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#Post#: 30--------------------------------------------------
First Cause's uniqueness and intellect
By: Atno Date: November 8, 2019, 10:53 am
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1- Why exactly can there only be one First Cause, and no more
than one?
I am familiar with the argument. The basic idea is that if there
were a multiplicity of necessary First Causes, they must be
differentiated by some property which one has and others lack.
Let's say A has X and B has Y. A and B cannot have been caused
to have X and Y; since it is what differentiates them, they must
have such properties essentially. So it is of the essence of A
to have X, and of the essence of B to have Y.
But in this case, what is the problem? It just is a necessary
fact that A has X and B has Y. They are different essences; A is
the kind of being which necessarily exists and has X and B is
the kind of thing which necessarily exists and has Y. What is
the problem here?
I assume the argument is that "but A and B would at least be
part of the same genus, that of being a necessarily existing
thing. And there must be some explanation for why necessary
existence is combined with X in A's case, but combined with Y in
B's case". This would surely be the case in a Neoplatonic
Argument, but unfortunately I do not quite share the Neoplatonic
intuition that every single case of composition must have a
cause. At least, as of now, it is not so strong an intuition for
me - if it is a necessary fact that A must include X as part of
its essence, I don't feel too pressured to explain it.
Someone could still argue that "well, but A and B differ *only*
in the fact that A has X and B has Y. This means there is no
necessary connection between X and and the rest of A's essence,
and Y and the rest of B's essence, so it would be impossible for
A and B to have X and Y essentially like that". That's better, I
can see some plausibility here. But I guess my problem is that
over time I might have developed too platonic a view of
essences. Just like "well, but it just is the nature of A to
include X. A is necessary existence plus X". I would probably
agree that there must be some explanation though, since X does
not follow from the rest of A's essence. So I can accept the
argument; I just wish it were a bit clearer for me. (I tend to
accept uniqueness on the basis of epistemic simplicity; the idea
that there would be an infinity of First Causes, each with some
necessary limit not shared by others, seems much messier and
more complicated than positing just one limitless First Cause).
Does anyone have any comments? I actually do find the argument
plausible, when I think about it; I just wish it could be
clearer.
2- This is a more complicated case. Why think the First Cause
(or group of first causes) has Intellect? There are many reasons
why (the First Cause is also ultimately the cause of
intellects/minds; we can also combine teleological arguments to
say the First Cause probably is intelligent; etc), but I am
talking about Feser's argument in Five Proofs. The idea is that,
by the principle of proportionate causality, all effects must
somehow be present in the First Cause. But why think this
entails that all effects are in the First Cause the way forms
are in an intellect? A match produces fire, it has the effect in
itself virtually. It has a causal power to bring about fire. The
First Cause can ground all effects in itself formally,
virtually, or eminently. But why assume it does that the way a
mind grounds a form/idea, instead of the way matches house fire?
The First Cause has a causal power to bring about all kinds of
contingent substances and forms. This is what we can know. Why
should we favor "all effects are in the First Cause the way
forms are in an intellect" over "all effects are in the First
Cause the way effects are in the powers of inanimate objects"?
Why does PPC itself (not talking about the origin of our finite
minds specifically) lead to an intellect, instead of just a
standard "it has the power to create all things"?
#Post#: 31--------------------------------------------------
Re: First Cause's uniqueness and intellect
By: RomanJoe Date: November 12, 2019, 12:09 am
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I'll try to answer this like a good Thomist:
Well, a monotheistic understanding of the First Cause seems to
follow from its metaphysical simplicity. Pure actuality excludes
potentiality. Potency is a sort of limitation of positive being,
of actuality. A cat on a table is limited by its potency to be
actually elsewhere in the kitchen or, broadly speaking, anywhere
in the cosmos. His multitude of potentialities to be in location
x,y,z, etc. narrows his actuality. He stands in potency to all
these locations insofar as he is actually in one location.
Potentiality, in a sense, carves up actuality, producing
specificity. Now pure actuality is unlimited, it has no
metaphysical limitations--it's the reason why the Scholastics
refer to God as infinite. He is not bound by any metaphysical
composition which would limit his being. Is it possible to have
two purely actual first causes? In what sense do we
differentiate them? Is one in location x rather than y? Is one
in state x rather than y? All possible instances of
differentiation require a narrowing of actuality and the
introduction of a potency to be otherwise, therefore spoiling
the First Cause, making it another secondary causal member in a
chain of metaphysically-composite beings.
Here's a whack at the second one. Unintelligent material things
possess one substantial form at a time. A tree possesses the
form of a tree. It doesn't simultaneously possess the form of
dead wood, charcoal, ash--those forms stand in potency. An
intelligent being can possess more than one form without
undergoing radical material transformation. Therefore, you can
come to understand the form of the tree via the immaterial
operation of your intellect. Your intellect isn't materially
subdued into actually becoming a tree, rather, it grasps the
nature of a tree apart from its particular material
instantiation. Now when it comes to the First Cause, it must by
consequence of metaphysical simplicity, be immaterial. By virtue
of being immaterial it can be the metaphysical bedrock for not
just one but the vast multitude of forms. God is not
simultaneously a tree, a horsefly, a human, a pig, etc. There is
no form informing some material substratum of the First Cause.
Rather, by virtue of immateriality, the First Cause grounds all
forms in a way analogous to the human intellect.
A match may catch on fire and generate its effect of flame,
consequently burning itself to ash. But it can only be one
substantial form. The match isn't simultaneously ash and match.
Now perhaps the First Cause has all of these forms, including
rational animality, in some virtual way. Similar to how sticks
aren't formally flame but do have the virtual power via friction
to produce flame. In no sense is the flame metaphysically a part
of the sticks beyond being the effect of a virtual power. Now
this sort of unthinking virtual causation makes sense with the
example of a material thing tending towards certain effects.
Those effects are attributed to the powers of its material
composition, like in the case of the sticks. And this is done
blindly, unintelligent, with no immediate recourse to some
intellect. But what about something immaterial virtually
producing forms. With regards to our own intellects, we
frequently produce accidental forms and, in a looser sense,
substantial forms. We are imbued with intentionality, aboutness,
immaterial apprehension. E.g. a painter painting a painting he
sees in his mind's eye, a CEO assembling an advisory board he's
dreamed of, you planning to write your questions out, an
outdoors-man turning trees into a bonfire he's been planning to
make. There is an immaterial grasp of a form that prefigures any
virtual causation. Now, say, we have merely a material thing
producing something like a bonfire. An unconscious assortment of
circuitry and sensors that make up a robot that is programmed to
locate trees, cut them, and light a fire from their logs. By
virtue of being merely the aggregate assortment of unintelligent
material parts, the robot doesn't really grasp what it means to
chop down a tree, to assemble a bonfire. He doesn't really grasp
what fire is, what ash is, etc. Why? Because he's a material
thing. Now contrast that with the designers of the robot who had
to grasp all of those immaterial concepts of chopping, logs,
fire, etc. By virtue of their immateriality, they had in them
the prior forms necessary to design the robot and virtually
create something qualitatively other than themselves, that is, a
robot and a fire.
I think the Thomist would argue that by virtue of being
immaterial, the First Cause necessarily possesses all forms in
an intellectual fashion. The resultant forms of the First
Cause's creative act aren't analogous to the blind and
unthinking examples of material virtual causation, precisely
because the First Cause is immaterial. If anything the creative
act would be more analogous to our own intellectual capacity as
intentional beings.
#Post#: 46--------------------------------------------------
Re: First Cause's uniqueness and intellect
By: Atno Date: November 25, 2019, 12:40 am
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It seems to me pure actuality needs uniqueness in order to be
established, so it is not very helpful to use pure act to
establish uniqueness. Because someone might consider the first
cause to be purely actual w.r.t. existence but not w.r.t. some
other property it might have. And if there are multiple first
causes, all actualities can be traced back to different first
causes without any single one of them having to be absolutely
purely actual. Say, having something whose essence is EXISTENCE
PLUS INTELLIGENCE, purely actual for both but potential for
other things, and another whose essence is EXISTENCE PLUS FIRE
(or whatever).
So we might first need Avicenna's argument that there would have
to be some explanation for why NECESSARY EXISTENCE is combined
with INTELLIGENCE in one case but with FIRE in another.
I am more confident in Avicenna's argument now, in any case. If
necessary existence is not necessarily combined with all other
essential properties of a thing, it would be unintelligible why
this specific combination would exist, and in any case it would
appear arbitrary to have N1 have properties1 essentially while
N2 would have some further properties2 essentially, etc.
I don't know how to respond to your second argument, but it
still doesn't seem entirely right to me - maybe because I am
considering ex hypothesi the possibility of an unintelligent
immaterial cause with many forms (as powers to create such and
such).
But now that I'm thinking about it, maybe the argument can be
understood in a manner similar to the fifth way. This is still
quite obscure in my mind, but consider: the First Cause has
multiple forms in itself, the forms of all possible effects it
can cause. But if these forms exist merely as causal tendencies
(like with the match and fire), how are they really able to
affect anything? With the match and fire example, Aquinas seems
to think the final cause of fire must somehow be real before it
can direct the match's efficient causal act. The final cause
must be doing some work, must somehow be connected with the
efficient cause. But if the final cause is simply understood as
the result of an efficient cause, then it will be dependent on
the efficient cause, but the efficient cause cannot specifically
produce the final cause unless the final cause is first real in
some sense. In short, there is a vicious circle here: final
cause can direct efficient cause if it somehow is real; final
cause can be real only if efficient cause somehow produces it;
efficient cause can produce it only if it is directed to it. In
order to avoid the vicious circularity, Aquinas posits that the
final causes must first exist in an intellect, abstractly. The
same could be the case with the First Cause - how can it be
directed to any specific form, as in a causal tendency, if this
form's existence would itself depend on this tendency? The form
must therefore exist in a more robust way, but since it cannot
do so as an instance, it must do so as a concept.
Another path would be to focus on the universality of abstract
forms. The first cause must be the cause of all possible effects
and instantiations of all possible forms. So it must have these
forms in itself not in any particularized way, but as a
universal. But what has a form specifically as a universal just
is an intellect.
I just thought of these arguments right now, I don't know how I
feel about them. They seem somewhat plausible and attractive to
me, but they're very complex and I'd have to think a little
more.
Bonus point: just thought I'd mention it, but there is a very
simple way to argue for the uniqueness of the First Cause if you
reject actual infinities. The argument goes back at least to
Brentano.
Basically: either there is only one first cause, or a finite
multiplicity of first causes, or an infinite number of first
causes. An infinite number is impossible (if actual infinities
are rejected). A finite multiplicity would be arbitrary (why
exactly 829 first causes instead of one more or less?). So it is
only one.
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