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       #Post#: 243--------------------------------------------------
       Atomism and unactualized actualizer
       By: TiCatho Date: October 16, 2020, 9:42 am
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       Hello,
       What's a good argument against atomism? I mean, sure, we have
       the potential-actual distinction, but if we look at it through
       the lens of atoms, everything can be studied as small particles
       moving (with a discretization of space if needed), and we have
       ample evidence of "things moving". Atoms are unchanging in
       themselves (partially actual?), and voilą... No need for an
       unactualized actualizer. :(
       I fail to see how I can refute that. Help? What do I have wrong?
       Thanks in advance. :)
       tiCatho
       #Post#: 244--------------------------------------------------
       Re: Atomism and unactualized actualizer
       By: ClassicalLiberal.Theist Date: October 28, 2020, 5:56 pm
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       The physical is by definition always divisible. For example, if
       I take a stick and cut it in half, I can then cut one of those
       in half, and then one of those in half, ad infinitum. Because
       physical things are the way they are, there can always in
       principle be a division between it. Therefore, every physical
       thing, just in terms of being physical, is composite. What this
       means then is that each physical whole is only in existence
       insofar as each one of its constituents continues to hold it in
       existence or cause it to be. Metaphysically, the potential for
       the whole is actualized by its parts. Therefore, you must appeal
       to something ontologically prior in order to explain its
       existence or we end up with a "brute fact" you might say.
       A really important distinction to make when speaking of act and
       potency is the potential for accidental changes lets say (this
       involves moving up or down, left to right, etc. Any change
       something undergoes that is not a change in the thing itself),
       and the "potential for existence". There are things of
       derivative existence (books, particles, angels, atoms, etc), and
       things of underived existence (this is God). Given the analysis
       above, an atom is strictly speaking something of derivative
       existence because it must causally apeal to its structure. In
       order to satisfy the causal principle, you must at some point in
       the chain of continued actualization end up with something of
       underived existence. Sure, you can posit that in some way a
       physical thing can have no potentiality. There is nothing, as
       far as I can tell, logically wrong with that; however, given the
       reasons already stated, you will still need something causal
       prior to it in order to explain its existence as such.
       Another classic thomistic appraoch, even though I am not a huge
       fan of it, would be to appeal to its metaphysical composition
       (technically, a composition of act and potency is a metaphysical
       composition, but that isn't what I am talking about). That is,
       to state that every physical thing is composed of matter and
       form (it has material existence, and has a physical/formal
       structure) or to state that every physical thing is composed of
       essence and existence (it exists, and it has a nature). In
       either case, you cannot appeal to one or the other to explain a
       physical things existence because you will end up with something
       circular: the form causes the matter to exist, which causes the
       form to exist, which causes the matter to exist, etc; its
       existence is caused by its essence, which is caused by its
       existence, which is caused by its essence, etc. You must then
       appeal to something which is not composed of form or matter, or
       of essence and existence. This is what we call, God.
       It is important when talking about the argument from change to
       understand why change is spoken about at all. As I see it,
       change is simply talked about in order to establish the
       existence of act and potency. It is not the change itself which
       is important to the deduction, it is the metaphysical principles
       it demonstrates. When Feser (I am assuming you've read some of
       his work. If you haven't, you really should) talks about change,
       he doesn't really deduce God existence from that change, even if
       it seems like he is doing so. Rather, he deduces God existence
       using the metaphysical principles change proves, and uses them
       in a way to show that everything but God is only potentially in
       existence, whereas He is actually in existence; He is pure act.
       Sorry for the long winded answer. This is something I struggled
       with for awhile and I feel a very thorough explanation is
       required. If you have any further questions or would like me to
       clarify something, I will be happy to respond.
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