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#Post#: 5--------------------------------------------------
A Question on the Types of Actualizations
By: ClassicalLiberal.Theist Date: October 25, 2019, 12:37 pm
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Feser once said in a debate that all change is the actualizing
of some potential but not vice versa. This "not vice versa"
means sustaining a thing in existence or perhaps just sustaining
a thing in its current state. I suppose my question is then, how
exactly do we phrase a thing being sustained in existence using
the act/potency distinction? More generally, a thing being
sustained in existence is the actualization of a potential, but
what potential?
This "difficulty" stems from the debate Feser had with Oppy. His
objection, at its heart, was that once a thing already actually
is, no longer needs a mover because it just is already actual.
He then goes on to explain further, that if we take some other
route to defend the CP, we end up in some sort of vicious
regression; however, I have very little doubt that he was wrong,
because the obejction as far as I can tell, is built on a crude
understanding of AT metaphysics.
I think that we could either reject the CP, reject that
sustaining something is actually the actualization of a
potential, or figure out some other way to phrase this sort of
thing, but I fear that any other way to phrase the situation
will fall prey to the same difficulties.
#Post#: 6--------------------------------------------------
Re: A Question on the Types of Actualizations
By: RomanJoe Date: October 25, 2019, 1:43 pm
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I have the memory of a squirrel so I can't recall much about the
Oppy-Feser debate.
With regards to your first question, I think you could invoke
the Aristotelian distinction of form and matter. When a lion
becomes ash, its underlying matter is actualized in such a way
that it gains the form of ash at the exclusion of its previous
lion form. Existence is actuality--to be sustained in existence
is to have the underlying conditional potentials for existence
remain actualized. Ice remains in existence because certain
environmental potentials are being actualized (air temperature)
which in turn continually actualizes its rigid molecular,
atomic, subatomic structure.
"His objection, at its heart, was that once a thing already
actually is, no longer needs a mover because it just is already
actual."
Yeah, temporally speaking, if we're analyzing existence as
purely the result of prior efficient causes, then we won't
invoke a constitutional cause. But it's always seemed pretty
obvious to me that existence is something that's ontologically
dependent horizontally and vertically. That is, once something
is brought into existence, an intricate array of conditional
potentials have to be fulfilled at any moment in order for the
existing thing to endure. And I don't see how a potential qua
potential can retain some impetus of actuality in the absence of
some actually existing thing. In fact, scientific observation
seems to affirm this radical contingency of substances. We have
yet to find a free-standing actualized potential.
#Post#: 17--------------------------------------------------
Re: A Question on the Types of Actualizations
By: Dominik Date: November 2, 2019, 2:23 am
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"His objection, at its heart, was that once a thing already
actually is, no longer needs a mover because it just is already
actual."
Iīm still tentative to make any statement when it comes to my
convictions on the nature of existence. However such objections
canīt be right, since the consequences are untenable. Letīs take
a cat as an example.
The cat already exists, so according to Oppy it wouldnīt need a
mover anymore. This leaves us with:
1. The cat will live forever.
2. Vitalism as an efficient cause, therefor the cat will die
once the life-substance is used up.
3. The death of the cat is unintelligible.
4. The death of the cat is entirely reducible to the relocation
of matter, thus commiting us to a strict mechanistic
materialism.
Did I forget an option? Anyway, the way I see it, none of those
can be correct.
On Aristotelianism however, the death of the cat becomes
intelligible, without committing ourselves to mechanistic
philosophy or life-substances as efficient causes. If the cat is
alive, the material fills out the form of the cat. Once the
material canīt do that anymore, e.g. once the material within
the DNA-strings donīt hold together anymore, the form of the cat
isnīt filled out and it vanishes; the cat dies.
So the way I see it, the claim that existence is not a potential
actualized at every moment but something inherent in existing
objects, commits one to unacceptable consequences.
Thoughts?
#Post#: 27--------------------------------------------------
Re: A Question on the Types of Actualizations
By: ClassicalLiberal.Theist Date: November 5, 2019, 5:21 pm
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Oppy would say, Dominik, that the existence of the cat would
continue to exist insofar as nothing impedes on its existence.
To give a simpler example, the chair will remain in X location
until some other object acts upon the chair, changing its
location from X to Y (I think the analogy works because Oppy
doesn't make distinctions between essential and accidental
properties, but he couldn't because he is a nominalist).
Although, this seems very dubious to me. Lets say a glass is
holding water. Oppy would say that the water will remain in the
glass until something acts upon on it which would impede on the
waters being in the glass. Well what if the glass broke? The
water would change locations obviously, and Oppy would be happy
with this, but it seems very suspicious to me that the water
didn't move until the glass was no longer able to hold it.
Simply put, it sounds very suspiciously like the AT CP.
Nevertheless, I was more concerned about the semantic issue at
stake, rather than the veracity of the CP. Basically, I was
questioning whether the sustaining of a thing in existence can
really be phrased in terms of the act/potency distinction. I
think the conclusion I've come to is yes, but not in a strict
sense, like temporal change. A thing remains X because the
potential for X to be actual is kept actual by Y. I'm not super
satisfied with this position, though.
#Post#: 28--------------------------------------------------
Re: A Question on the Types of Actualizations
By: Dominik Date: November 6, 2019, 7:07 am
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[quote author=ClassicalLiberal.Theist link=topic=4.msg27#msg27
date=1572996092]
Nevertheless, I was more concerned about the semantic issue at
stake, rather than the veracity of the CP. Basically, I was
questioning whether the sustaining of a thing in existence can
really be phrased in terms of the act/potency distinction. I
think the conclusion I've come to is yes, but not in a strict
sense, like temporal change. A thing remains X because the
potential for X to be actual is kept actual by Y. I'm not super
satisfied with this position, though.
[/quote]
If that is the basic concern, then I think that RomanJoe has
said enough. There is nothing obviously false with explaining
existence in terms of act and potency. Iīd go so far as to say
that combined with an Aristotelian philosophy of nature, this is
the best game in town, since it keeps the beginning of life, as
well as the death intelligible.
However, of course, everything depends on the definition of
existence applied here, if you assume a Fregean notion like
Kenny did when reviewing Aquinas, then of course this doesnīt
make a lick of sense.
Like I said, Iīm not yet well versed enough to give a deeper
explanation, but I want to return to the concerns I raised above
and your describtion of Oppys position.
[quote]Oppy would say, Dominik, that the existence of the cat
would continue to exist insofar as nothing impedes on its
existence.[/quote]
This is either question-begging or avoiding the issue
altogether, pick one. If itīs the former then Oppy already
assumes an account of existence, which is however exactly what
is the issue here.
[quote]To give a simpler example, the chair will remain in X
location until some other object acts upon the chair, changing
its location from X to Y (I think the analogy works because Oppy
doesn't make distinctions between essential and accidental
properties, but he couldn't because he is a nominalist).[/quote]
Letīs stay with the cat, just because it is easier to illustrate
the problems I suspect with Oppys position. I assume that Oppy
uses the deflationary Fregean notion, since in the discussion
with Feser I can recall him working on different existing
simples with different charges. In the A-T framework this would
make those supposed simples composites, but when "existing" here
merely states that the "concept of simple X is instantiated",
the problem could be avoided. (Do nominalists have the resource
to apply concepts? They sound awfully close to universals when
formulated that way). But I think this makes the existence of
said simples unintelligible, which becomes even more apparent
when we climb the ladder of being to higher levels to living
matter and individuals.
I think that this proposition runs exactly into the problem I
raised in the last post, that the existence of the cat becomes
entirely reducible to the spatial existence of the matter.
Because what does it even mean for the cat to exist until
something impedes on said existence? What is the existence here
supposed to be? Though Oppy may be a materialist, the way I see
it it is a reductio ad absurdum. In a nominalist framework the
problem only becomes even more obvious.
[quote]Lets say a glass is holding water. Oppy would say that
the water will remain in the glass until something acts upon on
it which would impede on the waters being in the glass. Well
what if the glass broke? The water would change locations
obviously, and Oppy would be happy with this, but it seems very
suspicious to me that the water didn't move until the glass was
no longer able to hold it. Simply put, it sounds very
suspiciously like the AT CP.[/quote]
I think I understand your point, though it isnīt so apparent to
me when we are only talking about water or chairs. Hence my
constant illustrations with the cat. Maybe you can be a bit more
clear in your last paragraph here.
Sorry for the rambling, it reads strange when I read it over
again, but Iīm struggling a bit with the language barrier.
#Post#: 47--------------------------------------------------
Re: A Question on the Types of Actualizations
By: Atno Date: November 25, 2019, 12:55 am
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I am super tired and lazy right now, but I'll just give you some
2 cents:
You do not need to perfectly understand how act/potency (or any
other metaphysical category, for that matter) would apply to any
specific situation in order to see its truth and most general
applications. Act and potency is a way of structuring the
phenomena of change, dependency, and contingent existence. We
know there are contingent things; dependent things that do not
have to exist in themselves, and are therefore dependent on
other things in order to be real. This can be described through
act and potency in a way that is simple to grasp by our minds,
even if it happens to not be a perfect description of every
situation (Aquinas himself maintained that creation is not a
change, but heck, do you really not see what the Aristotelian
proof is trying to establish with act and potency? Things around
us do not have to exist; they are dependent on other things;
they do not exist by their own nature, they are not actual in
themselves, they are conditioned by other things - but there
must be an unconditioned first being that is entirely
self-sufficient. Act and potency is just a way of cashing out
this basic insight, which can also be captured or described with
other concepts - such as neoplatonic ideas of unity and
composition; Aquinas's real distinction of essence and
existence; logical categories of contingency, dependency and
necessity, etc).
It is pretty neat to work out the metaphysical details of what
exactly is going on in the world, but you do not have to have
the picture completely figured out before you can see what it is
and it's more general features. There are things whose reality
is a matter of being actualized by other external actual things,
but the totality of things cannot be like that, so there must be
one which is purely actual in a self-sufficient way, etc.
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