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COMMENT PAGE FOR:
HTML Encrypted Spaces: An architecture for collaborative applications
rozzie wrote 20 hours 4 min ago:
In its day (1997-2005) Groove was quite a sophisticated architecture
and implementation of encrypted collaborative workspaces, using a
decentralized P2P architecture augmented by optional store-and-forward
relays that enabled fully offline use.
For endpoint authentication it supported direct peer key signing, or
org-signed certs, or any combination.
Arbitrary collab apps could be built on a blockchain-like
signed/encrypted transaction log with decentralized global ordering and
automatic rollback, transaction insertion, and play forward. The most
used apps were file folders, discussions, chat (with PTT), calendars,
sketchpad, collaborative browsing, and more.
Interestingly, for several years, it was a "killer app" for those who
needed confidentiality: USAID and numerous NGO's, US DoD, joint and
coalition forces operating in Iraq, all the three letter agencies
trying to collaborate across silos immediately post-9/11.
Quite a testament that decentralized architectures truly work when
security is paramount. And also, concrete proof that even after immense
investment, there is little appetite for decentralized solutions in
enterprise and consumer domains.
DonsDiscountGas wrote 15 hours 53 min ago:
Engineering always involves trade-offs. The right architecture for
the military in Iraq might not be the right architecture for sharing
cookie recipes with your family
krunck wrote 1 day ago:
So it seems this is a system where the server only does encrypted
storage and minimal processing on plaintext that it is allowed to
decrypt. I was hoping it was a FHE implementation where the server
does computation on the encrypted data. Still waiting for that.
filup wrote 23 hours 41 min ago:
I don't understand the hype around FHE. FHE sounds like a fancy way
to say my data is only partially encrypted and we can still gain all
the insights we want without technically unencrypting it.
I don't want my encrypted payloads to betray me in any of the ways
FHE wants it too.
baby wrote 19 hours 53 min ago:
Am I paranoid or does this comment feels like what an LLM would
write to imitate an HN comment?
Stefan-H wrote 20 hours 43 min ago:
Consider 2 researchers, Alice and Bob. Lets say that Alice has
developed a cool way to analyze gene data, and she uses it on her
gene data and gets cool information, so naturally Bob would like to
do the same analysis. How does Bob securely get his data analyzed
with Alice's intellectual property (which she wants to keep secret
as well), enter homomorphic encryption! Bob can encrypt his data
in such a way that Alice can run her analysis on it, without Alice
ever knowing the content of Bob's data. Alice can get neither Bob's
data nor the analysis of it.
perching_aix wrote 21 hours 0 min ago:
> FHE sounds like a fancy way to say my data is only partially
encrypted and we can still gain all the insights we want without
technically unencrypting it.
Does it just sound like it or is it? Cause it sure as hell didn't
"sound like that" to me last I checked, so that's 1:1 so far.
ebb_earl_co wrote 1 day ago:
âUsers verify cryptographic proofs to ensure that servers behave
properly.â
If this is one of the defining tenets of this data system, is it not
DOA? See also: the PGP key-signing parties that never wereâ¦
Cassell wrote 1 day ago:
Itâs just waiting for the killer app, the Pokemon Go of
cryptographic signing.
brianwmunz wrote 1 day ago:
"what the server can see to support rich queries" is the whole
ballgame, right? Anything queryable is metadata that can leak or be
subpoenaed... membership, access patterns, query frequency. For the
activist/journalist threat idea, that's usually the sensitive part.
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