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       #Post#: 51--------------------------------------------------
       Backmann's No Time for Powers
       By: AnonymousThomist Date: December 3, 2019, 9:12 pm
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       I know this was on the old forum, but does anyone have remember
       some of the responses given to Backmann's argument against the
       compatibility of powers theory and eternalism?  I think Koons
       e-mailed some answers to someone but I can't remember anything
       from that discussion.
       #Post#: 117--------------------------------------------------
       Re: Backmann's No Time for Powers
       By: Dominik Date: April 8, 2020, 3:38 am
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       The apparent inconsistency is due to a strange understanding of
       both the block universe in question, as well as of the powers
       account. Backmann follows Friebe in arguing that powers require
       both bringing about/into existence, as well as existential
       dependence, and wants to argue that these are inconsistent with
       eternalism. But on further inspection we can see that this
       apparent inconsistency is resting upon assumptions about
       eternalism and the “bringing about“ that neither are entailed by
       their respective analyses nor by the assumptions of
       Aristotelians.
       We first need to make clear that eternalism/block universe does
       not equal to a Parmedian block. It is only the latter that is
       inconsistent with both physics and every day experience. A
       normal four-dimensionalism championed by e.g. Pruss, Dougherty,
       Cundy and Rea acknowledges passage of time in the subjective
       mind of the observer within the universe, while following
       physics that for the observer outside the universe, all times
       are equally real. The Parmedian block is Spinozist in nature, a
       weakness the Four-dimenoinalist doesn't have. This is crucial,
       because it shows why the inconsistency just isn't there.
       The powers account require substance causation, so bringing
       about a change is due to the intrinsic powers of particular
       substances. Lets say that we have at time 1 the fact 1 that I'm
       lying in bed (T1F1). At time 2 we get fact 2 (T2F2), that I got
       up. Prima facie this is okay with an Aristotelian, we can admit
       that both times are equally real and their separate
       highlightedness is due to the subjective observer. Backmann
       wants to argue though that this lacks the “bringing about“ and
       the existential dependence the powers modality requires. This is
       wrong though. Because even if T1F1 and T2F2 are equally real and
       at most ordered in a before-after relation, this doesn't mean
       that they lack the connectedness for bringing about and
       dependence. The fact that I got up at T2 is due to the fact that
       I had the potency already at T1 but actualized it at T2. The
       event is still contingent, and this is all we need. Just because
       it is eternally true that I chose to actualize said potential at
       T2 doesn't entail that it is necessary, nor does it entail that
       it was not libertarianly free. T2F2 could have been different,
       it would just have been eternally true that I rather have turned
       around than getting up, thus altering T2F2 to T2F2*. This would
       entail the nonexistence of the former, while the original
       entailed the nonexistence of the latter. Thus as can be seen we
       have both saved existential dependence, while pointing out the
       contingency of eternally true events saves “bringing about“. It
       had to be pointed out that eternalism doesn't mean parmedian and
       that equally real events don't just by the fact of being equally
       real loose the interconnectedness between the other timeslices.
       The analysis of time won't help in determining the right account
       of causation, as these have nothing to say about the crucial
       connectedness between those slices/events, which are exclusively
       interesting for causation.
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