:49 am
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Wow, Ron, thank you so much for your detailed comments! You're
clearly extremely well-informed about Aristotle.
The question is indeed interesting, although you make a good
point about it never having come up on an official examination
paper - let's hope it does now, right? :) I think the points you
raise re the question are excellent, especially with the backing
of other writers.
I finished the Nicomachean Ethics today and think I've now got
a fuller understanding of Aristotle's moral theory - clearly I
need to familiarise myself with some of the critical articles
relating to the NE and Aristotle... It's a great learning
experience though, and one we should continue to share with this
forum.
Thanks again! Lou
#Post#: 83--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: LouFederer
Date: July 19, 2012, 7:51 am
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I just found a really interesting essay on Aristotle's virtue of
Justice. I hope you can access this link OK:
HTML http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/27823292.pdf
HTML http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/27823292.pdf
Lou
#Post#: 84--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: Hongkonger
Date: July 22, 2012, 9:50 pm
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If everything is judged solely on the basis of law with no
exception, it may be too harsh; but if everything is judged
solely on the basis of human relationship, our society will
become highly corrupted and many people will be treated
unfairly. Thus, perhaps, between these two extremes there exists
a mean which may signify Aristotle's conception of Justice. A
Chinese proverb: -
法律不外乎人情 -
translation: law is no more than humanity, or law should not be
devoid of humanity. (I think this translation cannot express as
well as in Chinese but I can't think a better one)
For instance, in Hong Kong (I think it should also be the case
in other countries), in serving the courts and the parties
concerned, Probation Officers prepare pre-sentence reports
including Probation Officer's Reports, Suitability Reports for
Community Service Order, progress reports of the probationers
and social welfare reports on long-term prisoners and petition
cases. Why the judge has to take these into account rather than
simply strictly sending an law-offender to prison?
#Post#: 89--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: waveletter
Date: July 29, 2012, 11:07 pm
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Hi Lou:
Thanks for the compliment, and I did go through the Aristotle
module just last year, but I still would not be inclined to
assert that I'm very well-informed about Aristotle. It's just
too deep. I've been trying. The Aristotle module mostly concerns
ontology, epistemology, physics, soul, and metaphysics...more my
intellectual strengths, but, alas, there's nothing there on
ethics, which topic seems to be relegated to the Historical
Ethics module. Or: Here we are.
I have to be kind of brief, because I just got back into town. I
took a brainless weekend in the mountains.
There are some counterpoints that have been raised vis-a-vis the
interpretation of justice as a mean, proffered by Aristotle, and
critiqued by LouFederer and Ross. In particular, Hongkonger
(Tim) in another post seems to find some way to defend Justice
as a Mean. It's not now clear to me whether that follows along
with Aristotle, but it's a valid point of departure for
discussion. Also, it seems to me that Guthrie himself seems to
reflect kindly on interpretations of the EN that see some way to
defend Aristotle on this point. These are of two kinds (maybe;
don't hold me to this--I'm still puzzling over the problematics;
also, I'm no good with ethics): first, pointing out that
Aristotle makes an exception to his doctrine of the mean as
regards Justice (this may be pertinent to Tim's point
elsewhere), and, second, that the doctrine of the mean was not
itself promulgated by The Philosopher in so narrow a sense as he
does with, say, Courage.
So, I think that with your practice essay, and with Tim's
(Hongkonger's) reply, we have posed before us a real question of
how to read the Nich Eth: as axiomatic, with Courage as an
axiom; or discursive, with Courage as an example (and Justice as
a deviant development). I'm working on this. Thanks! --Ron
#Post#: 107--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: waveletter
Date: August 6, 2012, 11:28 pm
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Hello again LouFederer & all:
I want to add a few notes on how one might salvage Aristotle's
thesis that Justice is a mean. In earlier posts on the thread
Louise criticized Aristotle's viewpoint with particular force,
and I noted that none other that Sir David Ross also held that
"The attempt to exhibit justice as a mean breaks down" [Ross,
Aristotle, London: Methuen, 1923, p. 214].
It seems that Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. VI
(Aristotle: An Encounter), Cambridge: CUP, 1981, p. 371n] is not
so ready to endorse Ross's position. He writes in a footnote
about Ross's statement (above): "This was denied in a long and
careful note by Stewart...as later by Hardie...." Guthrie (pp.
371-2) then quotes Aristotle [1133b30]: "Just dealing is a mean
between wrongdoing and being wronged, i.e. having too much or
too little. Justice is a kind of mean, not in the same way as
the other virtues but because it is of a mean, whereas injustice
is of the extremes."
Guthrie points out that Aristotle's Greek text is "hoti mesou
estin", which G. translates as "because it is of a mean" (his
italics above), whereas Ross amplifies this quite a bit into
"relates to an intermediate amount". The Greek words for 'the
mean' are "to meson"--like the elementary particles, or as in
the term Meso-America, or Mesopotamia (in the middle of the
rivers)--so Aristotle is using the genitive, and it could also
be translated as "from a mean". Guthrie's translation (and mine
too) serves to separate the notion of justice from the kind of
mean it comes from, whereas Ross tends to push justice towards
that mean. Anyway, this is just a little grammatical point that
shows how sometimes a knowledge of the Attic Greek is useful in
exegesis.
Guthrie goes on (p. 372): "Aristotle sees at once that his first
attempt at a definition in terms of the mean will not do. Just
action is a mean between apportioning (whether in one's personal
relations or as a judge between others) more or less than what
is fair and appropriate." If Guthrie is right about this, and
I'm thinking that he has a good point here, Aristotle is being
quite flexible in what he considers to be a mean and how some
virtue relates to the mean from which it comes. If I go back and
look at Ross's further comments (see my previous post where I
numbered the points; see point #11), it now appears to me that
Ross is being quite unfair to Aristotle.
Here is how Hardie [Aristotle's Ethical Theory, Oxford:
Clarendon, 1968, p. 182] approaches the question: "His analysis
of various kinds or spheres of justice leads him to the
conclusion at the end of chapter 5 [of N.E. Book V] that
'justice is a kind of mean, but not in the same way as the other
virtues, but because it relates to an intermediate amount, while
injustice relates to the extremes' (1133b32-1134a1). Thus
Aristotle does not assert, but denies, that the application of
the Mean to justice is the same as its application to other
virtues. But we should not be in a hurry to decide that the
doctrine here breaks down or is a failure [here Hardie notes
Ross's text as I quoted above]. If Aristotle's treatment of
justice as a mean is in some respects confusing and complicated,
so also are both the facts to be surveyed and our ways of
talking about the facts whether in Greek or in English."
I'd better stop here. I'll try to summarize later the points
that Stewart makes, but his notes are rather difficult, quote a
number of late 19th century authors, and are strewn with Greek.
I think that the innocent-sounding sample question that Lou
selected for a trial essay is really quite difficult to answer.
Just look at the arguments among Aristotelian scholars! Thanks!
--Ron
#Post#: 110--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: waveletter
Date: August 8, 2012, 1:12 am
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Hi Lou and all:
Unless you are keenly interested in Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics, and in particular with its concept of justice as a mean,
then stop reading this post now. OK, let's see how the web page
formatting works on that one.
I say this because I'm launching into a reading of commentary on
Book V of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics that is old and Greek
and difficult. And, to boot, I'm neither an expert on ethics (to
say the least) nor on Aristotle (to say something or other, I'm
not sure what). I'm talking about the notes in J.A. Stewart,
Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, vol. I, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1892.
[Oh, aside, I got this book (and vol. II too) from Stanford
University's Green Library. It didn't even have a US Library of
Congress index--instead it was located among quite old books,
way upstairs, in a scrunched wing of the library called the Bing
Wing, in a corner in fact, one that only had only texts on
ancient philosophy, those with Dewey Decimal System numbers.
Pretty cool. I once bumped into a guy yanking books from the
shelves up there and making notes. I said, "What are you doing?"
(He was pulling out old books and writing down their Dewey
Decimal numbers.) He basically said, "I'm finding things that we
might be able to upload onto Google Books." I thanked him
(Jeremy) and told him that I often used their web-based services
for Byzantine lexicography. So that's how it happens.]
Concerning Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 1133b32ff. On p. 472
(vol. I, op. cit.) old Stewart notes that (an anonymous
paraphrasis, through Heliodorus) commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics says (my translation from the Greek; sorry) that "...but
implementing justice is a mean not of a type according to the
earlier virtues; for, indeed, of the others, each of the virtues
is a mean of two vices, according to making a deficit and to
making an excess" (Stewart, p. 472).
This is a point that I think we've already seen. Stewart goes on
to remark that "Mich. Eph. has a note to the same effect--viz.
that every one of the other virtues has two vices contrary to
it, but justice has only one vice (adikia)...." [this would be
Michael of Ephesus (11-12th century CE, who wrote a commentary
on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics].
A little later Stewart remarks that "According to this view,
then, of the passage before us [1133b32ff], the point is in the
words 'he de adikia ton akron': 'justice is not a mesotes in
quite the same way as the other virtues are 'mesotetes',
because, although it does indeed observe a mean, "both the
extremes fall under the single vice of injustice."' Is it this
alone that constitutes the difference? I think not."
Stewart thinks that the difference is
(1) marked by the words 'hoti mesou estin', which we've remarked
upon before, and yet
(2) a merely minor difference is signaled by the fact that both
extremes fall under the single vice of injustice.
Thus, Stewart inspires Guthrie's comments on Aristotle here, and
Stewart tends to dismiss the slant on this passage taken by the
later commentators. Thanks! --Ron
#Post#: 120--------------------------------------------------
Re: Ethics: Historical Perspectives - Practice Question
Response!
DIR By: LouFederer
Date: September 25, 2012, 7:11 am
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Hi guys
I haven't been on the forum in ages! Been reading heaps and
writing lots of essays too, immensely enjoying the course -
particularly in love with Kant, surprisingly, more on that in
another post maybe. :)
I was wondering whether somebody could help me understand the
distinction between the dominant and inclusive 'types' of
eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics? I am not entirely clear on
what the difference is, or how exactly to put it into words.
Hope everybody is well and having a great time of studying!
Lou
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