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#Post#: 61--------------------------------------------------
Torts 2 -outline 2
DIR By: SunsetSailor
Date: February 17, 2011, 9:38 pm
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Torts II Outline
Defenses
I. Defenses
a. Possible for  to prevail even if  proves
every element of prima facie negligence.  may prevail
if they assert an affirmative defense such as contributory
fault, assumed risk, or the statute of limitations.
b. Case may be determined by ’s failure to prove his
prima facie case. May also be determined by ’s failure
to prove an affirmative defense.
c.  burden of proof – elements of negligence
d.  burden of proof – evidence of contributory fault –
what the evidence shows
II. Contributory Negligence
a. Traditional rule - Contributory negligence of a  was
a complete bar to the claim – Butterfield v. Forrester
b. Similarities to Negligence
i. Reasonable person and balance of risks and utilities applies
to contributory negligence as well as negligence
1. Example -  is not necessarily guilty of contributory
negligence when she subjects herself to risks in the course of
rescuing another person – value of saving another makes the
risks reasonable
ii. Normal rules of cause in fact AND proximate cause apply to
contributory negligence.
c. Differences from Negligence
i. Possible that a reasonable person would expose himself to
risks that he could not reasonably inflict on others
1. Example – You may drop into a vat of poison to save your
child – cannot expect another to do the same
III. Exceptions to Contributory Negligence – permitted a full
recovery for  against:
a.  who was guilty of intentional, wanton, or reckless
harm
i. Ex. – driving while intoxicated
b.  who had the last clear chance to avoid injury
i.  put himself in danger from which she could not
escape
ii.  could do nothing to save herself once she had put
herself in danger, but that the  could have avoided
injury by ordinary care
iii. Davies v. Mann -  tied his donkey in the road,
where it stood eating grass when the  ran into it.
 was not on hand to free the animal and it could not
escape.
1. Held - ’s negligence was no bar to recovery since
 had “last clear chance”
iv. Discovered Peril
1. Exception would not apply unless  actually discovered
’s helpless condition and was negligent thereafter in
failing to avoid injury.
2. Vs. last clear chance – under LCC, exception can only be
invoked not only when  actually discovered the danger
but also when he should have done so
v. Inattentive 
1. The inattentive , who was not in fact helpless, might
claim the benefit of the rule where  actually discovered
his danger in time to avoid harm and negligently failed to do so
2. If  sees a  who is apparently conscious and
able to protect himself by moving, the exception does not apply
and contributory negligence remains a bar
c.  whose duty was to protect  from her own
risky conduct
i. Protect  from her own weakness, incapacity or fault
ii. When the  is harmed because the  breaches
that duty of care, the  cannot defend on the ground of
contributory negligence, since that was the thing he was obliged
to prevent.
1. What counts as contributory negligence – determined by the
scope of ’s duty
iii. Statutes
1. Although contributory negligence is ordinarily a defense, it
is no defense at all if the  violates a statute intended
to protect the  from his own negligence or incapacity.
a. Statutes impose strict liability.
2. Protect children and others under a disability
iv. Common Law
1. Courts are free to impose duties that require s to
protect vulnerables, incapacitated, or minor s from
their own inability to protect themselves.
IV. Risk Allocated to Defendant
a. Customary practices, the relationship of the parties, or
their understandings, may operate to allocate some risks
entirely to the .
i. Ex. – Pedestrian is not required to wear a helmet against the
possibility that a driver may run him down. Law expects driver
to keep off the sidewalks.
ii. Ex. – doctors may owe a duty to provide patients with
material information about the need for and risks of proposed
operations.
V. Comparative Fault
a. Reduces the amount of the award to a  who is
chargeable with contributory fault.
b. Reduces the ’s recovery in proportion to the
’s relevant fault. ’s fault is not relevant if
it is not one of the causes in fact of the ’s harm. Nor
is it relevant if it is not a proximate cause.
i. Ex. - ’s fault is 75% of all the relevant fault and
’s fault is 25%, the ’s damages must be reduced
by 25%. If ’s damages are $10K, he may only recover
$7500.
c. Pure
i. Applies comparative fault to all s in all negligence
cases. No  is completely barred from recovery for their
own contributory negligence.
d. Modified
i. “Greater than”
1.  is completely barred if her fault exceeds that of
the 
2.  barred if 51% or greater
ii. “Equal to”
1.  is completely barred if her fault, though not
exceeding the ’s is at least equal to it
2.  barred if 50% or greater
VI. Assigning Shares
a. Juries can compare the relevant unjustified risks taken by
the  with the relevant unjustified risks taken by the

i. If jury believes that  driving 100 mph created 3
times the risk as  driving 70 mph, the apportionment
will be 75%-25%.
b. Comparison is of unjustified risks
i. 75 mph is much too fast, and that given the risk to others
she should not have driven more than 65 mph. Jury would only
c. Factors Used
i. Assessment of relative fault
1. Reasonableness of a party’s conduct
2. Existence of a sudden emergency
3. Whether conduct was justified since it was used to save a
life
ii. Unreasonably risky
1. Probability that harm will result
2. Amount of that harm
3. Costs of avoiding the risk
d. Comparison of Causation
i. Comparative negligence is the comparison of the unjustified
risks taken by each. The only negligence to be compared is the
negligence that is a cause in fact and also a proximate cause in
the sense that the harm caused was the kind of harm put at risk.
ii. Cause in fact and proximate cause concepts are gate-keeping
concepts, excluding some negligence from consideration when it
is not causal in fact and when it is too remote.
VII. Distinguishing Avoidable Consequences and Comparative
Negligence
a. The first rule of avoidable consequences denies the 
recovery for negligently inflicted damages that she could have
avoided or minimized by reasonable care.
b. Fault apportionment – comparative fault (CF)
i. Each party’s fault has contributed to the whole harm – use
percentages to determine where no particular item of harm can be
distinctly allocated to the .
ii. Both  and  are concurrent causes of an
indivisible harm
iii. Because the  has suffered one harm that cannot be
divided into parts, courts in a comparative negligence system
apportion liability between the  and  in
proportion to their fault in causing the loss as a whole
c. Causal apportionment – avoidable consequences (AC)
i. Used when courts isolate two or more distinct items of harm
resulting from two or more distinct acts or causes.
ii. Courts could allocate the entire responsibility for one item
of harm to the  as the responsible cause of that
particular harm. Allocation of responsibility was not based
upon a percentage of fault but upon the fact that a specific
item of harm could be identified as the ’s entire
responsibility.
d. Examples
i. Ex. - ’s damages were $100K and the ’s fault
was 5% of the total.
1. CF - ’s award would be reduce by 5% so that he would
recover $95K.
ii. What if ’s only fault was failure to take drugs and
this aggravated her injury and caused additional care costing
$10K.
1. CF - ’s fault still 5% and she will still recover
$95K.
2. AC -  failed to minimize damages and will recover
only $90K.
VIII. Role of AC in CF Regimes
a. Remaining role of the AC approach to apportionment of
responsibility between the  and  has been called
into question.
i. Ex. – It is seldom possible in highway accidents to say that
the ’s broken leg is a result of ’s fault, but
that the  alone is responsible for her broken arm.
ii. CF apportionment is particularly well suite when causal
apportionment is not possible.
b. When causal apportionment is possible, as where the
’s failure to follow medical advice makes her condition
worse, adoption of CF rules leave the court with several
options.
c. CF principles absorb to AC rule
i. If  and  are both culpable causes of the
’s injury, apportionment of responsibility is made
entirely under comparative fault rules; AC (mitigation) rules
are dropped altogether.
d. Applying AC rule to post-injury conduct
i. Some courts hold that the ’s negligence is counted as
contributory negligence if it contributed to the initial injury
and is thus to be apportioned under comparative negligence
statutes where they are adopted.
e. Applying AC rule to discrete items of harm
i. Some courts reject the first two approaches. They apply CF
apportionment unless the ’s pre-injury fault caused some
particular item of damage to which causal apportionment
principles could be applied.
1. Ex. – If  suffers added injury in an auto crash b/c
he failed to wear a seatbelt, these courts invoke the AC
(mitigation) rule to bar recovery for the added injuries.
ii.  must prove that the  was at fault and that
some identifiable amounts of harm resulted from that fault. In
addition, it must appear that the separate items of harm should
justly be borne entirely by the  rather than apportioned
between the parties.
IX. Intentional Torts
a. ’s CF cannot be used to reduce the liability if an
intentional tortfeasor.
i. Ex. – If  batters the , the ’s
negligence in taunting the  does not reduce the
’s damages.
X. Last Clear Chance after Comparative Negligence
a. Traditional rule -  charged with CN could recover all
her damages without reduction if  had the last clear
chance to avoid injury to the  at a time when the
 could no longer save herself.
b. After CN – last clear chance doctrine was almost always
discarded.
XI. Duty and Negligence Issues after Comparative Negligence
a. If ’s fault establishes CN, she may still recover
with reduced damages. On the other hand, if  owes no
duty or care or if he is not negligent b/c he could reasonably
expect the  to protect herself, he is not liable at all.
b. CN on part of  and lack of negligence on the part of
the  are easily confused in these circumstances. Often
in “open and obvious danger” cases – when  creates a
condition that will be dangerous to anyone who ignores it but
that is safe enough when people pay attention.
i. Ex. – A car legally parked at the curb is an obstruction in
the street, but not ordinarily dangerous. The owner can expect
that people will see and avoid it. If the  runs into
the parked car, it is ordinarily the owner of the car who can
recover, not the  who ran into it.
c. On the other hand, when the  can reasonably foresee
that some people will not observe an open danger or will not be
able to protect themselves from it, the answer is different.
i. Ex. -  owes  a duty of care and knows that
, carrying a big box might be blind to a hole in the
ground and does nothing to warn her or cover the hole. It would
be entirely foreseeable that the  would step in the hole
and fall. The trier of fact could find  to be
negligent.
d. CN rules are of no assistance to the  unless the
 is actually negligent.
e. Distinguishing Cases of No Duty
i. CN rules are likewise of no assistance to the  when
the  is under no duty to the , or, what is often
the same thing, when the ’s conduct is the sole
proximate cause of her harm.
XII. Comparative Negligence when Multiple Actors Cause Harm
a. Defendant’s conduct – the setoff rule
i. Personal injury cases both the  and  are
injured.
ii. Ex. - Pure or CN system and jury finds:
1.  guilty of 40% of the negligence and suffered $100K
2.  guilty of 60% of the negligence and suffered $14K
3. ’s recovery reduced by 40% and give her a potential
judgment of $60K.
iii. Counterclaim -  sues 
1. ’s recovery reduced by 60% and give him a potential
judgment of $5600.
iv. Many states - ’s CC fails since ’s
negligence is greater than ’s
v. Could succeed in an incomplete system
1. CC - $5600 could be used to offset the $60K and 
could recover a net of $54,400.
b. Comparing ’s fault with Multiple Defendants –
Aggregation Problem
i. In pure or CF systems,  is entitled to recover
against all s who are found to be negligent, regardless
whether the ’s negligence exceeded that of the s
or not.
ii. Incomplete systems limit ’s right to recover to
cases in which the ’s negligence is less than, or at
least not more than, the tortfeasors’ negligence.
iii. Each tortfeasor is liable for his comparative fault share
of an indivisible injury. Where this is true - ’s
recovery is affected by the number of actors whose fault can be
counted.
1. 100% is the max – whether there are 2 or 20
2. When there are 2 – fault of each tortfeasor is 50%
3. When there are 20 – fault of each is 5%
Assumption of Risk
I. Assumed Risk
a. This is typically not used as a defense b/c can be resolved
other ways:
i. Applying the CF rules
ii. Holding that had no duty of care
iii. Holding that  did not breach a duty
b. Traditional Rule -  who assumed the risk of
’s negligence could not recover. Children as well as
adults could assume the risk and if they did, their claims would
be barred.
i. Could assume risk expressly or impliedly
c. CN Connection
i. Reasonable confrontation of known risks
1. When the ’s conduct in confronting a known risk was
in fact unreasonably risky, it did not much matter in the days
before CN whether the courts thought of it as assumed risk or
CN.
a. Courts departed from the underling reasons for the doctrine
by treating confrontation of a known risk as if it were a
consent to accept the risks.
d. No Duty or No Negligence Connection
i. Third group – courts used the term assumed risk to express
the view that the  should not be liable, but the reasons
for nonliability did not lie in the ’s consent or in her
culpability.
e. Merging Assumed Risk with Contributory Negligence
i. Ex. – Hitchhiker who falls asleep on the highway’s edge is
not assuming the risk of being run over by a negligent driver;
he is merely negligent and may suffer a reduction in damages
under CN rules
ii. CN, however, could not absorb all the cases that were once
under assumed risk
I. Plaintiff’s Consent Altering Defendant’s Duty
f. The effect of ’s consent to accept the risk is that
the  has no duty to the  with respect to that
risk. By agreement responsibility has been shifted to the
.
i. This consent operates to bar the ’s claim entirely
b/c it qualifies of limits the ’s duty of care.
g. If the  has no duty of care, or is not negligent, an
element of ’s prima facie case is missing. When assumed
risk means that the ’s consent has shifted
responsibility – an assertion that the  has not proved
duty or negligence.
h. Difficulty – determine in which case the ’s conduct
is merely negligent and is covered by comparative fault rules
and in which cases it is an assumption of the entire risk that
acts to bar the claim.
II. Express Consent
i.  may expressly assume a risk by accepting the
’s disclaimer of responsibility or by giving a release
in advance of injury. An express assumed risk ordinarily will
relieve the  of the duty that otherwise existed. It
will establish a standard of care that shows he has breached no
duty.
i. Ex. – Sign a release before drag racing or skydiving –
releases provider from all liability in advance. Also if a
patient demands to a surgery with no transfusions, doctor’s
compliance is not negligent.
j. Public policy limits
i. Express assumed risk by way of releases in advance may be
rendered ineffective when it violates public policy.
ii. Courts sometimes impose a duty of reasonable care even when
the  has expressly agreed to relieve the  of
responsibility.
1. Ex. - Products liability, hospitals that demand patients sign
a form relieving them of all responsibility, etc…
III. Implied Consent
k. When the , knowing of the risk and appreciating its
quality, voluntarily chose to confront it.
i. Voluntary assumption - ’s confrontation of the risk
had to be voluntary ( had to have a reasonable
alternative course of action).
ii. Knowledge of the risk -  did not assume the risk
unless she knew of the risk itself as well as the facts that
gave rise to it and “really” assumed the risk. ’s
subjective consent was required.
iii. Implication of consent from conduct – difficult to equate
confrontation of known risks with manifestation of consent
l. Scope of consent
i. Although the  may consent to accept a risk (express
or implied) does not mean that she has consented to relieve the
 of all possible duties of care.
IV. Statute of Limitations
m. Statutes of limitations – how much time does  have to
bring an action?
n.  has the burden of pleading the statute as a defense
and the burden of proving facts that show it was run. If he
does not plead the statute in a timely way, the defense is
waived.
o. Reasons for having a SOL statute:
i. Evidence will deteriorate as memories fade
ii. Renewal of ancient conflict may initiate more conflicts than
it resolves
iii.  is entitled to peace of mind
iv. Society’s expectations and standards change
p. When does the clock start to run?
i. Traditional rule – Period begins when ’s claim
accrued:  had committed a negligent act and it had
caused a legally cognizable harm
1. Sometimes say that claim accrues when the  commits
the negligent act.
ii. Discovery rule – Postpone the accrual date until the
 discovers or should discover some of the relevant facts
1. Facts that must be discovered to start the clock:
a. All the elements of the tort are present
b.  discovers, or as a reasonable person should have
discovered,
i. That he is injured and
ii. That the  had a causal role in the injury
2. Discovery of the negligence, as distinct from causal
connection, is not required to start the statute running.
3. If the  discovers the injury and it connection to
, the statute begins to run even if some of its
injurious consequences are not discovered until much later.
V. Compliance with Statute
q. The fact that the  has complied with a statute is not
ordinarily in itself a defense.
i. Ex. – Although the speed limit may be 60 mph, under some
circumstances (blizzard) reasonable care requires speed of no
more than 30 mph.
Duty of Care
I. Duty
a. Unless the  has assumed a duty to act, or stands in a
special relationship to the , s are not liable
in tort for a pure failure to act for the ’s benefit.
The fact that the  foresees harm to a particular
individual from his failure to act does not change the general
rule.
i. Ex. -  sees a blind person on a sidewalk about to
step into traffic, but he does nothing to prevent injury, which
in fact follows. The general rule applies that relieves the
 of any liability.
b. Rule is embedded in the question whether the  owes a
duty to protect the  from harms inflicted by others
c. Exceptional cases in which a duty of care may require
reasonable affirmative steps by the :
i.  or his instrumentalities, innocently or not, have
created risks or caused harm to the 
ii.  is in a special relationship to the  that
is deemed to create a duty of care that encompasses affirmative
action
iii.  takes affirmative action that is either cut short
or performed negligently
iv.  has assumed a duty of affirmative care by action or
promise
d. The exceptions to the no-duty-to-act rule do not impose a
strict liability. When courts recognize a duty to act
affirmatively for the ’s benefit, they only impose a
duty to act when reasonable people would do so.
i. Ex. – officer does not have to recognize occupants of a
burning car if to do so would subject him to unreasonable
danger.
II. Failure to Act
a. Nonfeasance – not always just the failure to act, may be part
of a larger action.
i. Ex. – When a person fails to apply their brakes and runs into
a pedestrian, the driver is guilty of negligently driving his
car, not merely of “doing nothing” by not applying the brakes.
b. Negligence includes the “omission to do something” a
reasonable person would do as well as the doing of something a
prudent person would not do.
c. There is no bright line to distinguish non-action from
negligence
III. Defendant Innocently Creates Risk or Harm
a. The  who knows or should have known that he caused
physical harm to the , even if caused without fault,
owes a duty of reasonable care to avoid further harm. If
reasonable care requires it, he must act affirmatively to
minimize the harm he has innocently caused and he is subject to
liability for the additional harm caused by his failure to do
so.
b. Same principle applies when the  knows or should have
known that he has innocently created a risk to others and the
 has an opportunity to minimize the risk before harm
actually eventuates.
i. Ex. – If , without fault, collides with and kills a
horse on the highway, reasonable care may oblige him to take
steps to warn others or have the animal removed. If he doesn’t
and a 2nd driver is later injured, the  is again subject
to liability if he failed to exercise due care.
IV. Defendant’s Relationship to Plaintiff Creates a Duty
a. If  and  are in a special relationship,
 may be under a duty to use reasonable care to rescue
the .
b. Formal relationships – 5 categories:
i. Carrier-passenger
ii. Innkeeper-guest
iii. Landowner-invitee
iv. Custodian-ward
v. Employer-employee
c. This list is not exhaustive. There may be highly transient
relationships (buddies all go out for a beer together) that may
be sufficient to impose a duty.
d. Same duty exists when the issue is ’s duty to protect
the  from third persons.
i. Ex. –
1. Landowner whose invitee becomes ill may have a duty to summon
care
2. Operator of a day-care center finds a child in his care is
sick, he is obliged to use reasonable care to obtain medical
attention
e. Even if a duty to take reasonable action is recognized,
liability is by no means a foregone conclusion. The exact
conduct that reasonable care would demand may vary according to
the relationship and circumstances.
i. Ex. – If a landowner owes an invitee a duty of medical care,
it is not likely that the duty is violated by failing to have a
large stock of medical supplies on hand.
V. Defendant’s Affirmative Action Creates a Duty – Rescue
a. When the  acts affirmatively to aid a person who is
helpless, he must act with reasonable care.
i. Ex. – Cannot begin to airlift someone with a helicopter and
then drop the person. Would be liable for negligence in
dropping the person.
b. The  who takes charge of a helpless person cannot
discontinue his aid if discontinuance leaves the victim in a
position worse than when the  took charge. (§324)
i. Making matters worse – could not remove a person to a
position of safety and then out him back in the original danger
or a new danger.
ii. May give up the effort before bringing the helpless person
to a position of safety.
1. Ex. – rescuer throws a rope to a drowning woman, pulls her
toward shore, then decodes to go for a beer, leaving the victim
to drown – victim is not left in any worse position so under
§324 there is no liability.
c. Lost-chance – The rescuer who discontinues aid could also
make matters worse because his efforts dissuade other potential
rescuers from acting or because his efforts create the
appearance that no rescue is needed.
i. Loss of chance will count as a worsening position even if
they cannot be confident that the chance of being saves was a
very good one.
VI. Defendant’s Undertaking Creates a Duty
a. Special relationships may also arise from voluntary acts or
undertakings. An undertaking is a kind of explicit or implicit
promise, or at least a commitment, conveyed in words or in
conduct.
b. One who voluntarily assumes a duty must then perform that
duty with reasonable care.
c. Restatement §323 – The undertaking may create a duty of care
to perform in accordance with the undertaking, even if no
consideration is given. Liability is imposed only if the
 suffers physical harm from the ’s negligent
performance and only if one of two other conditions is met:
i. ’s negligent performance (or withdrawal from
performance) must increase the risk to the , OR
ii.  must have relied upon that performance
d. Increased Risk – the  may be subjected to liability
if he increases the risk by his negligent performance
i. Limits the scope of the risk created by failure to use due
care. I negligent nonperformance causes harm, but the harm
caused is not the result of any increased risk, liability is
inappropriate.
ii. Important in two ways:
1. Undertaking might actively work to create risks
a. Ex. – If one of two workers at a day care center assures the
other worker he will take the comatose child to the ER, his
assurance or undertaking creates the risk that the other will
not. The risk of the child is increased as a result of the
undertaking and its nonperformance, and that is enough.
2. The increased risk clause limits liability to harms resulting
from the risk that the undertaking was intended or reasonably
expected to protect against.
a. Ex. - ’s band K’ed to play at the ’s place
and  K’ed to provide helpers to unload band equipment.
The  breached this provision and the  had to
unload the equipment himself and was injured while doing so.
i. ’s nonperformance of his undertaking to provide
helpers to do the loading was a cause in fact of the harm. But
the undertaking was not about avoiding falls and liability
grounded on the undertaking was inappropriate.
e. Reliance
i. Duty is imposed to act affirmatively (and with reasonable
care) when the  undertakes action and the 
relies upon the undertaking. An undertaking assuredly requires
an express promise, but it also includes actions that express an
intention or a commitment to act.
ii.  must show reliance upon the ’s undertaking
or assumed duty.
iii. What duty is undertaken? – number of cases conclude that
the duty undertaken was not one that would have saved the
 and consequently that the  cannot recover.
1. Actions without promises are often ambiguous ways of showing
an undertaking. It is too much to say that the  only
undertakes what he actually does.
VII. Complete Nonperformance of Gratuitous Undertakings
a. The  is under a duty to perform undertakings made for
safety purposes and is liable for physical harm he causes the
 by negligently performing or quitting performance once
it has begun.
VIII. Defendant’s Undertaking Creating a Duty to Third Persons
a. Winterbottom v. Wright -  was injured when a coach
supplied by  to the ’s employer broke down and
threw the  to the ground.  had not only
supplied the coach but had failed to repair it as required by
the contract between the  and the employer.
i. Held – there was no privity between the injured employee and
the , the  owed no duty at all.
b. Misfeasance – when the  causes physical harm through
misfeasance (affirmative acts of negligence) rather than
nonfeasance, he is liable to the foreseeably injured person for
that harm. When the ’s only duty arises from his
contract with or undertaking to A, however, and his complete
nonperformance results in harm to B, nonfeasance rules may
prevent liability in some cases.
c. If ’s promise or undertaking is not enforceable by A
as a contract, then it creates no duty to B, either. Some cases
have gone further and held that even if the ’s contract
with A is enforceable by A as a K, the K ordinarily creates no
duty of care to B unless the K was intended to be for B’s
benefit.
d. Moch v. Rensselear Water – City contracted with the 
to supply water to the city for various purposes, including
water at appropriate pressure for fire hydrants. A building
caught fire. , although notified of the fire, did not
supply sufficient water pressure at the hydrants, fire spread
and destroyed the ’s warehouse and contents.
i. Held – K was not intended to make  answerable to
individuals who might be injured. The K created no duty to the
 (not a third party beneficiary K). Also,  was
found to not be guilty of misfeasance. With no misfeasance and
with no K protecting him,  lost.
e. When the ’s undertaking or K with A is clearly made
to protect B from physical harm, every reason supports a duty of
care to B, both in K and in tort.  is subject to
liability if he assumes a duty by making a safety promise, and
then negligently performs it, causing injury. Simple case of
misfeasance and neither privity nor nonfeasance rules apply.
Duties to Protect the Plaintiff from Himself or Third Persons
I. No Duty to Control Others
a. Sometimes the  himself does not directly injure the
 but instead fails to prevent the risk or injury by
another. Question is whether the , who could have
prevented the injury by a warning, or by exercising control he
had over the attacker, or otherwise, is under any duty to do so.
i. Ex. – When the newly released parolee with a history of
violence toward women does not appear at the halfway house, they
can minimize the risk that the parolee will commit crimes by
warning the police that he has not appeared as required.
1. Courts have frequently held that the  owes no duty to
control the dangerous person and have refused relief to the
parolee’s victims.
b. General rule is subject to significant exceptions:
i. Statutes may impose a duty to take action and to use care to
protect others. This is the case with statutes requiring state
agencies to investigate and deal with reports of suspected child
abuse.
ii. The  is under a duty to use reasonable care for the
’s safety where the  is in a special
relationship with the .
1. Ex. - A property owner may owe a duty of reasonable care to
protect an invitee upon the land.
iii.  is under a duty to use reasonable care for the
’s safety when the  is in a special relationship
with the immediate tortfeasor and in a position to control his
tortious behavior or at least to minimize risks to the 
by some means.
1. Ex. – A jailer or other custodian of a dangerous person owes
a duty of reasonable care to prevent that person from harming
others.
II. Duty Based Upon Defendant’s Relationship to the Plaintiff
a. The ’s relationship to the  has been
recognized as a ground for requiring the  to take
affirmative acts of reasonable care. Courts recognize several
formal relationships between the  and the  as
grounds for imposing a duty if reasonable care. Categories
include:
i. Landowner and invitees
1. Carrier and passenger
2. Innkeeper and guest
3. LL-T sometimes
ii. Custodian and ward
1. Jailers and prisoners
2. Persons with severe mental or physical disabilities
iii. Schools and students
iv. Spouses and spouses; Parents and children
v. Employers and employees
III. Landowner’s Duty to Protect Customers and Others
a. All landowners that open their land to the public owe their
invitees (customers) a duty of care.
b. Limiting Duty of Finding No Negligence
i. Even when risks are entirely foreseeable, the landowner or
business is not necessarily liable for crimes against invitees
or others, since the duty to exercise reasonable care, not to
guarantee safety.
IV. Custodian’s and School’s State-Law Duty to Protect Ward or
Students
a. Person who has custody if another owes a duty of reasonable
care to protect the other from foreseeable harm. A custodian
may thus be held liable for failure to make reasonable efforts
to protect a ward from a 3rd person’s attack.
b. Jailer owes the prisoner a duty of reasonable protection from
attack and from suicide.
V. Employer’s Duty of Protection
a. Employers owe a duty of reasonable care to protect employees
who are endangered on the job, at least when they are threatened
with imminent danger.
VI. Control and other Means of Protecting from Dangerous Persons
a. One in charge of a person who is, or should be recognized as
dangerous, is under a duty of reasonable care to control that
person to prevent harm.
b. Policy conflicts – when does the greater good of the
community outweigh the doctor-patient relationship?
c. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of CA – psychologist
concluded that his patient, Poddar, intended to kill Tatiana
Tarasoff. He told the police who only detained him for a short
time. The psychologist and his superiors did not attempt to
commit Poddar or even warn the Tarasoff family. Poddar did in
fact kill Tarasoff.
i. Held – Therapist owed a duty of reasonable care, at least
when a specific, known person was endangered. The therapist is
thus required to act only when his own professional judgment
indicated that others were in danger.
d. Doctor duty – In some cases it will be impossible to know who
besides the  should receive a warning. Even when the
doctor could identify the person the most at risk from the
patient’s disease, issues of confidentiality privacy will be
important.
i. Requiring a reasonable warning may not be necessary if the
patient himself has expressed no intent to harm others.
VII. Enhancing Dangers – Providers of Alcohol
a. Most courts recognize a common law duty of reasonable care
and impose liability when the licensed seller of alcohol
negligently sells to a minor or intoxicated person who, as a
result, causes injury to the .
b. If the harm is foreseeable, liability is not to be avoided
merely because the provider furnished alcohol to a minor
directly.
c.  must prove negligence. Must prove that the 
negligently provided alcohol to a person whom the seller should
have recognized as being a minor or intoxicated.
d.  must also prove proximate cause.  may
enhance risk that drinker will drive dangerously, but he does
not necessarily create a risk that the drinker will set a house
on fire or commit rape or murder.
Duty of Care – Unborn Children
I. Prenatal Injury
a. No one is to be denied compensation for injury merely because
the harm was inflicted before the person’s birth.  must
prove the elements of a tort claim, the fact that the harm was
initially done to a pre-viable fetus does not defeat the claim.
b. Wrongful Death Cases – Two Questions
i. Was the fetus viable at the time of injury?
ii. Was the child born alive, with death occurring some moment
after birth?
c. Fetus not born alive –
i. Some states reject the action altogether in the absence of a
live birth. If  does enough damage to terminate life of
the fetus before birth, he simply is not liable.
ii. Other states – reject the wrongful death action in the
absence of a live birth but permit the mother or parents to
recover for mental anguish or emotional harm
iii. Most courts – an action lies for wrongful death of a
stillborn infant or of a fetus not born alive, at least where
injury occurs when the fetus was viable.
d. Born alive after pre-viable injury –
i. A different pattern occurs if the fetus is injured before
viability, but the child is then born alive. In that case, the
child could maintain a personal injury action if it lived, so
there seems no objection to a wrongful death claim if the
born-alive child dies.
e. An action for emotional harm to parents, or at least to the
mother, may be more, may be more manageable and suitable form of
redress.
II. Harm from Preconception Negligence
a. When the  is injured by negligent acts that occur
before the  was conceived, courts are somewhat divided.
b. Some courts – unless some other fact dispels a duty of care,
the  will be held liable for foreseeable harms he causes
to the later-conceived child.
c. Most of these cases recognizing a duty of care to an
unconceived child are in fact suits are against health care
professionals who are engaged in treating the mother.
i. In particular cases, injury to an unconceived child may be
regarded as unforeseeable and hence not actionable.
d. Arguments against duty of care for unconceived child
i. Arguments against liability begin with metaphysical
abstraction – the  was not a person in existence when
the  was negligent; hence the  could owe no
duty.
ii. Rule is inappropriate because it treats all cases the same
when in fact there are many differences.
III. Liability for Interfering with Mother’s Opportunity to
Avoid or Terminate a Pregnancy
a. Claims for interference with a mother’s opportunity to avoid
pregnancy, or to terminate it have taken three distinct forms.
All have in common that but for the ’s negligence, the
mother could have avoided giving birth to a child who is either
unwanted or who suffers terrible birth defects.
i. Wrongful Life – The claim is asserted by a child suffering
birth defects such as a painful and debilitating disease.
Typically, the physician negligently allowed the child to be
born at all and that the child has a claim for the suffering he
must undergo as a result. Most courts reject this claim
altogether.
1. Few courts – have allowed the child to recover and limited
the recovery to medical expenses that otherwise would have been
recovered by the wrongful birth claim.
ii. Wrongful Birth – The mother asserts the claim, not the
child. The mother typically claims that, but for the ’s
negligence in testing or counseling, the mother would have
terminated a pregnancy to avoid birth of a child with serious
genetic defects.
1. This  does not recover for the genetic defect itself
but for the loss of choice to terminate the pregnancy and the
damages that flow from that loss.
2.  needs to prove that given appropriate testing and
information, she would have terminated the pregnancy.
iii. Wrongful Conception – The claim for wrongful pregnancy or
conception typically asserts that the  physician was
negligent in performing a medical procedure to prevent
conception and that as a result, the mother bore a child, with
the added expense of child rearing.
1. Differs from wrongful birth – 2 ways
a. Does not rest on the claim that the mother had a right to
terminate her pregnancy
b. Does not necessarily involve an unhealthy or genetically
damages child
2. Instead the mother has decided against enlarging the family
for personal or economic reasons
Strict Liability
I. Types of Strict Liability
a. Strict liability is liability without fault. The defendant
is subject to liability for conduct that amounts neither to
negligence nor to any intentional tort.
b. The risk is always generated by an activity not commonly
pursued in the relevant community. Fall into two factual
settings:
i.  introduces wild animals into the community
ii.  uses explosives or other forces that are abnormal
to the community so that the  subjects the members to
the community to risks that are quite different from the risk
the community imposes on the .
II. Strict Liability for Animals
a. Applied to barnyard animals generally. It did not apply to
domestic animals, like dogs and cats, although the keeper of
such animals might be liable for negligently or intentionally
causing them to enter the land.
III. Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Domestic Animals
a. Domestic animals like dogs and cats were treated differently;
their owners of keepers were not strictly liable for the
animals’ trespasses at all but under limited conditions could be
liable for personal injuries inflicted by such animals.
b. Strict liability is impose when the keeper of the animal
knows or has reason to know that his animal is abnormally
dangerous in some way and injury results from that danger.
i. Ex. – If a dog owner knows that his dog has an abnormal or
vicious propensity to attack or bite, or his horse to kick, he
is liable for the dog’s biting and the horse’s kicking.
c. In addition, the keeper of the animal must have knowledge or
at least notice of the dangerous tendencies that resulted in
harm.
d. Strict liability is limited to cases in which the animal’s
dangerous propensity is a cause of the ’s harm. The
fact that the  is injured results from some abnormal
trait or from a danger of which the keeper had neither knowledge
nor notice.
IV. Strict Liability for Abnormal Dangers
a. Restatement supports liability for activities that are
abnormally dangerous, characteristically those that are highly
dangerous and that are not commonly pursued in the community –
liability without fault is imposed.
b. The idea is not to deter such activities altogether but make
them “pay their way” by charging them with liability for harms
that are more or less inevitably associated with the activity.
V. Abnormal Activities on the Land
a. Rylands v. Fletcher -  retained an independent
contractor to construct a pond. Beneath the land were old mine
shafts that had ling since been filled or covered. Neither the
contractor nor the landowner discovered any reason for concern.
The ponded water eventually broke through the debris in the
shafts and flowed into them, then through the horizontal shafts
to flood the ’s mine.
i. Held – 2 opinions –
1. A person who introduces something to the land that is not
naturally there and likely to do mischief if it escapes must be
held strictly liable for foreseeable harms resulting if it does
in fact escape.
2. A use of the land not natural or normal in the community or
an activity that was incompatible with surrounding land use.
a. The focus of this line may have been on the community’s usage
and custom, not on the natural condition of the land itself.
ii. Limitations –
1. Required that the substance escape from the land.
2. Non-natural use could mean a use of the land that was way out
of line with the custom or normal uses in the community.
iii. Thus, strict liability would be imposed only in the case of
“some special use bringing with it increased danger;” landowners
would not be liable for ordinary uses of the land.
VI. Restatement
a. 1st Restatement – strict liability would be imposed for harms
resulting from “ultrahazardous” activities, that is, activities
that were especially dangerous and could not be made safe even
by the exercise of the utmost care. Strict liability would be
imposed, however, only if the activity in question was not a
matter of common usage.
b. 2nd Restatement – modified the formulation. Characterized
the problem as one involving “abnormally dangerous activities”
rather than “ultrahazardous activities.”
i. Factors – strict liability is more likely to imposed if the
’s activity
1. Creates a high risk
2. With a likelihood of great harm
3. That cannot be avoided by reasonable care, and if
4. The activity is uncommon and
5. Inappropriate at the particular site
ii. Strict liability is less likely to be imposed if
1. The activity has value to the community
iii. Judge, not jury determines whether strict liability applies
VII. Abnormally Dangerous Cases
a. Explosives and high energy activities
i. Strict liability seems most readily imposed when physical
harm results from the ’s use or storage of dynamite or
other materials intended to cause explosions
b. Natural gas and other “useful” products
i. Many decisions have rejected strict liability of such
materials. All courts have rejected imposing strict liability
for natural gas.
ii. Reasons for rejecting SL:
1. Activity is socially useful
2. Activity is a matter of common usage, OR
3. Can be made reasonably safe by the exercise of care
c. Poisons and toxic materials
i. SL has been imposed when the  has used toxic
materials commercially to kill pests or protect crops.
1. Langan v. Valicopters – SL imposed for a crop duster
accidentally spraying pesticides on an organic farm
VIII. Limitations on Strict Liability
a. Proximate cause
i. The ’s SL activities must at least be a cause in fact
of the ’s harm. Beyond that, the ’s activities
must be a proximate cause of that harm.
b. In the case of abnormally dangerous activities, the harm must
result from the characteristic that prompted SL in the first
place.
i. Ex. -  will be SL for impacts caused by use of
explosives and also for vibration damage, but NOT for the loss
of mink pelts resulting because the noise of explosion drives
mother mink to eat their young. (Foster v. Preston Mill)
c. Intervening Acts
i. Restatement – innocent, negligent and even reckless acts of
third persons present no barrier to SL – nor do forces of
nature. This leaves the possibility that intentional
intervening of third persons might at times suffice to insulate
the  from SL.
1. Ex. – A striker in MO caused a large explosion by shooting a
shotgun at a truck filled with dynamite.
a. Held -  was not strictly liable for harms done by the
explosion
2. Ex. – An AL court held that the  who stored dynamite
would be liable for harms done by an explosion deliberately set
ii. Restatement – Intervention of others is a part of the risk
of abnormally dangerous activity, at least when the intervening
actor is not guilty of intentional harm.
1. Courts have also said that sometimes a force of nature or Act
of God will cut off liability.
IX. Defenses to Strict Liability
a. Contributory Negligence –
i.  who was subject to SL either b/c he possessed an
animal that caused harm or b/c he carried on abnormally
dangerous activities could not assert ordinary CN as a defense.
1. Ex. – If the  negligently failed to discover the
danger, he was not barred by his fault. However, except where
statutes provide otherwise, the  could defend on the
ground that the  assumed the risk or was guilty of CN by
knowingly and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk of
harm from the SL activity.
ii. Restatement justifies permitting recovery by a 
whose own fault contributed to her injury on a purely formal
reason. It says that since the SL action is not founded on the
’s fault in the first place, the ’s fault should
furnish no defense.
1. Result – person who is at fault in causing the harm recovers
from the person who is not at fault in causing it.
b. Assumption of Risk –
i. When the  knowingly and unreasonably encounters a
danger, the Restatement recognizes such behavior as a defense to
the SL claim.
c. Privileges or Immunities
i. Governmental entities are almost never held SL even when
immunities of public entities are otherwise abolished.
Products Liability
I. Development of Theories of Recovery
A. No manufacturer or distributor is liable for harm caused by a
product unless the product is defective. The language of
defectiveness encompasses negligence, warranty, and strict tort
liability.
B. Privity Requirement – Winterbottom v. Wright – a negligent
manufacturer was definitely not subject to liability for a
defective product when the injured victim was not the person who
purchased the product. If the  was not in contractual
privity with the , he had no claim.
C. Abolishment of privity requirement – MacPherson v. Buick
Motor
1. Facts – A wheel on the ’s new car collapsed and the
 was injured.  was not in privity with the
manufacturer – he had purchased the car from a retailer, not
from the manufacturer.
2. Held – Imminent, inherent or intrinsic danger was no longer
required to avoid the privity limitation. “If [the
manufacturer] is negligent where danger is to be foreseen, a
liability will follow.”
D. Limits of MacPherson – After MacPherson, injured s
could recover against manufacturers for negligence, but
negligence of a manufacturer or even a retailer remained
difficult to prove. Instead – sometimes sued for breach of
express warranty.
1. Few manfs would expressly guarantee that the product will
produce no injury, so s began to urge that the sale of
goods implied a warranty.
2. UCC – a sale of goods impliedly carried a warranty that goods
were merchantable (they were what they seemed and fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods were sold).
1. Implied warranty – implicitly contracted to provide a
reasonably safe product, the  was not required to prove
fault.
2. Privity rule – still applied to bar the express and implied
warranty claims except when the  sued his immediate
seller.
E. Implied Warranty – Extended – Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
1. Facts -  was injured when the steering failed in a
new automobile
2. Held – court held that he implied warranty extended not only
items like food, but to any item. Neither the absence of
privity nor the presence of contractual limitations on the
manf’s responsibility would bar the claim.
II. Strict Liability in Tort
A. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products – strict liability would be
imposed upon manfs of defective products. It was to be imposed
as a matter of tort law, not by implied warranty as a matter of
contract law. Since the claim was now brought in tort, privity
was not required.
1. SL in tort also meant that the ’s claim would not be
barred by the ’s disclaimers or limits on liability.
B. Restatement §402A – If a product was defective and the defect
caused harm, liability would be imposed upon the manufacturer
and distributors, whether or not they were at fault and whether
or not they were in privity with the .
III. Rationales of Strict Liability – 3 rationales
A. Compensation, loss spreading or enterprise liability – Manf
liability is socially desirable as a means of spreading losses
that would be hardship upon individuals but that can be passed
on by enterprises through insurance and increased prices.
B. Deterrence, greater safety – Manfs will tend to make products
safer if SL is imposed.
C. Representation – Manfs at least implicitly represent their
products as healthy and safe, and consumers are entitled to rely
upon that appearance.
D. Trend – Restatement (3rd) dropped all references to strict
products liability.
1. SL – manufacturing defects
2. Negligence – design and warning defects
IV. Requirement of Defectiveness
A. Restatement §402A imposed SL only for harm caused by products
that were defective and unreasonably dangerous. The burden is
on the  to prove that:
1.  was in the business of selling products
2. He sold or otherwise supplied the product in question
3. The product was expected to and did reach the 
without substantial change
4. The product was defective when it left the ’s hands
5. The product’s defect was a cause in fact of physical harm to
the , AND
6. A proximate cause as well
B. Under §402A -  could show a defect in the product
without showing negligence of its manufacturer. The focus is on
the condition of the product, not the act of the s.
Thus the  is liable for a defective product even though
he is entirely without fault.
C. The fact that a product is dangerous does not render it
defective.
1. Knives are not defective merely because they are sharp.
2. Restatement – product had to be both unreasonably dangerous
AND defective
D. Three types of product defects
1. Manufacturing defects
2. Design defects
3. Warning defects
V. Defects
A. Manufacturing Defects
1. Product has a MD when it disappoints consumer expectations by
departing from its intended design.
1. Ex. – Soft drink bottle explodes from tiny crack, blade of an
electric saw shatters, food contaminated with foreign matter
2. The manf or distributor may be held SL in such cases for harm
caused by the MD. For MD claims, the product is tested against
the consumer’s reasonable safety expectations.
3. The  is subject to liability for MD even though he
has exercised the utmost care. The defect in MD cases can be
determined with relative ease by comparing the product to its
intended design.
4. Justifies SL most readily because the flawed product violates
the intention of both the manf and consumer to sell and buy a
standardized product with standard value, utility and safety
features.
B. Design Defects
1. DD occurs when the intended design of the product line itself
is inadequate and needlessly dangerous.
1. If a car is deigned in an unsafe and defective way, the
entire product line is defective, so the potential for liability
in design defect cases can be very great indeed.
2. Apply a risk-utility test to determine whether a harmful
design is also a defective design. Seems like courts are using
negligence as the basis for liability.
C. Warning Defects
1. Some products are reasonably safe and not defective if they
are accompanied by a warning of their dangers or by information
needed to use them safely. Products may become unreasonably
dangerous and defective if no information explains their use or
warns of their dangers.
VI. Consumer Expectation Test (§402A)
A. The test of defectiveness under §402A was the consumer
expectation test. The product was defective if, considering its
reasonably foreseeable use, it left the seller’s hands in an
unreasonably dangerous condition “not contemplated by the
original consumer.”
1. Ex. – Consumers rightfully expect that food will not be
contaminated with foreign matter
B. Some courts use the risk-utility test if the consumer
expectation test does not show a defect.
C. The test has worked especially well in the case of
non-obvious product flaws, as distinct from design defects.
1. If the grocer displays cartons of milk, the buyer has every
reason to think that she is buying milk and not milk with human
toes in it. The seller in turn knows the buyers expectation.
Both understand that he is to provide pure milk, not that he
will merely exercise care.
D. Problems with the Test
1. Vagueness and ambiguity – not useful in complex information
2. Overbreadth – used for anything
3. Consumer’s knowledge of dangers precluding liability
VII. Risk-Utility Test for Design Defects
A. Under the RU test courts attempt to balance the risks of the
product as designed against the costs of making the product
safer (negligence). Factors:
1. Usefulness and desirability of the product
2. Probability and magnitude of potential injury
3. Availability of substitutes
4. Manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character
5. User’s ability to avoid danger
6. User’s probable awareness of the danger
7. Manf’s ability to spread the loss – has little relevance
since RU dissolves SL into negligence law
8. Ex. – Manufacturer produces a press that delivers 60 tons of
force. Such a press creates a risk that the operator’s hand may
be crushed if the press is accidentally activated when the
operator is handling material in the press bed.
1. Manf can cheaply eliminate the risk by designing the press so
that it can be activated only when the operator presses two
separate buttons away from the press area.
2. Courts can easily find that the press is defective under the
RU balance b/c a large reduction in risk can be achieved at a
relatively small cost.
a. On the other hand, if the risk were low and the cost of
avoiding it high, the product would not be defective, and the
 would not be liable either on a negligence or a SL
theory.
VIII. Risk-Utility Test and Unknowable and Unavoidable Dangers
A. Restatement adopts the RU test as the sole basis of liability
for design defects. Liability can only be imposed if the risk
of harm was reasonably foreseeable when the product was
distributed
1. Requires that the risk is scientifically knowable when the
product was distributed. , if the risk was
scientifically unknowable at the time the product was
distributed, the manf is not liable for design features that
failed to avoid that risk.
B. Effect:
1. SL – manufacturing defects
2. Negligence – design defect cases
C. Restatement Comment (k) - exception for unavoidably unsafe
products. SL was not imposed for unavoidably dangerous products
if a proper warning was given.
1. Products Restatement – requires foreseeable harm in all
design defect claims – made comment (k) obsolete
D. Question is whether the product is reasonably safe. The fact
that danger is unavoidable bears heavily on the question whether
a product’s risks outweigh its utilities.
1. Ex. – Knives, guns, alcohol and nicotined tobacco are
dangerous by nature – unavoidably dangerous
E. If the utility of these products outweighs these irreducible
risks, they are not defective.
F. If dangers outweigh the unavoidable risks, the logic of RU is
that they are defective. They are also defective if they are
not accompanied by a feasible and reasonable warning when one is
needed.
IX. Unknowable Dangers
A. The concept of unknowable dangers refers to products that
appear to be safe as judged by scientific, medical or technical
knowledge existing at the time the product leave the manf’s
hands and after reasonable testing that reveals no reason to
investigate further.
B. Different than unavoidable danger – the risk is known even
though it cannot be avoided; b/c the risk is known the consumer
can and must be warned of it.
C. Unknowable danger – the risk is not known and the consumer
cannot be warned of it.
1. Ex. – new drugs and other chemical products. Drugs appear
safe and risks associated with the drugs don’t arise until much
later after people have taken them.
D. Most decisions now reject liability for warning defects that
cause harms if the risks were unknowable when the product was
distributed. This applies to design defects as well and most of
the cases reject liability based on the design defect claim when
the risks are unknowable at the time of distribution.
E. The rule against liability for scientifically unknowable
risks does not necessarily foreclose all liability.
1.  may be able to prove that the risk could have been
reasonably understood on the basis of existing knowledge, or
that existing knowledge at least would require reasonable
manufacturers to investigate further before marketing the
product.
2.  may come under some duty of care to provide a
post-sale warning.
3. SL for manf defects is retained even when the manf could not
foresee harm from his product.
X. Proving Design Defects
A. Burden of proof – Under the RU test, the  in most
states has the burden of proving that the design was defective
and that its defective character was a cause in fact and
proximate cause of the ’s injury.
B.  must provide evidence from which the trier can
reasonably estimate risks of the product and the utilities or
advantages that would be lost if it were made safer. Juries can
frequently make this determination based on familiarity with
products.
1. Jury could easily conclude a hubcap with sharp propeller
blades is unreasonably dangerous and further that the utility of
the blades is virtually zero.
C. Expert testimony – An expert’s testimony that the ’s
product is unsafe for specific reasons and that safer products
are actually available will ordinarily suffice.
D. Cash costs – Evidence showing exceedingly small costs to
avoid horrific injury may suffice to get the  past a SJ
or DV.
1. Ex. – Ford Pinto – gas tank exploding and causing death could
be fixed for as little as $1.80
E. The fact that costs of better safety are small does not
establish that the product is defective, b/c the risk of the
product may be even smaller than the costs or the utility of the
product may be very great.
F. Testimony about the cost of safety is not the same testimony
about the profits of the manufacturer.
G. Evidence that other products have safer designs should almost
always suffice to show that th
#Post#: 79--------------------------------------------------
Re: Torts 2 -outline 2
DIR By: Grandstarding
Date: April 2, 2015, 3:18 am
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The content and topics that are very good. I like to have that
again.
#Post#: 90--------------------------------------------------
Re: Torts 2 -outline 2
DIR By: Wartking
Date: May 11, 2015, 7:56 am
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I do not regret the time To read these articles yet.
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