Subj : Re: REPOST Post-Quantum Secure Encryption
To   : warmfuzzy
From : warmfuzzy
Date : Wed Aug 05 2026 01:06:39

On 03 Aug 2026, warmfuzzy said the following...
 
 wa> The algorithms currently recognized as secure against post-quantum
 wa> decryption  are those that rely on mathematical problems which are
 wa> believed to be hard for  both classical and quantum computers to solve.
 wa> Unlike traditional public-key  systems such as RSA and elliptic-curve
 wa> cryptography, which can be broken  efficiently by a large-scale quantum
 wa> computer using Shor's algorithm, the new  post-quantum standards are
 wa> based on different mathematical foundations. The  United States National
 wa> Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized  its first set of
 wa> post-quantum cryptography standards on August 13, 2024,  establishing
 wa> three primary algorithms for widespread use.
 wa> 
 wa> The first standard is ML-KEM, formerly known as CRYSTALS-Kyber. This is
 wa> a  module-lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism designed for general 
 wa> encryption and key exchange. It allows two parties to establish a shared 
 wa> secret key over an insecure channel, replacing algorithms like
 wa> Diffie-Hellman  or RSA key transport. ML-KEM is considered secure
 wa> because it relies on the  hardness of solving certain lattice problems,
 wa> specifically the Module Learning  With Errors problem, which has not
 wa> been shown to be vulnerable to quantum  attacks.
 wa> 
 wa> For digital signatures, NIST standardized two distinct algorithms to
 wa> provide  flexibility for different use cases. The primary signature
 wa> standard is ML-DSA,  formerly known as CRYSTALS-Dilithium. Like ML-KEM,
 wa> this is a  module-lattice-based scheme. It is designed to be efficient
 wa> and suitable for  most general-purpose digital signing needs, such as
 wa> authenticating software  updates or securing TLS connections. Its
 wa> security is also based on lattice  problems that are resistant to
 wa> quantum computation.
 wa> 
 wa> The second signature standard is SLH-DSA, formerly known as SPHINCS+.
 wa> This is  a stateless hash-based signature scheme. Unlike the
 wa> lattice-based options, its  security relies entirely on the properties
 wa> of cryptographic hash functions,  which are believed to be much more
 wa> resilient to quantum attacks than  number-theoretic problems. While
 wa> hash-based signatures generally produce  larger signature sizes and can
 wa> be slower than lattice-based ones, they offer a  very conservative
 wa> security assumption that does not depend on the complex  mathematics of
 wa> lattices. This makes SLH-DSA an important backup option in case 
 wa> weaknesses are discovered in lattice-based cryptography in the future.
 wa> 
 wa> In addition to these three primary standards, NIST has selected FALCON
 wa> as an  alternative lattice-based signature algorithm for situations
 wa> where smaller  signature sizes are critical, although it is not yet part
 wa> of the initial  mandatory federal standards. It is worth noting that
 wa> symmetric-key algorithms  like AES and hash functions like SHA-2 and
 wa> SHA-3 are not completely immune to  quantum speedups but remain secure
 wa> if their key lengths or output sizes are  doubled to counter Grover's
 wa> algorithm, a quantum search algorithm. Therefore,  while asymmetric
 wa> encryption and signatures require a complete switch to these  new
 wa> post-quantum algorithms, symmetric cryptography primarily requires 
 wa> adjusting key sizes to maintain security levels against quantum
 wa> adversaries.  Organizations are currently advised to begin migrating
 wa> their systems to these  NIST-standardized algorithms to protect data
 wa> against future threats posed by  quantum computing.
 wa> 
 wa> Cheers!
 wa> -warmfuzzy/SilentPartner
 wa> 
 wa> --- Mystic BBS v1.12 A49 2023/04/30 (Linux/64)
 wa>  * Origin: thE qUAntUm wOrmhOlE, rAmsgAtE, uK. bbs.erb.pw (700:100/37)

--- Mystic BBS v1.12 A49 2023/04/30 (Linux/64)
 * Origin: thE qUAntUm wOrmhOlE, rAmsgAtE, uK. bbs.erb.pw (700:100/37)

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