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#Post#: 136--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: Dominik Date: April 28, 2020, 7:16 am
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Jeremy made another good point. The falsehood of materialism is
more certain than Gods existence. We should grant that, since
nothing, not even God is as close to us like introspective data,
which entails the falsehood of materialism, that we are
libertarianly free, have bodily autonomy (falsehood of
determinism and epiphenomenalism), have intentionality (pace
physicalists like Michael Tye) and that we are really
distinguished from our body.
To define naturalism lets adopt their definition:
1. Conservative Naturalism: ontological physicalists like
Dennett, Rosenberg, Papineau and Maitzen
2. Moderate Naturalism: allows abstract objects like platonic
forms of math or morality (Quine, Wielenberg)
3. Liberal Naturalism: everything up to non-theism, which allows
for dualism (Chalmers, Huemer, Burge, Strawson) of some sort,
dispositions, certain forms of Aristotelianism (Mumford, Foot,
Nagel)
There are views though in the third category that collapse into
theism through Morelands argument from consciousness. Nagels
views perhaps collapse into the fifth way. Pruss has made an
argument that Powers ontology+S5 entails a necessary being.
A note to the second category: Wielenberg assumes objective
morality as a brute fact independent of grounding. The question
is also how wether the second category collapses into the first
(Quine was an eliminativist and I believe reductionism a la Kim
collapses into it).
A key point is wether intentionality can be reduced to powers or
dispositions of material objects. Nagel recognizes that, as did
Armstrong. If the mental property of aboutness is really there
and cannot be reduced, then we arrive at a foundational mind.
Defining Naturalism is notoriously difficult and the concrete
definitions I came across are self-refuting or indetermined,
e.g. if one says that one believes in what future physics
discovers. Van Fraassen polemically responded “So you don't know
what you believe in?“. I'm also unsure if the idea of brute,
independent, ungrounded (platonic) morality is even a coherent
one.
Anything to add?
#Post#: 137--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: Atno Date: April 28, 2020, 4:11 pm
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I don't see the point in responding to every single argument
there, especially since a lot of them are very weak and many are
variations of the same ideas. But here's my assessment:
1- I think the problem of evil is by far the strongest argument
the atheist has to offer. And most arguments in the list are
really just variations of it. I differ from most people here in
thinking that Brian Davies's and Hart's responses (as I
understand them; I haven't read their books, but people have
presented their ideas to me, I have read excerpts, did some
research, etc., and don't think my opinion would change) are
almost entirely useless. I think the defenses and theodicies we
find among contemporary analytic philosophers, including
"theistic personalists", are 1000x better and even necessary.
God is not wholly unlike a virtuous person; if there is to be at
least an analogy between God's goodness and ours, we need to
assume God has intelligible morally sufficient reasons for
allowing so much evil and suffering. And with that in mind:
A) It is always important to approach theism on the basis of the
totality of evidence. In other words, we can grant that the
problem of evil is really bad and in fact lowers the probability
of theism. But that's not the whole story, for we also have
positive arguments for theism. And I think the positive case for
God's existence is a lot stronger, so as to be compelling and
even withstand the attack of PoE and still swamp it out. Evil
lowers the probability of theism, but still, the existence of
contingent things, order, consciousness, goodness, etc. gives us
a much stronger overall case for theism;
B) We can, in any case, weaken the problem of evil. In my
opinion, the best response is Alexander Pruss's "blink of an
eye" response (google it) combined with a host of theodicies.
For all we know, an infinite afterlife can more than make up
for, sublimate, etc., any evils we suffer in our finite
existence here. And to this we add the Free Will defense; the
soul building theodicy; and more;
C) If horrendous evils are still a problem, an explicitly
Christian response (like that of Adams in her book on horrendous
evils) may be required. The fact that God entered the picture
through Jesus Christ, and suffered so much, can be a game
changer. Those who suffer horribly in this life can be united in
a special way to the suffering Christ God, converting pain into
a love and dignity that lasts forever;
D) Animal suffering can still be a specific problem requiring
specific responses. We might adopt a few ad hoc ideas (Pruss
thinks it plausible that God removes the qualia of pain from
animals in some situations), or we can adopt a radical response,
such as Trent Dougherty's in his book on animal pain. Dougherty
argues that God might transform every animal into a rational,
Narnia-esque being in the afterlife and that their sufferings
here may therefore be given a value similar to that in
soul-building theodicies.
Of course, in any case, there is skeptical theism and we can
choose to take a hit and keep moving; while the problem of evil
can be a good atheistic argument, we nevertheless have stronger
reasons to believe in God. And personally, I find theodicies
very plausible - blink of an eye, soul building, free will, the
religiously-inspired ones; I even find some plausibility in the
radical animal theodicies. I don't think the amount of suffering
we see is clearly incompatible with theism, I think it can make
a lot of sense that God would choose to create a world like
this.
2- Argument from hiddenness I take to be a weaker version of the
problem of evil. There can be value in discovery; in being sorta
in the dark and even having doubts; in having to dedicate
oneself to studying a metaphysical issue such as God's
existence; etc;
3- Arguments from materialism I find particularly weak. I'm very
convinced that dualism is true and I think it is very strong
evidence for theism; there are perfections of immaterial
consciousness, intelligence, reason, will, etc., and there must
be a source for them. Personhood must come from a foundational
Person. And even if materialism were true animal, multiple
realizability could allow for intelligence to be material in
humans but immaterial in God;
4- Problem of material causation I find quite weak. A theist
could be open to biting the bullet with a few caveats, as
Rasmussen does in his dialogue with Leon. In any case, I think
the idea that matter is a perfection to be very implausible;
matter is just a limitation, an act of existence intrinsically
limited to spatial location, extension, temporal change, etc.,
so an immaterial (more perfect) being can create a material
(less perfect) being. Moreover the Kalam might refute such an
argument;
5- Incoherence arguments I don't take too seriously. I am not
convinced of any particular arguments for omni-God being
incoherent, I think there are good responses in the literature
for all of that. But if a theist is convinced that even a
suitably defined omnipotence/omniscience/etc is incoherent, they
can bite the bullet and instead adopt Yujin Nagasawa's Maximal
God thesis. God just is the Maximal, metaphysically consistent
and possible set of Power, Knowledge and Goodness. If a being
can't be omniscient, still there can be a maximally
knowledgeable being, and ao on.
The rest of the arguments I just find very weak. I don't think
any of that even comes close to the cogency and power of
theistic arguments; that we need God to explain Being,
Consciousness, Order, Value, etc.
#Post#: 138--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: Dominik Date: April 28, 2020, 4:20 pm
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Goodness and Evil are notoriously difficult to define. I have a
PDF of Oderbergs new book if someone is interested.
#Post#: 139--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: RomanJoe Date: April 28, 2020, 9:17 pm
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From a metaphysical standpoint the problem of evil does nothing
to theism. The intelligibility of being isn't rendered
meaningless because the primary cause is not perfectly good.
That said, I think those of particular religious stripes are
threatened by the problem of evil. At most it could show that
the divine revelation of, say, Christianity is false--that God
is not all good.
#Post#: 140--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: Atno Date: April 29, 2020, 1:01 am
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I don't think so. I think theism as a whole would be
compromised, since I agree with Samuel Clarke in thinking that
if the Necessary Being is personal/intelligent, then it must be
good. How could it even make any sense for a being to be
intelligent but indifferent towards the good? That would
constitute a limitation, a form of irrationality. If a being is
intelligent, rational, then it must care about goodness and
fittingness, and must in fact desire the good.
If the Necessary Being is personal, but doesn't care about or
desire things to be good and fitting, then the Necessary Being
is stupid, which is absurd. How and why would it be stupid or
have such a limitation/lack of perfection? It would be
deficient, less than purely actual, limited, etc.
And if the Necessary Being is not personal, then all perfections
associated with personhood (such as intelligence, will,
consciousness, etc) would have magically come into being from
nothing. We don't secure the intelligibility of being after all.
The source of existence must also be the source of perfections,
otherwise we would have a case of a reality (such as
intelligence) coming into being from nothing. Plus all the other
arguments we have for attributing intelligence, will, etc. to
the First Cause.
Thus the Necessary Being must be intelligent (in fact, it must
be omniscient). But if it is to be omniscient, it must know
moral truths, natural laws, etc; it must in fact desire the good
and reject evil, and given that there is no ignorance, weakness
or any other imperfection in the First Cause, it must be morally
perfect.
So the problem of evil is indeed an argument against theism in
general. And a powerful argument, in fact, as I think Davies's
and Hart's "classical theist" response is almost entirely
useless. Some theodicy must be true. Still, even without knowing
any theodicy, one can (and should, I think) still find the
positive case for God's existence to be more compelling than the
problem of evil.
#Post#: 141--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: Dominik Date: April 29, 2020, 11:46 am
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Rasmussen was really impressive in the dialogue. Not only have I
never heard of the geometrical argument for a necessary beimg
before, but he also forced Leon to embrace a position where
Mackie rolls around in his grave. And iIrc he argues for the
foundational mind without once violating the Principal of
Material Causality he conceded for the sake of argument (creatio
ex nihilo just became ex deo).
Atno, do you agree that evil is a privation of goodness? Or, to
formulate it like Rasmussen, that goodness is always more
foundational and evil “builts“ upon it? If you agree as much I
think we can find a middle ground. I must also recognize that
Davies' non-theodicist position has often not been communicated
that well. While I have neither time nor space to do him
justice, consider what Maimonides wrote in his “Guide for the
Perplexed“. After establishing Gods aseity, self-sufficiency and
immutability, Maimonides directly draws from the fact of
creation to the Goodness of God, despite obviously recognizing
all the evil, because God couldn't benefit from it. Doing
something for its own sake is what we could call benevolence.
Maimonides is an adherent of full apophatic theology, so I think
he'd agree with me that Gods goodness isn't human goodness. I
don't support your view that God needs good moral reasons, if
that is to mean in terms of moral standards that we also adhere
to. The PoE is no problem for supernaturalism and, pace you, no
problem for certain kinds of theism. Maimonides himself argues
that creation is mirroring Gods perfection and that humanity is
a neglectible factor.
What I mean to suggest is that this view is a good retreat.
Davies isn't concerned with those evidential arguments from Rowe
or others, Feser neither, due to their rejection of such a view
on Gods goodness.
I still think though that theodicies can provide valuable
insights. I also think that they help explaining certain kinds
of evil. So I'd encourage everyone to proceed, since it is
always preferable to have a justification that we can
understand. What I like about the classical answer though is
that it enables us to even turn the table.
Hiddenness is in a similar field.
I have to read Drapers paper on the a priori much more
likelihood of source physicalism than theism , but I fear that
this is more a topic for the philosophy of mind.
Anyone got something to add on mind-brain dependence or
evolution? Not that I think the latter works in any way without
teleology, but I'd still be interested in insights for reasons
as to why God might have used it.
#Post#: 142--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: RomanJoe Date: April 29, 2020, 2:04 pm
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[quote author=Atno link=topic=35.msg140#msg140 date=1588140080]
I don't think so. I think theism as a whole would be
compromised, since I agree with Samuel Clarke in thinking that
if the Necessary Being is personal/intelligent, then it must be
good. How could it even make any sense for a being to be
intelligent but indifferent towards the good? That would
constitute a limitation, a form of irrationality. If a being is
intelligent, rational, then it must care about goodness and
fittingness, and must in fact desire the good.
If the Necessary Being is personal, but doesn't care about or
desire things to be good and fitting, then the Necessary Being
is stupid, which is absurd. How and why would it be stupid or
have such a limitation/lack of perfection? It would be
deficient, less than purely actual, limited, etc.
And if the Necessary Being is not personal, then all perfections
associated with personhood (such as intelligence, will,
consciousness, etc) would have magically come into being from
nothing. We don't secure the intelligibility of being after all.
The source of existence must also be the source of perfections,
otherwise we would have a case of a reality (such as
intelligence) coming into being from nothing. Plus all the other
arguments we have for attributing intelligence, will, etc. to
the First Cause.
Thus the Necessary Being must be intelligent (in fact, it must
be omniscient). But if it is to be omniscient, it must know
moral truths, natural laws, etc; it must in fact desire the good
and reject evil, and given that there is no ignorance, weakness
or any other imperfection in the First Cause, it must be morally
perfect.
So the problem of evil is indeed an argument against theism in
general. And a powerful argument, in fact, as I think Davies's
and Hart's "classical theist" response is almost entirely
useless. Some theodicy must be true. Still, even without knowing
any theodicy, one can (and should, I think) still find the
positive case for God's existence to be more compelling than the
problem of evil.
[/quote]
Thanks for addressing that Atno. I hadn't contemplated much on
this, but considering now the adage that being is convertible
with goodness or that actuality is perfection, I think you're
right that the problem of evil can pose a metaphysical challenge
to theism in general.
#Post#: 143--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: Atno Date: April 29, 2020, 8:45 pm
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Yes, Rasmussen is one of my favorite philosophers at the moment.
He's relatively easy to reach and talk to, as well.
Dominik, I still can't make sense of that "theism" you're
suggesting wouldn't have problems with the PoE. It seems to me
that, in the attempt to dissociate God from criteria human moral
goodness, we end up dissociating him from all goodness, or at
the very least from any notion of "moral goodness" which makes
sense to us. If the later, that is also problematic because I
would argue that (here in agreement with Hart) to be beyond good
and evil (even our understanding of it) just is to be evil. A
God who, for instance, doesn't need any morally sufficient
reasons to permit a child to suffer horribly is evil or
deficient.
I do think that evil is a privation of goodness, but that does
nothing to weaken my position. Moral evil is a violation of
moral laws, and we know (or I believe we know) facts/evils which
ought to be repugnant and antagonic to any ideal rational
observer. Since God is an ideal rational observer, he must
oppose evils, and that leads to the problem of evil.
If a being is intelligent and rational - in any way - then he
ought to know facts like "an innocent person should not
gratuitously suffer horribly", "people are not to be tortured
for fun", and so on. These are facts based on the intrinsic
natures of the beings involved, in the natural law which
ultimately is founded on the eternal law. God cannot possibly
will for people to be tortured for fun; he cannot be indifferent
to it, either. He cannot be indifferent, and, having the means
to stop, must do so. Unless that God were quite literally stupid
or irrational, incapable of grasping simple truths and acting
accordingly, which is absurd.
Do you think God could possibly create a world that consisted of
nothing but children being horribly tortured forever? And if so,
do you think such a God could still be considered "good" in
gratuitously providing Being to such a world? That seems clearly
absurd to me. If the horrendous world is impossible, we are
already placing God in a moral context that is analogous to our
understanding of morality. I think that's inevitable.
To me, every rational agent (possessing Intellect and Will) is a
moral agent by its own nature. And we know enough about morality
to know that any rational agent should recognize that "torturing
people for fun is wrong" and is to be avoided and shunned. God
is a rational agent. So God is a moral agent and should also
recognize moral truths and act accordingly. In fact, as the
ground of all being, rationality, and natural law, God cannot
fail to recognize and act accordingly to moral truth. To suggest
God could possibly allow an innocent child to be tortured for no
reason whatsoever is as insane as saying that God could desire
to create square circles or feel frustration over not being able
to create married bachelors, etc.
So it is quite simple to me. Consider any example of a
horrendous evil. If God can tolerate such an occurrence without
any morally sufficient reason (MSR as traditionally understood
in standard theodicies), then either 1) God is irrational or
non-rational, or 2) that horrendous evil really is not some kind
of universal evil after all (i.e. our moral knowledge is
completely wrong). I think 2 is unacceptable. You can accept 1,
however, and maintain that the Necessary Cause is not rational,
but I wouldn't call that theism anymore.
I see no way around this. To adopt Davies's line, either we have
to become radically revisionistic about our moral knowledge and
hold that a horrendous evil is NOT something universally
repugnant that any *ideally rational being* would/should seek to
oppose; OR we have to turn God into some effectively irrational
being which is indifferent towards that which any ideal
rationality would oppose.
#Post#: 144--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: guest2 Date: April 30, 2020, 1:01 am
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I'm not sure what is meant he by the approach of Davies and
Hart. The former I associate with the idea God is not a moral
agent. Whilst I see some validity to this, I agree it has
issues, not least because the Platonist in me would say that
creation must in some sense reflect God anyway, even if he is
indifferent to it as a personal being. But I think the privation
understanding of evil, if that is what is meant as well, is
fundamental to all understandings of evil and imperfection, and
must underlie all the other theodicies. That creation is by its
nature open to imperfection, because not even God can create
another God, is to me the foundation of all the more particular
theodicies, which are needed mostly to deal with certain
specific issues.
As a consequence of this, I think we need to be a little less
coy about a further option for explaining some of the instances
of evil in the world: God cannot stop them. I don't think this
is as problematic as the problem of evil suggests, because even
God can't do what is impossible, and evil as privation suggests
at least the possibility of certain evils existing if creation
does. The rest is more a matter of details, and if we can't say
for certain why such and such an evil occurs, I think that only
is very minor evidence against theism at best, and agree with
Atno that the evidence for theism must be taken as a whole.
I think it also worth emphasising the traditional hierarchy of
being. In that hierarchy, for most of creation, imperfection
doesn't equal suffering or evil. Only in the corporeal and
infernal realms does it do so. This is quite a different vision
to the modern view that informs sceptics, which only takes in
the corporeal realm, and that from only certain aspects. The
reason I think this is important is that the problem of evil
seems to often come down to intuitions about the amount and kind
of suffering in the corporeal world, and whether a truly good,
all-powerful God would allow it. Seeing that suffering in its
proper place and proportion is therefore of great importance.
#Post#: 145--------------------------------------------------
Re: A list of arguments for atheism
By: Dominik Date: May 1, 2020, 6:55 pm
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Time is rare today, I will continue in due time. Meanwhile I
will link to Davies book so that it is more clear what he is
talking about:
HTML https://noachideblog.files.wordpress.com/2020/01/141094444-54650507-the-reality-of-god-and-the-problem-of-evil.pdf
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