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       #Post#: 148--------------------------------------------------
       Necessary indeterminate matter?
       By: Dominik Date: May 19, 2020, 5:37 am
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       That matter itself is contingent is pretty much a given,
       absurdities lurk when denied.
       My question is though if the atheist can avoid Spinozism through
       claiming that fundamental matter has necessarily indetermined
       causes? In other words would indeterminancy provide contingency?
       And more importantly, and this is the objection I would give,
       could we even expect indeterminate causes? It seems like if we
       asserted the necessity of the matter and its properties,
       positing indeterminancy would come close to a contradiction.
       #Post#: 151--------------------------------------------------
       Re: Necessary indeterminate matter?
       By: jd3 Date: May 21, 2020, 9:57 pm
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       Could you clarify a few things for me. First, what do you mean
       by Spinozism? Second, the claim that "fundamental matter has
       necessarily indetermined causes" are you saying that a necessary
       cause creates matter in an indeterminate way, or that the cause
       is itself indeterminate?
       #Post#: 152--------------------------------------------------
       Re: Necessary indeterminate matter?
       By: Atno Date: May 22, 2020, 11:23 pm
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       There are multiple problems with a material necessary
       foundation; one of which is necessitarianism (why should this
       particular arbitrary universe have to exist?). An
       indeterministic material cause would avoid this problem, sure.
       But there are other problems with a material necessary cause.
       And this position in itself is a cost, as it significantly
       raises complexity (and a truly random, indeterministic
       impersonal first cause seems very strange), if it's even
       possible (non-free indeterministic action is controversial,
       especially a global action which could create universes)
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