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#Post#: 33--------------------------------------------------
God and the Necessity of Creation
By: ClassicalLiberal.Theist Date: November 15, 2019, 2:20 pm
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How could the universe be truly contingent if God could have
never decided to create some other universe, because that would
involve changing his mind, which is impossible. My thought is
that we might be nearing the conclusion of a modal collapse, but
I think at best this alone leaves us with a universe which has
some sort of "weak necessity". As in, its conception may have
been necessary but the events that play out could be contingent,
unless you're a determinist, which I'm not.
#Post#: 35--------------------------------------------------
Re: God and the Necessity of Creation
By: Ouros Date: November 15, 2019, 3:25 pm
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But if God had decided from all eternity that there was another
world, that wouldn't involve any changing of his mind contrary
to what you said: it would be altogether another situation.
Ofc, I'm not gonna pretend that this solve entirely the problem:
for it seems to imply there's still some contingency in the will
of God, which is, given divine simplicity, God Himself. This
paper from Alexander Pruss would be on point:
HTML http://alexanderpruss.com/papers/On3ProblemsOfDivineSimplicity.html
#Post#: 37--------------------------------------------------
Re: God and the Necessity of Creation
By: Dominik Date: November 18, 2019, 2:31 am
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I think what could help is a softer version of divine
simplicity. I am certain that DS is true, but the question is,
how strong need it be? If I remember correctly Vallicella has
also toyed with the idea of attributing accidental mental states
to God.
#Post#: 39--------------------------------------------------
Re: God and the Necessity of Creation
By: ClassicalLiberal.Theist Date: November 18, 2019, 8:59 am
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[quote author=Dominik link=topic=11.msg37#msg37 date=1574065861]
I think what could help is a softer version of divine
simplicity. I am certain that DS is true, but the question is,
how strong need it be? If I remember correctly Vallicella has
also toyed with the idea of attributing accidental mental states
to God.
[/quote]
I think the issue I'm trying to get at is more of a timelessness
problem. Although divine simplicity brings about its own set of
problems with respect to things like mental states, it seems to
me to be the case the issue wouldstill be present with a being
which was composite as well.
I think any weaker version of DS is going to involve the
affirmation of real composition of essense/existence in God, and
to me, this is undesirable.
#Post#: 40--------------------------------------------------
Re: God and the Necessity of Creation
By: Dominik Date: November 18, 2019, 3:09 pm
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[quote author=ClassicalLiberal.Theist link=topic=11.msg39#msg39
date=1574089195]
[quote author=Dominik link=topic=11.msg37#msg37 date=1574065861]
I think what could help is a softer version of divine
simplicity. I am certain that DS is true, but the question is,
how strong need it be? If I remember correctly Vallicella has
also toyed with the idea of attributing accidental mental states
to God.
[/quote]
I think the issue I'm trying to get at is more of a timelessness
problem. Although divine simplicity brings about its own set of
problems with respect to things like mental states, it seems to
me to be the case the issue wouldstill be present with a being
which was composite as well.
I think any weaker version of DS is going to involve the
affirmation of real composition of essense/existence in God, and
to me, this is undesirable.
[/quote]
For me too. Iīm reading more about Scotus and the idea of a
formal distinction. Although I will probably never affirm
anything like univocal language, I think the formal distinction
isnīt falling prey to the charge of bringing in composition.
This at least seems to me so superficially.
Ouros linked paper by Pruss was a real help. Although I donīt
think that we can ever solve all the problems of DS by our
reason alone, without witnessing Gods essence, the issue doesnīt
seem so pressing to me anymore.
#Post#: 41--------------------------------------------------
Re: God and the Necessity of Creation
By: ClassicalLiberal.Theist Date: November 21, 2019, 11:19 am
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I don't see how a formal distinction could really avoid bringing
in composition while remaining coherent. The idea of formal
distinctions, as I understand them seems to be contradictory.
How could the attributes of God be univocal and at the same time
not distinct from one another; that omnipotence and timelessness
are different but actually the same? I think if pressed, the
scotist would devolve into affirming a conceptual distinction.
Although, from what I understand, something is simple iff it is
not seperable (to Scotus). Scotus would be correct according to
this definition of simplicty but would fail, atleast on a
thomistic analysis, to be the most ontologically absolute thing.
To Thomas (and to me), Scotus' "formal distinction" is really
just a real distinction under a different light.
#Post#: 44--------------------------------------------------
Re: God and the Necessity of Creation
By: Dominik Date: November 22, 2019, 5:46 am
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This Iīm not sure about, certainly the guys from The SMithy
would qualm with your formulation, however like I said Iīm still
a beginner at Scotus, so I donīt go any further. If a problem
with the thomistic DS is perceived however, I still believe that
a weaker DS is the key and that the supposed composition would
be only appearing if the thomistic metaphysics were presupposed.
But I also donīt think that there is the problem of necessity if
God as unchanging being canīt change his mind. I canīt give an
exhaustive account here though.
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